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Malware

atomic-lockfile

Tracked since Jun 12, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs2Tracked

atomic-lockfile is a malicious npm package used in the June 2026 "Atomic Arch" supply-chain campaign targeting the Arch User Repository (AUR). Attackers hijacked orphaned AUR packages and modified PKGBUILD and related install scripts to fetch and install atomic-lockfile, including via npm install atomic-lockfile; the package’s package.json contained a preinstall hook that executed an embedded Linux ELF payload named deps from ./src/hooks/deps. The package was also associated with a later related wave involving js-digest delivered via bun install.

The deps payload is described as a stripped 64-bit Linux ELF written in Rust and analyzed as a full-featured infostealer aimed primarily at developer workstations and build systems. Reported theft targets include Chromium-family browser cookies, tokens, and local storage; data from Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram; GitHub, npm, HashiCorp Vault, and OpenAI/ChatGPT credentials; SSH keys and known_hosts; shell history; Docker and Podman credentials; and VPN configuration files. The malware also queried legitimate APIs such as Slack, Teams, Discord, GitHub, and OpenAI/ChatGPT to validate or enrich stolen credentials.

The malware exfiltrated data to external infrastructure, including HTTP uploads to temp.sh, and used Tor-based command-and-control via a localhost proxy or SOCKS-style transport to a decoded onion service. It established persistence through systemd services configured for automatic restart. When run as root, it copied itself under /var/lib/ and created a unit under /etc/systemd/system/; when run as a regular user, it persisted from the user home directory using ~/.config/systemd/user/.

When sufficient privileges were available, the payload could optionally load an eBPF rootkit. This rootkit was reported to hide processes, process names, socket inodes, and related activity from standard monitoring tools, and to block debugger attachment. It was not used for privilege escalation. Reported artifacts included BPF maps or paths such as hidden_pids, hidden_names, hidden_inodes, and /sys/fs/bpf/hidden_*. One analyzed sample delivered via atomic-lockfile had SHA-256 6144D433F8A0316869877B5F834C801251BBB936E5F1577C5680878C7443C98B. The campaign has been linked by reporting to AUR package takeovers and to the malicious npm publisher account herbsobering.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence10

The Arch User Repository (AUR) suspended new registrations Monday due to an ongoing supply chain attack flooding the repository with more than 1,500 malicious packages.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence5

According to Sonatype, the campaign started with abandoned packages in AUR, which were modified to execute a malicious NPM package during installation. By June 12, the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.

T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

This attack goes after the trust model, not a software flaw. The compromised packages kept their names, their histories, and the trust that came with them. Only the build instructions changed.

Execution

8 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence10

In an initial wave affecting about 400 packages, this script executed an npm install command for a package called atomic-lockfile. Shortly afterward, the attackers switched tactics, instead using the Bun runtime to install packages called js-digest and lockfile-js

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Sonatype researchers say that the threat actor hijacked at least 20 orphaned packages on AUR and pushed atomic-lockfile by modifying the PKGBUILD file - a Bash script with the build information needed by Arch Linux packages.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

atomic-lockfile ‘s package.json contains a preinstall lifecycle hook: "preinstall": "./src/hooks/deps"

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Analysis identified references to an eBPF program ( scales.bpf.c ) and to libbpf APIs including: bpf_object__load bpf_program__attach bpf_map__pin

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

They modified the packages' PKGBUILD to introduce a post-install script that executes npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk during package installation, causing affected systems to retrieve and install the npm package atomic-lockfile.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

The Linux executable that runs during package installation as part of an Atomic Arch attack references eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter), the technology that allows programs to run inside the Linux kernel with elevated privileges, likely for persistence purposes.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence4

The rootkit-like malware also references credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookies, and data stores from popular collaboration applications

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

the hackers modified the packages’ PKGBUILD to introduce malicious behavior masquerading as the NPM package atomic-lockfile.

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

This means a developer workstation, maintainer machine, or CI/build host could execute the malware as a side effect of building or installing the compromised AUR package.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence2

Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

They modified the packages' PKGBUILD to introduce a post-install script that executes npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk during package installation, causing affected systems to retrieve and install the npm package atomic-lockfile.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

The binary contains references to GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookie databases, Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram data stores.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

SSH private keys — enabling attackers to pivot to remote servers and infrastructure System environment variables — potentially exposing API tokens, cloud credentials, and application secrets Cryptocurrency wallet data — targeting local wallet files and seed phrases.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

The binary contains references to GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookie databases, Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram data stores. Taken together, these references strongly indicate credential and token harvesting functionality.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence3

The rootkit-like malware also references credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookies, and data stores from popular collaboration applications, suggesting it was designed for credential and secret harvesting and exfiltration.

Discovery

1 technique
T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

The malicious dependencies act as loaders to retrieve a Rust-based infostealer targeting developer credentials and secrets

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The executable also includes archive support, multipart form-data handling, and HTTP upload functionality, including references to POST /upload, indicating potential data collection and exfiltration capabilities.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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xakepNews · Jun 15, 2026Более 400 пакетов для Arch Linux распространяли руткит и инфостилер - ХакерMalicious npm package used in compromised AUR packages to deploy a Rust ELF infostealer that steals browser cookies, tokens, local storage data, Slack/Discord/Microsoft Teams data, GitHub/npm/HashiCorp Vault/OpenAI tokens, SSH keys, shell history, VPN profiles, and Docker/Podman credentials; exfiltrates data to an external server over infrastructure using Tor; establishes persistence via systemd and may optionally deploy an eBPF rootkit for stealth.Read more ↗freebufNews · Jun 13, 2026逾400个Arch Linux AUR软件包遭劫持用于部署信息窃取器与eBPF rootkit - FreeBuf网络安全行业门户A malicious npm package referenced in tampered AUR build scripts as part of the supply-chain attack chain. It was used to fetch or stage the malicious payload affecting Arch Linux users.Read more ↗thecybersecguruNews · Jun 12, 2026Atomic Arch: 900+ AUR Packages Backdoored with eBPF RootkitCopy | The CyberSec GuruA trojanized npm package used in the Atomic Arch supply-chain attack. Version 1.4.2 included a malicious preinstall hook that automatically executed the embedded deps ELF payload during npm installation.Read more ↗bleeping computerNews · Jun 12, 2026Over 400 Arch Linux packages compromised to push rootkit, infostealerA malicious npm package delivered via compromised AUR packages that installs a Linux payload with credential-stealing and optional eBPF rootkit capabilities. It targets developer workstations and build environments, stealing browser and Electron app data, Slack, Microsoft Teams, Discord, GitHub, npm, Vault, Docker/Podman, SSH, VPN material, shell histories, cookies, and other local secrets, and appears capable of archiving and HTTP-based exfiltration.Read more ↗
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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.