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Mallory
Malware

Teabot

Tracked since May 31, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs96Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SmishingFake updateLure
Platforms
Android

TeaBot, also known as Anatsa and Toddler, is an Android banking trojan first observed in early 2021. It steals financial credentials, SMS messages, and authentication codes, and provides remote screen monitoring and device interaction capabilities that enable account takeover and on-device fraud. Initially observed targeting Spanish banks, it expanded to other European markets and subsequently targeted banking, cryptocurrency, wallet, and digital insurance applications across multiple regions, including North America.

TeaBot abuses Android Accessibility Services to log input in targeted applications, read screen content, simulate gestures and clicks, and capture authentication codes, including those displayed by Google Authenticator. It enumerates installed applications and retrieves application-specific overlay payloads from its command-and-control infrastructure to impersonate legitimate login interfaces. Stolen information is transmitted to attacker-controlled servers. Screen capture and remote interaction allow operators to conduct fraudulent activity directly from compromised devices.

Distribution includes smishing campaigns impersonating delivery companies and media applications, as well as Google Play-hosted droppers disguised as scanners and other utilities. These droppers can retain legitimate functionality while presenting fake update prompts that persuade users to sideload the malicious payload. TeaBot has also been delivered through DawDropper, Android/FakeAdBlocker, and FluBot distribution infrastructure. Some delivery chains use separate GitHub repositories for payload-location retrieval and payload hosting.

TeaBot uses dynamically loaded, encrypted second-stage code, junk code, and XOR-protected communications to hinder analysis. It can hide its launcher icon, suppress intercepted SMS notifications, mute the device, disable Google Play Protect, and terminate selected security-related processes. Background services support continued operation and persistence.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

the malware authors are believed to have paid to appear in Google Ads served within other legitimate applications and games

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

Reports suggest that hackers have used the Google Play store to distribute the “dropper applications”.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

With the help of Scam Alert, we've seen how this malicious SMS now informs users of potential problems with parcel delivery and tells users that Flash player needs an update, that they have a missed voice mail or that some Android component needs upgrading.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Such an SMS comprises an information (e.g. missed call) and a link to follow.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

When it detects one, it overlays a fake login screen that mirrors the real app, tricking the user into entering their credentials directly into the malware.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

The app itself presents a fake UI saying that an update is required, and users are instructed to allow the Android app to install third-party packages.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Once the victims install and open the app through the Google Play store, the app gives a pop-up message that an update must be installed. When victims click on install, the application downloads the dropper and installs another application on the victim’s device.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Teabot’s attack chain clearly states that attackers have been working on the sideloading and evasive techniques which start from the initial dropper application to the hosting of the malicious payload.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

During the installation, it also asks for Accessibility services permission to get necessary privileges.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

During the installation, it also asks for Accessibility services permission to get necessary privileges.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The apps were programmed to download an "update" followed by prompting users to grant them Accessibility Service privileges and permissions to install apps from unknown third-party sources.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

A full detailed report on how threat Actors used strong obfuscation techniques to evade antivirus software was published by Cleafy.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence2

decrypts the malicious payload file called eepHM.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘eepHM.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

In August 2021, they matched a voicemail theme by resembling messages that network carriers send on missed calls. This changed in September 2021 when SMS texts started to abuse the DHL brand.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

This malware also terminates the predefined list of apps process(es)... that list includes a few popular security products... in order to remain undetected.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When the user starts the Android app, it also starts a background service that checks the country code of the current registered operator... If the country starts with a 'U' or is unavailable, the app skips executing the malicious code.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence3

The malicious code within the app has a minimal footprint, as the authors were careful about not triggering security heuristics.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Teabot’s attack chain clearly states that attackers have been working on the sideloading and evasive techniques which start from the initial dropper application to the hosting of the malicious payload.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Some of the malicious features include Key logging, Disabling Google Play Protect...

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

This permission is acquired to view and control the screen on the victim’s device which is used for obtaining login credentials, 2FA codes, and to read SMS.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Abusing the Android Accessibility Service, this Trojan acts as a keylogger to steal all the victim’s information on the device.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

Retrieve window content Used to retrieve sensitive information such as login credentials, SMS, 2FA codes from authentication apps, etc.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

“Session cookie theft ... increased in 2025.”

Discovery

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When the user starts the Android app, it also starts a background service that checks the country code of the current registered operator... If the country starts with a 'U' or is unavailable, the app skips executing the malicious code.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence2

Teabot enumerates all the installed applications on the victim’s device and then sends the list of installed apps from the victim’s device to the C2 server during its first communication.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1563Remote Service Session HijackingEvidence1

“Godfather and Teabot malware families ... focus on device takeover and session manipulation to bypass strong authentication controls.”

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

This permission is acquired to view and control the screen on the victim’s device which is used for obtaining login credentials, 2FA codes, and to read SMS.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Abusing the Android Accessibility Service, this Trojan acts as a keylogger to steal all the victim’s information on the device.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

Other features of the trojan included Remote access capabilities and screen capturing via request-on-demand services.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The PTI team has de-anonymized the C&C server and discovered that Toddler has already infected more than 7,632 devices at the time of this report.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

By analyzing TeaBot network communications, it was possible to group them into the following three main types: [C2-URL]/api/botupdate ... [C2-URL]/api/getkeyloggers ... [C2-URL]/api/getbotinjects

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

A message instructs the target to download a third-party application by clicking a download button. As of September 2021, these downloads are either Flubot or in some cases Teabot.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Other features of the trojan included Remote access capabilities and screen capturing via request-on-demand services.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

All the communications between C2 and the malware remain encrypted using an XOR key

Indicators of compromise

Observables

96 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching96Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.