Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

Nocturnal Stealer

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

it runs a simple command to kill the stealer task as well as remove the dropped files: cmd.exe /c taskkill /im <random_digits>.exe /f & erase C:\ProgramData\Nocturnal<System_UUID>\<random_digits>.exe & exit

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Once Nocturnal Stealer is done searching for relevant data, zipping data to be exfiltrated, and sending it to the C&C, it runs a simple command to kill the stealer task as well as remove the dropped files: cmd.exe /c taskkill /im <random_digits>.exe /f & erase C:\ProgramData\Nocturnal<System_UUID>\<random_digits>.exe & exit

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To avoid detection, Nocturnal Stealer uses several anti-VM and anti-analysis techniques, which include but are not limited to: environment fingerprinting, checking for debuggers and analyzers, searching for known virtual machine registry keys, and checking for emulation software.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The stolen data for targeted browsers includes login credentials, cookies, web data, autofill data, and stored credit cards.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Upon execution, Nocturnal Stealer searches the '%LOCALAPPDATA%' directory for any sensitive data or files related to the browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and FTP clients it currently targets. If found, the malware copies data into the 'passwords.txt' file. The stolen data for targeted browsers includes login credentials...

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

This includes system information such as machine ID, date/time, installation location, operating system, architecture, username, processor type, video card, and a list of all running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

This includes system information such as machine ID, date/time, installation location, operating system, architecture, username, processor type, video card, and a list of all running processes.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To avoid detection, Nocturnal Stealer uses several anti-VM and anti-analysis techniques, which include but are not limited to: environment fingerprinting, checking for debuggers and analyzers, searching for known virtual machine registry keys, and checking for emulation software.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Nocturnal Stealer searches the '%LOCALAPPDATA%' directory for any sensitive data or files related to the browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and FTP clients it currently targets.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

This report also contains a zip archive with the harvested data.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

It utilizes an HTTP POST method for the initial check-in to report the infected machine information to the C&C server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware only reports some of this information back to the Command and Control (C&C) server via a check-in beacon, but also zips and uploads all of the information contained in the dropped files to the C&C.

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.