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Prince Harming is the name used for an Apple Mac EFI/UEFI firmware flash-lock vulnerability discussed in 2015 security conference presentations. The issue was described as a failure to properly lock firmware flash memory, allowing writes to SPI flash from userland. It was characterized as similar to Thunderstrike, but more serious in that it enabled remote attack scenarios, whereas Thunderstrike required physical access. The vulnerable condition could reportedly be triggered by putting the machine to sleep and reopening it after the fans stopped, or by using "pmset sleepnow." The content states that Sandy Bridge and Ivy Bridge Macs were vulnerable, while Haswell and newer Macs were not; older Core 2 Duo-era systems were also described as vulnerable and in some cases lacking flash protections entirely. In the broader context of EFI compromise on Apple systems, successful firmware modification could enable persistent EFI rootkits that survive OS reinstalls, support diskless persistence, bypass full-disk encryption such as FileVault 2 via keylogging, redirect boot to custom bootloaders, and potentially support SMM backdoors or attacks against systems such as Tails. The content does not attribute Prince Harming to a specific threat actor, but places it alongside discussion of Apple firmware weaknesses, Thunderstrike, Thunderstrike 2, and HackingTeam’s UEFI rootkit as examples of practical firmware attack risk.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A named Apple firmware attack/rootkit discussed as a remote-capable EFI compromise enabled by failure to lock flash, allowing writes to firmware from userland and persistence in EFI.
A firmware attack/rootkit affecting vulnerable Apple systems by exploiting failure to lock flash memory, allowing remote firmware compromise and persistence.
A named firmware attack exploiting failure to lock flash memory on vulnerable Macs, enabling writes to flash from userland and remote compromise of EFI firmware.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.