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Mallory
Malware

Linux/CDorked.A

Tracked since May 24, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The HTTP server is equipped with a reverse connect backdoor that can be triggered via a special HTTP GET request. It is invoked when a request to a special path is performed with a query string in a particular format, containing the hostname and port to connect.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

181944 cmdline:bash-cecho GOOD exec: tid = 181944 pid = 181944 /bin/bash ... 181981 cmdline:/bin/sh/sbin/servicehttpdstop exec: tid = 181981 pid = 181981 /bin/bash

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

All the information related to the backdoor is stored in shared memory

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

sent us a modified version of an Apache webserver redirecting some of its requests... The backdoor leaves no traces of compromised hosts on the hard drive other than its modified httpd binary

Persistence

2 techniques
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The HTTP server is equipped with a reverse connect backdoor that can be triggered via a special HTTP GET request. It is invoked when a request to a special path is done with a query string in a particular format

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence2

There are two ways the attacker can control the behavior of the backdoored server: through a reverse connect shell or through special commands, all of them are triggered via HTTP requests.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

My instinct was right and I found out a new variant of Linux/CDorked.A... It could be either a kernel rootkit (Crowdstrike’s analysis of such rootkit here), an Apache module, or something else... Voilá, __syslog_chk was hooked and redirect into libkeysutils.so.1.3 library. This is an upgraded sshd rootkit version.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

In the Linux/Cdorked binary all the important or suspicious strings are encrypted... decrypting the strings on demand with a static XOR key.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Three foreign binaries are installed in the filesystem, all three ending in space to hide in plain sight: '/usr/bin/s2p ', the trojaned httpd. '/usr/sbin/arpd ', the original httpd. '/usr/sbin/tunelp ', touch2 to restore time of original apache.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

The HTTP request does not appear in Apache's log file due to the way the malicious code is hooked into Apache.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The original binary has been deleted! Definitely a good clue to understand why the httpd binary checksums are always ok... starts it again, and replaces again the trojaned binary with the original copy.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

'/usr/sbin/tunelp ', touch2 to restore time of original apache... 182019 cmdline:touch-r/usr/sbin/arpd /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The HTTP server is equipped with a reverse connect backdoor that can be triggered via a special HTTP GET request. It is invoked when a request to a special path is done with a query string in a particular format

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The backdoor leaves no traces of compromised hosts on the hard drive other than its modified httpd binary... All of the information related to the backdoor is stored in shared memory.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

sent us a modified version of an Apache webserver redirecting some of its requests... The backdoor leaves no traces of compromised hosts on the hard drive other than its modified httpd binary

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

our analysis of this malware, dubbed Linux/Cdorked.A, reveals that it is a sophisticated and stealthy backdoor meant to drive traffic to malicious websites.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

if you try to just replace the bad binary with a good one, you will be denied, because they set the file attribute to immutable. So you have to run chattr -ai before replacing it

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Now I could see a strange incoming SSH connection executing commands and after that the trojaned Apache was running... An incoming sshd connection stops the original Apache, copies over the trojaned version, starts it again, and replaces again the trojaned binary with the original copy.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Running the ipcs command revealed a very suspicious shared memory segment... slightly bigger than the one mentioned in those articles and detection tools.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The configuration is pushed by the attacker through obfuscated HTTP requests that aren't logged in normal Apache logs.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The configuration is pushed by the attacker through obfuscated HTTP requests that aren’t logged in normal Apache logs.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

on some random requests (once per day per IP address) instead of just displaying the content, it also adds a malicious redirect. That causes the browser to load content from what seems to be random domains

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The HTTP server is equipped with a reverse connect backdoor that can be triggered via a special HTTP GET request. It is invoked when a request to a special path is done with a query string in a particular format

Impact

1 technique
T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1

In the sample we analyzed, the payload--which resides in memory, not on the hard drive--was redirecting web traffic, from the web server infected by Linux/Cdorked, to websites that seek to infect visitors via the Blackhole Exploit kit.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.