Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Executive summary Menorah malware was used by the APT34 group, which targeted organizations in the Middle East and was discovered by Trend Micro in August this year.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The malicious document is responsible for dropping a new malware we have called Menorah ... and for creating a scheduled task for persistence.
Command starts with “+sp” – Create a process and exfiltrate its output | The malware creates a new process via a function call to the CreateProcess function. The process’ output is read using the PeekNamedPipe and Read methods, and then exfiltrated to the C2 server
The hostname and username are retrieved, and then the malware computes the MD5 hash of the concatenation between these two values
It extracts the hostname and the username and computes a hash that identifies the infected machine.
The server response has the following structure “[@<Value>@]”. The extracted value is Base64-decoded and decrypted using the XOR operator.
The C2 server “http[:]//tecforsc-001-site1.gtempurl[.]com/ads.asp” is hard-coded in the malware | The process sets the interval of a timer to 32 seconds, which ensures a continuous communication with the C2 server... The encoded string that identifies the host is exfiltrated to the C2 server via a POST request.
The encoded string that identifies the host is exfiltrated to the C2 server via a POST request... The process’ output is read using the PeekNamedPipe and Read methods, and then exfiltrated to the C2 server... The file name, along with the content that is Base64-encoded, is transmitted to the C2 server
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Backdoor malware used by APT34 that establishes persistent C2 communications, fingerprints the infected host using hostname and username, executes commands, lists files and directories, exfiltrates arbitrary files, and downloads/writes files to the host.
A novel malware family referenced as used by OilRig.
A newly identified .NET malware attributed to APT34 and delivered via a phishing document. It establishes persistence via a scheduled task, fingerprints the victim machine, communicates with a C2 server, executes shell commands, lists files and directories, uploads selected files, and downloads additional files. It is described as designed for cyberespionage.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.