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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Parallax

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via bleeping computerRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorA remote access Trojan named Parallax is being widely distributed through malicious spam campaigns that when installed allow attackers to gain full control over an infected system.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA2541

According to the researcher’s observations, AsyncRAT, NetWire, WSH RAT, and Parallax appears to be the group’s top favorites being pushed most often in malicious messages.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Campaign infrastructure included domains contacted by the macro to download stage-two-through-five artifacts and domains used as NETWIRE RAT command-and-control nodes.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

A typical TA2541 attack chain starts with sending an email that is usually related to transportation (e.g. flight, aircraft, fuel, yacht, charter, cargo) and delivers a malicious document.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

These infections typically start through email spam campaigns delivering macro-enabled lure documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Recently, though, the group switched from malicious attachments to linking to a payload hosted in cloud services such as Google Drive.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

In the next step, the adversary executes PowerShell into various Windows processes and looks for available security products by querying the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

If executed, PowerShell pulls an executable from a text file hosted on various platforms such as Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The macro parses the embedded paragraph text on page three of the lure document... [and] uses the CreateObject function to create the required objects and download each of the malware components.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

To evade user mode hooks utilized by EDR/AV products and as debugger breakpoints, the malware uses direct system calls to low-level APIs used for process injection.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

If the first string of cs16.cfg points to a hosted file, it uses the IBackgroundCopyManager Component Object Model (COM) interface to download a PNG file and store it on disk.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

If the first string of cs16.cfg points to a hosted file, it uses the IBackgroundCopyManager Component Object Model (COM) interface to download a PNG file and store it on disk.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

A scheduled task is used to establish persistence for the PARALLAX RAT... creating a scheduled task to run Msidb.exe using Component Object Model (COM).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader uses the Heaven’s Gate technique and performs injection in the suspended cmd.exe process... [and] creates a suspended cmd.exe process and injects the NETWIRE payload and the last PARALLAX stage.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The fifth and final stage of PARALLAX Loader performs a UAC bypass through CMSTPLUA COM interface.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

The malware extracts a configuration structure from the stenographically-obfuscated PNG that contains the next PARALLAX loader stage and the final payload.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The malicious code is heavily obfuscated and leverages dynamic API resolution... retrieve library addresses using the CRC32 checksum hash of the requested library name... [and] builds its own import table.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader uses the Heaven’s Gate technique and performs injection in the suspended cmd.exe process... [and] creates a suspended cmd.exe process and injects the NETWIRE payload and the last PARALLAX stage.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Next, the malware will load cs16.wav and XOR-decrypt it using a key embedded in the file... The malware will then execute the shellcode inside the decrypted WAV file.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

If the first string of cs16.cfg points to a hosted file, it uses the IBackgroundCopyManager Component Object Model (COM) interface to download a PNG file and store it on disk.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Then it tries to disable the built-in defenses and starts gathering system information before downloading the RAT payload on the compromised host.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Then it tries to disable the built-in defenses and starts gathering system information before downloading the RAT payload on the compromised host.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The macro downloads malicious files used for DLL-side loading and injection.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.