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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
the malicious macro code injects and loads an embedded shellcode in the memory of the WINWORD.exe process directly... For the final stage of the infection, DOWNIISSA creates an instance of msiexec.exe and injects the LODEINFO backdoor shellcode in the memory of the process.
各Downloader ShellcodeはBase64エンコードされたうえ、複数のパーツに分割されています。これは、セキュリティ製品の検知を回避する手法であると考えられます。
The attackers exploited the name of a well-known Japanese politician... The file name and the decoy document suggest the target was the Japanese ruling party or a related organization.
the malicious macro code injects and loads an embedded shellcode in the memory of the WINWORD.exe process directly... For the final stage of the infection, DOWNIISSA creates an instance of msiexec.exe and injects the LODEINFO backdoor shellcode in the memory of the process.
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Known downloader malware referenced for structural similarities with LODEINFO's downloader shellcode, including self-patching, C2 encoding, and decrypted data structure. The article explicitly states it is a different malware family from the analyzed downloader.
Known downloader malware referenced for structural and implementation similarities to LODEINFO's downloader shellcode, including self-patching, C2 encoding, and decrypted data structure, though the article states they are different malware families.
A newly discovered multi-stage fileless downloader shellcode that is injected via malicious Word macros, downloads XOR-encoded payloads from attacker-controlled URLs, decrypts them, and injects the final LODEINFO backdoor into msiexec.exe.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.