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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

9002 Trojan

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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PKPLUG

The attackers also use the 9002 Trojan, which is believed to be shared among a small subset of attack groups.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Considering all the malware related to PKPLUG that Unit 42 has analyzed, the use of such exploits appears to be less common than a spear-phishing technique making use of social engineering to lure victims into running their malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Unit 42 published research that reported attacks using the 9002 Trojan delivered through Google Drive. The download originated with a spear-phishing email containing a shortened URL that redirected multiple times before downloading a ZIP file hosted on Google Drive.

Stealth

1 technique
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

The contents of the file, assuming a victim clicked on the URL in the spear-phishing email, resembles the structure used in a technique known as AppLocker Bypass whereby trusted Windows executables can be used to execute malicious payloads.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The C2 infrastructure blogged by Blue Coat Labs ... Domain microsoftwarer[.]com ... logitechwkgame[.]com was documented by Unit 42 ... as the C2 for the 9002 Trojans analyzed.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.