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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

AlphaSeed

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

On 17 May 2023, we disclosed information about AlphaSeed, a new Go-based malware from the SeedpuNK group.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
SeedpuNK

On 17 May 2023, we disclosed information about AlphaSeed, a new Go-based malware from the SeedpuNK group.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group primarily uses spear-phishing attacks to distribute malware and attempt to take over accounts to harvest data.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

HappyDoor in this case is also being distributed via an email attachment just like the previous method of distribution. This attachment file contains a compressed file, and the latter carries a JScript or a dropper (executable file). Once that is run, HappyDoor is created and executed along with normal bait files.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The discovered JSE file drops two additional pieces of malware encoded in Base64 and executes them through PowerShell commands.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

An EXE file disguised as the SGA Solutions installer drops and executes information-stealing malware.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It replicates and loads itself into the following path and registers for auto-execution through the registry to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It replicates and loads itself into the following path and registers for auto-execution through the registry to maintain persistence.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The malware is packed with VMProtector.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1
TacticStealth

Loads malicious DLL through regsvr32.exe.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

AlphaSeed captures keystroke information from the infected system.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Specifically steals cookie information from Chromium and Firefox-based browsers on the system.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Uses the systeminfo command to gather system information.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Steals specific files located on the C drive, including SSH and FileZilla data.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

AlphaSeed captures keystroke information from the infected system.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Takes screenshots of the infected system’s desktop and saves them as files for theft.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Compresses and encrypts the folder containing the stolen information before exfiltrating it to the C&C server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

AlphaSeed receives commands and transmits stolen information via Naver Mail.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.