atomic-lockfile
atomic-lockfile is a malicious npm package used in the June 2026 "Atomic Arch" supply-chain campaign targeting the Arch User Repository (AUR). Attackers hijacked orphaned AUR packages and modified PKGBUILD and related install scripts to fetch and install atomic-lockfile, including via npm install atomic-lockfile; the package’s package.json contained a preinstall hook that executed an embedded Linux ELF payload named deps from ./src/hooks/deps. The package was also associated with a later related wave involving js-digest delivered via bun install.
The deps payload is described as a stripped 64-bit Linux ELF written in Rust and analyzed as a full-featured infostealer aimed primarily at developer workstations and build systems. Reported theft targets include Chromium-family browser cookies, tokens, and local storage; data from Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram; GitHub, npm, HashiCorp Vault, and OpenAI/ChatGPT credentials; SSH keys and known_hosts; shell history; Docker and Podman credentials; and VPN configuration files. The malware also queried legitimate APIs such as Slack, Teams, Discord, GitHub, and OpenAI/ChatGPT to validate or enrich stolen credentials.
The malware exfiltrated data to external infrastructure, including HTTP uploads to temp.sh, and used Tor-based command-and-control via a localhost proxy or SOCKS-style transport to a decoded onion service. It established persistence through systemd services configured for automatic restart. When run as root, it copied itself under /var/lib/ and created a unit under /etc/systemd/system/; when run as a regular user, it persisted from the user home directory using ~/.config/systemd/user/.
When sufficient privileges were available, the payload could optionally load an eBPF rootkit. This rootkit was reported to hide processes, process names, socket inodes, and related activity from standard monitoring tools, and to block debugger attachment. It was not used for privilege escalation. Reported artifacts included BPF maps or paths such as hidden_pids, hidden_names, hidden_inodes, and /sys/fs/bpf/hidden_*. One analyzed sample delivered via atomic-lockfile had SHA-256 6144D433F8A0316869877B5F834C801251BBB936E5F1577C5680878C7443C98B. The campaign has been linked by reporting to AUR package takeovers and to the malicious npm publisher account herbsobering.
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
The Arch User Repository (AUR) suspended new registrations Monday due to an ongoing supply chain attack flooding the repository with more than 1,500 malicious packages.
According to Sonatype, the campaign started with abandoned packages in AUR, which were modified to execute a malicious NPM package during installation. By June 12, the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.
This attack goes after the trust model, not a software flaw. The compromised packages kept their names, their histories, and the trust that came with them. Only the build instructions changed.
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
In an initial wave affecting about 400 packages, this script executed an npm install command for a package called atomic-lockfile. Shortly afterward, the attackers switched tactics, instead using the Bun runtime to install packages called js-digest and lockfile-js
Sonatype researchers say that the threat actor hijacked at least 20 orphaned packages on AUR and pushed atomic-lockfile by modifying the PKGBUILD file - a Bash script with the build information needed by Arch Linux packages.
atomic-lockfile ‘s package.json contains a preinstall lifecycle hook: "preinstall": "./src/hooks/deps"
Analysis identified references to an eBPF program ( scales.bpf.c ) and to libbpf APIs including: bpf_object__load bpf_program__attach bpf_map__pin
A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.
They modified the packages' PKGBUILD to introduce a post-install script that executes npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk during package installation, causing affected systems to retrieve and install the npm package atomic-lockfile.
the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.
После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.
The Linux executable that runs during package installation as part of an Atomic Arch attack references eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter), the technology that allows programs to run inside the Linux kernel with elevated privileges, likely for persistence purposes.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
the attackers switched to Bun-based installation paths and also started pushing new malicious packages.
Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
The rootkit-like malware also references credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookies, and data stores from popular collaboration applications
the hackers modified the packages’ PKGBUILD to introduce malicious behavior masquerading as the NPM package atomic-lockfile.
Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.
A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.
This means a developer workstation, maintainer machine, or CI/build host could execute the malware as a side effect of building or installing the compromised AUR package.
Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding
They modified the packages' PKGBUILD to introduce a post-install script that executes npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk during package installation, causing affected systems to retrieve and install the npm package atomic-lockfile.
the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.
После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.
Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
The binary contains references to GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookie databases, Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram data stores.
SSH private keys — enabling attackers to pivot to remote servers and infrastructure System environment variables — potentially exposing API tokens, cloud credentials, and application secrets Cryptocurrency wallet data — targeting local wallet files and seed phrases.
The binary contains references to GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookie databases, Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams, and Telegram data stores. Taken together, these references strongly indicate credential and token harvesting functionality.
The rootkit-like malware also references credentials, SSH artifacts, HashiCorp Vault tokens, browser cookies, and data stores from popular collaboration applications, suggesting it was designed for credential and secret harvesting and exfiltration.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The malicious dependencies act as loaders to retrieve a Rust-based infostealer targeting developer credentials and secrets
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
Sonatype also observed functionality related to process, file, and network hiding; Linux socket diagnostic interfaces; debugger detection; and HTTP upload functionality.
The executable also includes archive support, multipart form-data handling, and HTTP upload functionality, including references to POST /upload, indicating potential data collection and exfiltration capabilities.
Observables
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.