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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

ATMZOW

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs50Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MageCart

In 2024, we published an article detailing how Magecart veteran ATMZOW was found using Google Tag Manager for delivering malware.

via sucuri blogblog.sucuri.net
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

Hackers like Google Tag Manager... they can inject custom scripts and HTML code via a script from the highly trusted domain googletagmanager.com.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

By injecting custom scripts and HTML code onto a website, hackers can harvest valuable data, including user credit card details.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

After removing the first layer of obfuscation, we got the familiar ATMZOW style of code... Unlike previous variants, however, the obfuscation used in this recently discovered GTM-TVKQ79ZS container uses extra complexity to hide all the domains and activation conditions.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

By injecting custom scripts and HTML code onto a website, hackers can harvest valuable data, including user credit card details.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

To further evade detection, the malicious code randomly selects two of those “cdn.*” domains from the list above and then injects two external scripts from the selected domains.

T1665Hide InfrastructureEvidence1

In an effort to prevent detection of domains and suspicious traffic through their IP addresses, attackers strategically hid these domains behind a CloudFlare firewall.

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

Moreover, these two domain names are saved in local storage so on subsequent loads in the same browser you will get the same pair of domains.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching50Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.