Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
DEFENSOR ID has used Firebase Cloud Messaging for C2; Rotexy can also communicate by using JSON messages sent through Google Cloud Messaging; Skygofree can be controlled via HTTP, XMPP, FirebaseCloudMessaging, or GoogleCloudMessaging in older versions.
DEFENSOR ID has used Firebase Cloud Messaging for C2. Rotexy can also communicate by using JSON messages sent through Google Cloud Messaging. Skygofree can be controlled via HTTP, XMPP, FirebaseCloudMessaging, or GoogleCloudMessaging in older versions. SpyC23 can communicate with the Command and Control server using HTTPS and Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM). Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control. Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control. Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Android SMS trojan using Google Cloud Messaging for command and control.
Android SMS trojan that uses Google Cloud Messaging for command-and-control.
Android SMS trojan that uses Google Cloud Messaging for command-and-control.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.