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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

Bateleur

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For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN7

Proofpoint researchers have uncovered that the threat actor commonly referred to as FIN7 has added a new JScript backdoor called Bateleur... starting in early June, we observed this threat actor using macro documents to drop a previously undocumented JScript backdoor, which we have named “Bateleur”.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
Carbanak

Proofpoint researchers have uncovered that the threat actor commonly referred to as FIN7 has added a new JScript backdoor called Bateleur... starting in early June, we observed this threat actor using macro documents to drop a previously undocumented JScript backdoor, which we have named “Bateleur”.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The email contains a macro-laden Word document.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

wexe Perform a “load_exe” request to C&C to retrieve an EXE, save it as debug.log and then execute the EXE via WMI ... wpowershell Same as powershell command but instead executes a PowerShell command via WMI

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the macro executes the following commands... schtasks /create /f /tn ""GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCorefh5evfbce5bhfd37"" /tr ""wscript.exe //b /e:jscript %TMP%\debug.txt "" ... When Bateleur first executes it creates a scheduled task “ GoogleUpdateTaskMachineSystem” for persistence

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The malicious JScript has robust capabilities that include... execution of custom commands and PowerShell scripts... powershell Perform a “load_powershell” request to the C&C to retrieve a command to execute... apowershell Same as powershell command but instead executes a PowerShell command directly with powershell.exe

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

cmd Perform a “load_cmd” request to the C&C to retrieve a command to execute... execute debug.cmd with cmd.exe

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The email contains a macro-laden Word document. The macro accesses the malicious payload via a caption: UserForm1.Label1.Caption.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

the macro creates a scheduled task whose purpose is to execute debug.txt as a JScript... /tr "wscript.exe //b /e:jscript %TMP%\debug.txt "

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the macro executes the following commands... schtasks /create /f /tn ""GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCorefh5evfbce5bhfd37"" /tr ""wscript.exe //b /e:jscript %TMP%\debug.txt "" ... When Bateleur first executes it creates a scheduled task “ GoogleUpdateTaskMachineSystem” for persistence

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the macro executes the following commands... schtasks /create /f /tn ""GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCorefh5evfbce5bhfd37"" /tr ""wscript.exe //b /e:jscript %TMP%\debug.txt "" ... When Bateleur first executes it creates a scheduled task “ GoogleUpdateTaskMachineSystem” for persistence

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The new macros and Bateleur backdoor use sophisticated anti-analysis and sandbox evasion techniques... the first FIN7 change we observed was in the obfuscation technique found in their usual document attachments... The caption contains a “|*|”-delimited obfuscated JScript payload.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

dll Perform a “load_dll” request to the C&C to retrieve a DLL... write a regsvr32 command to a file named debug.cmd and then execute debug.cmd with cmd.exe

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Bateleur has anti-sandbox features... This includes detection of Virtualbox, VMware, or Parallels via SMBIOSBIOSVersion and any of the following strings in DeviceID

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The backdoor also contains a process name blacklist including: autoit3.exe dumpcap.exe tshark.exe prl_cc.exe Bateleur also checks its own script name and compares it to a blacklist which could indicate that the script is being analyzed by an analyst or a sandbox

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

get_passwords Perform a “load_pass” request to the C&C to retrieve a PowerShell command containing a payload capable of retrieving user account credentials

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

get_process_list Return running process list (name + id)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

get_information Return various information about the infected machine, such as computer and domain name, OS, screen size, and net view

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Bateleur has anti-sandbox features... This includes detection of Virtualbox, VMware, or Parallels via SMBIOSBIOSVersion and any of the following strings in DeviceID

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The backdoor also contains a process name blacklist including: autoit3.exe dumpcap.exe tshark.exe prl_cc.exe Bateleur also checks its own script name and compares it to a blacklist which could indicate that the script is being analyzed by an analyst or a sandbox

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

get_screen Take a screenshot and save it as screenshot.png in the install_path

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The Bateleur C&C protocol occurs over HTTPS... Bateleur uses HTTP POST requests with a URI of “/?page=wait” while the backdoor is waiting for instructions.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

exe Perform a “load_exe” request to the C&C to retrieve an EXE... dll Perform a “load_dll” request to the C&C to retrieve a DLL... get_passwords Perform a “load_pass” request to the C&C to retrieve a PowerShell command containing a payload

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

kill_process Kill process using taskkill

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping18

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.