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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
By 2023, however, o1oo1 had made the jump from buyer to a malware developer, launching a private crypter service... The service is known publicly as AsmCrypt.
9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Potential crypter-as-a-service associated by Group-IB with the same actor as SnappyClient. Its builder options reportedly align with HijackLoader module names; its identification as the analyzed loader remains speculative.
Separate crypter service operated by the same developer and bundled with SilabRAT.
A private crypter/obfuscation service used as the intended obfuscation layer for SilabRAT, offering malware stubs and evasion against scantime, runtime, and cloud detection across x64/x86 and .NET files.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.