QSC
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
During the investigation, we discovered QSC: a multi-plugin malware framework that loads and runs plugins (modules) in memory.
Techniques & procedures
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
The Command Shell module launches % windir % \ system32 \ cmd . exe as a shell using the CreateProcess API, and data is written to and read from the shell using pipes.
net stop swprv ... sc config swprv start = auto ... net start swprv
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \ SYSTEM \ CurrentControlSet \ services \ swprv \ Parameters / v ServiceDll / t REG_EXPAND_SZ / d c : \ windows \ system32 \ swprr . dll / f
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
dc191340 Close the connection, delete its own module file and terminate its own process.
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \ SYSTEM \ CurrentControlSet \ services \ swprv \ Parameters / v ServiceDll / t REG_EXPAND_SZ / d c : \ windows \ system32 \ swprr . dll / f
The Loader then reads and decompresses code from the provided file path. It reflectively injects the decompressed code into memory and calls the exported method plugin_working.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
wmic / node : < domain_controller_ip > / user : < user_name > / password : < user_password > process call create "copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit $user\downloads"
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
systeminfo ipconfig / all netstat - ano - p tcp
ping 172.19.19.1 - n 1 ping 172.19.19.2 - n 1 tracert 172.19.19.2 netstat - ano ping - a 172.17.104.102 - n 1
Send target information (e.g. computer name, user name, OS version, etc.)
0x0A20010 If the sub-command is < root > , then get the logical drive letters and types in the system. Otherwise, send a list of files and folders at a specified path.
The domain controller was queried to view the list of users within the groups “domain controllers” and “domain computers” ... Next, the actor tried to list the users under the group “domain admins”
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
By using WMIC and the stolen domain admin credentials, the attackers were able to execute the QSC framework on other machines within the affected network.
we . exe - hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee : 621a23dd771b1eb39c954cd6828aee6c < user_name > @ < domain_controller_ip > "whoami"
Collection
1 technique
Collection
0x0A20012 Read the file and send it to the C2.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
the C2 in the configuration data contained an internal/proxy IP address, which suggested that the attackers were already aware of the target network topology.
In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we have named “GoClient”.
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.