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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In addition to msimm, one of the strings seemed to indicate the version of said keylogger, as well as a possible name for it: KSL0T Ver = 21.0
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
this is another algorithm... each section of data is XORed using 0x55 ... As assumed, the data is encrypted before being written to the file... data is being XORed using the original XOR keys.
As you can see, the data contains multiple API calls and DLL’s that are loaded during runtime – in this function. As we scroll down the graph, there are several calls to GetProcAddress... You should get LoadLibraryA. From then on, only GetProcAddress and LoadLibraryA are called by this function.
The two most common Windows API calls used in malware and ‘legitimate’ software to perform keylogging is GetAsyncKeyState or SetWindowsHookEx . Due to the number of issues with using GetAsyncKeyState , most keyloggers utilize SetWindowsHookEx nowadays. In this case, SetWindowsHookEx is used to capture keystrokes.
The two most common Windows API calls used in malware and ‘legitimate’ software to perform keylogging is GetAsyncKeyState or SetWindowsHookEx . Due to the number of issues with using GetAsyncKeyState , most keyloggers utilize SetWindowsHookEx nowadays. In this case, SetWindowsHookEx is used to capture keystrokes.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Turla keylogger analyzed in dedicated reverse-engineering writeups.
A Windows keylogger that resolves APIs at runtime, creates a mutex based on the current domain\username, installs a low-level keyboard hook via SetWindowsHookExA(WH_KEYBOARD_LL), captures keystrokes, encrypts logged data with XOR, and writes it to msimm.dat for later collection.
A keylogger DLL analyzed from a sample tagged with Turla/Venomous Bear. The malware uses XOR-encrypted strings and appears to log keystrokes, including special keys, with a possible log file named msimm.dat.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.