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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The initial supply chain attack was conducted through a piece of software called Orion, an IT network monitoring tool developed by a company called SolarWinds.
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The compromise of the software company SolarWinds and the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers highlighted the threat from supply chain attacks... The actor was able to implant malicious code into an update file for the software... This modification allowed the attacker to send administrator-level commands to any affected installation of that product.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Legitimate SolarWinds IT network monitoring software that was compromised in a supply-chain attack to deliver malicious code and enable administrator-level command execution on affected installations.
Orion is the SolarWinds network-monitoring platform whose software updates were trojanized in a supply-chain compromise, giving attackers remote access into victim networks and enabling espionage activity such as monitoring internal communications.
A stealer trojan shown decrypting and stealing data from Firefox-based browser storage.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.