Teabot
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- SmishingFake updateLure
- Platforms
- Android
TeaBot, also known as Anatsa and Toddler, is an Android banking trojan first observed in early 2021. It steals financial credentials, SMS messages, and authentication codes, and provides remote screen monitoring and device interaction capabilities that enable account takeover and on-device fraud. Initially observed targeting Spanish banks, it expanded to other European markets and subsequently targeted banking, cryptocurrency, wallet, and digital insurance applications across multiple regions, including North America.
TeaBot abuses Android Accessibility Services to log input in targeted applications, read screen content, simulate gestures and clicks, and capture authentication codes, including those displayed by Google Authenticator. It enumerates installed applications and retrieves application-specific overlay payloads from its command-and-control infrastructure to impersonate legitimate login interfaces. Stolen information is transmitted to attacker-controlled servers. Screen capture and remote interaction allow operators to conduct fraudulent activity directly from compromised devices.
Distribution includes smishing campaigns impersonating delivery companies and media applications, as well as Google Play-hosted droppers disguised as scanners and other utilities. These droppers can retain legitimate functionality while presenting fake update prompts that persuade users to sideload the malicious payload. TeaBot has also been delivered through DawDropper, Android/FakeAdBlocker, and FluBot distribution infrastructure. Some delivery chains use separate GitHub repositories for payload-location retrieval and payload hosting.
TeaBot uses dynamically loaded, encrypted second-stage code, junk code, and XOR-protected communications to hinder analysis. It can hide its launcher icon, suppress intercepted SMS notifications, mute the device, disable Google Play Protect, and terminate selected security-related processes. Background services support continued operation and persistence.
Techniques & procedures
34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
the malware authors are believed to have paid to appear in Google Ads served within other legitimate applications and games
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Reports suggest that hackers have used the Google Play store to distribute the “dropper applications”.
With the help of Scam Alert, we've seen how this malicious SMS now informs users of potential problems with parcel delivery and tells users that Flash player needs an update, that they have a missed voice mail or that some Android component needs upgrading.
Such an SMS comprises an information (e.g. missed call) and a link to follow.
When it detects one, it overlays a fake login screen that mirrors the real app, tricking the user into entering their credentials directly into the malware.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
They have an arsenal of other commands available, including sending an SMS with content provided by the command and control (CnC).
The app itself presents a fake UI saying that an update is required, and users are instructed to allow the Android app to install third-party packages.
Once the victims install and open the app through the Google Play store, the app gives a pop-up message that an update must be installed. When victims click on install, the application downloads the dropper and installs another application on the victim’s device.
Teabot’s attack chain clearly states that attackers have been working on the sideloading and evasive techniques which start from the initial dropper application to the hosting of the malicious payload.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
During the installation, it also asks for Accessibility services permission to get necessary privileges.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
During the installation, it also asks for Accessibility services permission to get necessary privileges.
The apps were programmed to download an "update" followed by prompting users to grant them Accessibility Service privileges and permissions to install apps from unknown third-party sources.
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
A full detailed report on how threat Actors used strong obfuscation techniques to evade antivirus software was published by Cleafy.
decrypts the malicious payload file called eepHM.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘eepHM.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
In August 2021, they matched a voicemail theme by resembling messages that network carriers send on missed calls. This changed in September 2021 when SMS texts started to abuse the DHL brand.
This malware also terminates the predefined list of apps process(es)... that list includes a few popular security products... in order to remain undetected.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.
When the user starts the Android app, it also starts a background service that checks the country code of the current registered operator... If the country starts with a 'U' or is unavailable, the app skips executing the malicious code.
The malicious code within the app has a minimal footprint, as the authors were careful about not triggering security heuristics.
Teabot’s attack chain clearly states that attackers have been working on the sideloading and evasive techniques which start from the initial dropper application to the hosting of the malicious payload.
this malicious apk decrypts the malicious payload file called kbu.json from the app’s assets folder to an executable dex format named ‘kbu.odex’ and loads the decrypted file
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Some of the malicious features include Key logging, Disabling Google Play Protect...
Credential Access
5 techniques
Credential Access
This permission is acquired to view and control the screen on the victim’s device which is used for obtaining login credentials, 2FA codes, and to read SMS.
Abusing the Android Accessibility Service, this Trojan acts as a keylogger to steal all the victim’s information on the device.
the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).
Retrieve window content Used to retrieve sensitive information such as login credentials, SMS, 2FA codes from authentication apps, etc.
“Session cookie theft ... increased in 2025.”
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
If the malware detects it is running inside an analysis environment, or if it cannot reach its command-and-control server, it simply shows a working file manager interface to the user.
When the user starts the Android app, it also starts a background service that checks the country code of the current registered operator... If the country starts with a 'U' or is unavailable, the app skips executing the malicious code.
Teabot enumerates all the installed applications on the victim’s device and then sends the list of installed apps from the victim’s device to the C2 server during its first communication.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
“Godfather and Teabot malware families ... focus on device takeover and session manipulation to bypass strong authentication controls.”
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
This permission is acquired to view and control the screen on the victim’s device which is used for obtaining login credentials, 2FA codes, and to read SMS.
Abusing the Android Accessibility Service, this Trojan acts as a keylogger to steal all the victim’s information on the device.
the malware C2 sends the specific payload(s) to the victim device to perform an overlay attack and track all the activity related to the identified targeted application(s).
Other features of the trojan included Remote access capabilities and screen capturing via request-on-demand services.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
The PTI team has de-anonymized the C&C server and discovered that Toddler has already infected more than 7,632 devices at the time of this report.
By analyzing TeaBot network communications, it was possible to group them into the following three main types: [C2-URL]/api/botupdate ... [C2-URL]/api/getkeyloggers ... [C2-URL]/api/getbotinjects
A message instructs the target to download a third-party application by clicking a download button. As of September 2021, these downloads are either Flubot or in some cases Teabot.
Other features of the trojan included Remote access capabilities and screen capturing via request-on-demand services.
All the communications between C2 and the malware remain encrypted using an XOR key
Observables
96 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.