AccountRestore
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The file was identified as a renamed version of ‘AccountRestore’, a tool used to perform dictionary attacks to extract passwords.
Techniques & procedures
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Stealth
1 techniqueUtilisation des répertoires « C:\Users\Public\Music\ » et « C:\Users\[user]\Downloads\ ».
Credential Access
3 techniquesThese included... using a password-dumping tool... first, he used Windows Task Manager to access credential data stored in the process memory of LSASS... Following that, the threat actor attempted to save the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive.
Day 2: A brute-force attack was initiated from a compromised server on the vendor’s network... via port 445 (SMB).
Utilisation de l’outil AccountRestore avec le dictionnaire « Passwordar.txt ».
IOCs tracked for this family
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.