Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
TeamPCP compromised two major open-source security vendors (Aqua Security and Checkmarx), four GitHub Actions repositories, two OpenVSX extensions, container registries, and used a self-propagating worm dubbed CanisterWork, controlled over blockchain, to compromise at least 66 npm packages.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The malware uses a stolen Kubernetes service account token to spread itself to every server in the cluster... It used obtained credentials to make live API calls to AWS and Kubernetes to pull any secrets from there as well.
LiteLLM’s build pipeline included Trivy security scanner, which wasn’t locked to a specific version. Hackers first poisoned the popular security tool... On March 24th, LiteLLM’s automation ran Trivy as part of the build process and exfiltrated the PYPI publishing token to the attackers. With that credential, the attackers published litellm 1.82.7 ... and 1.82.8 ... each containing malicious payloads.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.