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Mallory
Malware

TangleBot

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
SmishingFake updateLanding pageLure
Platforms
Android

TangleBot is an Android malware family identified in 2021 that targeted mobile users in the United States and Canada through SMS-based social engineering. The campaign used lures themed around COVID-19 notifications and power outages, directing victims to Android-specific landing pages that presented a fake Adobe Flash Player update and persuaded users to sideload a malicious application package from unknown sources. TangleBot has been described as distinct from earlier Medusa-related mobile campaigns despite some similarities in theme and tradecraft.

Once installed, TangleBot requests extensive Android permissions that enable broad surveillance, device manipulation, and data theft. Documented capabilities include reading and sending SMS messages, accessing call logs, viewing contacts, accessing files and media, keylogging, screen capture, camera and microphone capture, clipboard access, GPS-based location tracking, and monitoring running applications and current windows. It also supports HTML overlay injection to present fraudulent application screens, including banking-style login prompts, for credential harvesting. The malware can place phone calls from the infected device, creating opportunities for impersonation and potential abuse of voice-based authentication workflows.

TangleBot supports a large command set for remote interaction with compromised devices and uses covert command-and-control discovery via social media messaging, including retrieval of instructions from Telegram posts. Reported samples also used obfuscation and anti-analysis measures such as hidden secondary code modules, minified code, excessive unused code, modular design, and encrypted or decrypted-at-runtime strings. Audio captured from the device microphone has been reported as transmitted using RTSP.

The malware is best characterized as a mobile surveillance and credential-theft platform with strong remote-control features. Its observed infection chain relied on smishing and fake-update social engineering rather than exploitation of a software vulnerability. High-confidence targeting observed in public reporting focused on Android users in North America.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

If users click the link contained within the text message, threat actors use the time-tested method of advising users Adobe Flash Player needs an update to display the content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The following nine images highlight the experience of a victim from APK download (the installer file for Android) through the completed installation of the software.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The authors of the Medusa malware have opted to reduce its footprint on compromised devices, now requesting only a small set of permissions but still require Android's Accessibility Services.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The authors of the Medusa malware have opted to reduce its footprint on compromised devices, now requesting only a small set of permissions but still require Android's Accessibility Services.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

One final component of TangleBot not seen in the original Medusa is the advanced use of a string decryption routine helping to obfuscate and conceal the behavior of the malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Recent dropper apps used in those attacks include a fake Chrome browser, a 5G connectivity app, and a fake streaming app called 4K Sports.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The control afforded by the malware allows for the monitoring and recording of all aspects of user activity, including websites visited, collection of typed passwords | HTML injection is used to generate fake application overlay screens. These screens may perfectly resemble the login pages of financial institutions and are designed to compromise the credentials of unsuspecting users.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The following is a short list of a few available C2 commands: ... Keylogging capability ... collection of typed passwords

Discovery

2 techniques
T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence2

Drinik can request the READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Android permissions. TangleBot can request permission to view files and media.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

DocSwap has requested for the READ_CALL_LOG and WRITE_CALL_LOG permissions... Drinik can request the READ_CALL_LOG permission... TangleBot can request permission to view call logs... android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The control afforded by the malware allows for the monitoring and recording of all aspects of user activity ... and can harvest data including SMS activity and stored content.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The control afforded by the malware allows for the monitoring and recording of all aspects of user activity, including websites visited, collection of typed passwords | HTML injection is used to generate fake application overlay screens. These screens may perfectly resemble the login pages of financial institutions and are designed to compromise the credentials of unsuspecting users.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The following is a short list of a few available C2 commands: ... Keylogging capability ... collection of typed passwords

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The following is a short list of a few available C2 commands: ... Screen capture

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

We have identified several components used for voice recording using the microphone. Audio is recorded at times determined by the threat actor

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

The control afforded by the malware allows for the monitoring and recording of all aspects of user activity, including ... audio and video from the microphone/camera

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The threat actor uses social media messaging to deliver covert C2 infrastructure information to infected devices. The messaging in the detected sample arrives via Telegram.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Figure 15. Telegram page showing C2 information and network GET request

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once located, the malware can receive threat actor-supplied instructions.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Cleafy comments that all campaigns and botnets are handled by Medusa’s central infrastructure, which dynamically fetches the URLs for the command and control (C2) server from public social media profiles.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Audio is recorded at times determined by the threat actor and the collected content is transmitted via RTSP to threat actor-controlled systems.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.