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Malware3 associated actors

Collector Stealer

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs18Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureCracked software
Platforms
Windows

Collector Stealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family of suspected Russian origin that has been active since at least mid-2020. Written in C++, it is designed to harvest sensitive data from infected consumer systems and transmit the collected material to attacker-controlled command-and-control panels. Reported theft targets include stored browser passwords, cookies, autofill and other web data, screenshots, Telegram Desktop data, Steam-related information, and cryptocurrency wallet material. The malware has been observed targeting victims primarily in Europe, while also affecting users in other regions including the United States and Asia.

Collector Stealer is commonly distributed through social-engineering lures rather than exploit-driven intrusion. Observed delivery methods include phishing-style portals offering fake free games, counterfeit software downloads, and unauthorized activation or crack utilities. It has been bundled with riskware such as KMSAuto and disguised as game tools, miners, mod menus, and VPN-themed packages. In these campaigns, the visible lure application executes while a secondary process installs the stealer and begins communication with its control infrastructure.

On execution, Collector Stealer gathers host metadata such as computer name and time zone, uses obfuscated strings, and generates randomized filenames. It searches user directories for browser databases and application artifacts, including Telegram Desktop storage and Steam-related data. It can capture screenshots via keyboard-event simulation and clipboard access, and it scans desktop files for potentially valuable documents and connection files. To parse browser SQLite databases, it can retrieve a required SQLite library and then extract credentials, cookies, and related records in clear text. Stolen material is organized into directories and compressed into archives before exfiltration.

The malware performs an Internet-connectivity check before transmission and may delete itself along with staged stolen data if connectivity is unavailable, a behavior that reduces forensic residue and supports defense evasion. Exfiltration is performed over HTTP POST to attacker-operated panels. Collector Stealer has been marketed in Russian-language criminal ecosystems and has been associated with the Hack_Jopi group. Reporting has also noted code or lineage overlap with other stealers, including Panda Stealer, which has been described as a modified fork using more fileless delivery techniques.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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NCP

A modified fork of the malware Collector Stealer, Panda Stealer also utilizes a fileless approach in its distribution to evade detection.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
Hack_Jopi

Collector-stealer, a stealth stealer written in C++, infects the victim machine to steal valuable information such as stored passwords, cookies, web data and more, from the infected machine.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
su1c1de

A modified fork of the malware Collector Stealer, Panda Stealer also utilizes a fileless approach in its distribution to evade detection.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The Collector-stealer author uses multiple methods to launch infections, which include coercing users to visit phishing portals hosting free game downloads, Windows activation/crack software packages, etc., to trigger drive-by download attacks that install the malware on the fly.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The Collector-stealer author uses multiple methods to launch infections, which include coercing users to visit phishing portals hosting free game downloads, Windows activation/crack software packages, etc., to trigger drive-by download attacks that install the malware on the fly.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Let’s dissect the command: ‘cmd.exe /C ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 1000 > Nul & Del /f /q \”%s\”’

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Listing 1 highlights the pseudocode that Collector-stealer uses to deobfuscate the Windows public directory path address and other obfuscated strings using the key (string) ‘1A’.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The phishing web portal tricked users into believing that they had downloaded legitimate miner software, which was not the case.

T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence1

Appendix 4: MITRE ATT&CK TTP mapping... T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature Invalid signed executables

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Collector Stealer... covers its tracks by deleting its stolen files and activity logs after its execution

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Cookies : Chrome cookies are stored in the ‘Cookies’ SQLite database, within the ‘cookies’ table.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Collector-stealer, a stealth stealer written in C++, infects the victim machine to steal valuable information such as stored passwords, cookies, web data and more

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Table 4 we correlate malware activity with MITRE ATT&CK TTP mapping... Query Registry Query HKCU for Steam entry

T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence1

Collector-stealer creates a new command line sub-process to check Internet connectivity on infected machines by pinging Cloudflare DNS resolver IP address 1.1.1.1.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Collector-stealer also performs additional operations to extract the location ... along with the computer name by calling the GetComputerName method.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Collector-stealer starts to iterate each folder and file in the location ‘C:\Users\alert-user\AppData\Roaming\’ and looks for file login data, cookie files, web data, and wallet.dat.

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

Collector-stealer also performs additional operations to extract the location and attempts to check the current time zone setting using the GetTimeZoneInformation function

Collection

3 techniques
T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence1

In Table 4 we correlate malware activity with MITRE ATT&CK TTP mapping... Data Staged: Local Data Staging Store collected data at //Public// directory.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

to capture the screenshot, the malware uses the Keybd_event function from user32.dll and simulates the user pressing ‘Take Screenshot’

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

After successfully reading the data, Collector-stealer compresses all the stolen data, including directory structure, into Zip format.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Figure 13 shows the malware using HTTP POST requests to transmit stolen data using zip files.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Collector-stealer uses the URLDownloadToFile API to download sqlite3.dll from the C&C server

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

It drops files under %Temp% folder that stores stolen information under randomized file names, which are then sent to a command-and-control (C&C) server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching18Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.