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Malware

PANIX

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK31Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Capabilities
PersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

PANIX is a modular Linux persistence and post-exploitation framework developed by Ruben Groenewoud of Elastic Security for authorized security research, detection engineering, penetration testing, and CTF use. It automates deployment and removal of numerous user-level and privileged persistence mechanisms, including scheduled tasks, service and boot-start mechanisms, shell initialization changes, XDG autostart entries, SSH authorized-key backdoors, system-account manipulation, dynamic linker hijacking, kernel modules, web shells, package-manager hooks, Git hooks, udev rules, and system-binary hijacking. PANIX also supports mechanisms that can provide elevated or root-level access, including SUID or capability abuse, sudoers changes, PAM, Polkit, UID-zero accounts, bootloader and initramfs modifications, and container-based host escape persistence. Modules include paired setup and revert functionality and ATT&CK technique mappings, enabling repeatable adversary-emulation exercises and validation of Linux host detections across several major distributions.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053.002AtEvidence1

At is a utility for scheduling one-time tasks to run at a specified time in the future on Linux systems.

T1053.003CronEvidence2

Attackers can exploit [cron] jobs to run scripts or binaries that establish reverse connections or add reverse shell commands.

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

A timer unit specifies the schedule and is associated with a corresponding service unit that performs the task.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Reverse shells are utilized in many of the persistence techniques discussed in this article. | A bind shell listens for incoming connections on the compromised host. This allows the attacker to connect at will, gaining command execution on the target machine.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

D-Bus abuse aligns closely with T1543: Create or Modify System Process, as well as T1574: Hijack Execution Flow for cases where .service files are modified.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Dynamic Linker Hijacking occurs when an attacker manipulates the linking process to redirect execution flow. This can involve altering the library search order through LD_PRELOAD, modifying configuration files like /etc/ld.so.conf, or tampering with cached library mappings in /etc/ld.so.cache.

T1610Deploy ContainerEvidence1

Attackers deploy custom containers designed to break out of isolation. These containers often include exploits, scripts for privilege escalation or persistence, such as reverse shells or C2 beacons, and malicious configurations enabling unauthorized access to host resources.

Persistence

21 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

Dynamic MOTD scripts stored in /etc/update-motd.d/ execute shell commands every time a user logs in. | SysV init scripts in /etc/init.d/ are executed with root privileges and can be enabled through update-rc.d to run at boot.

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

The rc.local script contains commands executed at the end of system boot; systemd-rc-local-generator enables it when /etc/rc.local exists and is executable.

T1037.005Startup ItemsEvidence1

The following analytic detects potential persistence using a systemd generator on Linux, which involves creating a malicious script or binary that is typically executed during the system's boot process.

T1053.002AtEvidence1

At is a utility for scheduling one-time tasks to run at a specified time in the future on Linux systems.

T1053.003CronEvidence2

Attackers can exploit [cron] jobs to run scripts or binaries that establish reverse connections or add reverse shell commands.

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

A timer unit specifies the schedule and is associated with a corresponding service unit that performs the task.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

Persistence can be established through the creation or modification of user accounts.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence2

By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.

T1136.001Local AccountEvidence2

Attempt to create a new user with sudo privileges ... add the user to /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd and /etc/group manually.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

A web shell is a malicious script uploaded to a web server, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the host.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

Attackers can exploit GRUB’s flexibility and early execution in the boot process to establish persistence. By modifying GRUB configuration files, they can inject malicious parameters or scripts that execute with root privileges before the operating system fully initializes. | Modifying its contents—such as adding malicious scripts or altering initialization logic—enables execution of malicious code before the system fully initializes.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

Attackers who can insert overly permissive rules [can] gain unauthorized privileges... an overly permissive policy always returns polkit.Result.YES, which means that any action that requires Polkit’s authentication will be allowed by anyone. | Attackers can replace or add .service files ... to hijack legitimate communication or inject malicious code.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

This unit file would attempt to establish a reverse shell connection every time the system boots, running with root privileges.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence3

Git hooks are scripts that Git executes before or after specific events such as commits, merges, and pushes; they are stored in .git/hooks/. | An attacker can set the pager to a command that executes arbitrary code by modifying the core.pager configuration. | When a rule matches, it can trigger a wide range of actions, including executing arbitrary commands or scripts.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

Attackers [can] establish persistence on a system by injecting backdoors into these scripts.

T1546.016Installer PackagesEvidence2

By hijacking the package manager's execution flow, attackers can insert malicious code that executes during routine package management tasks, such as package installation or updates.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Adversaries abuse XDG autostart entries to achieve persistence on Linux desktop environments — any .desktop file placed in these directories is automatically executed when a user logs into a graphical session.

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

To achieve persistence across reboots, a configuration file named panix.conf is created in both /etc/modules-load.d/ and /usr/lib/modules-load.d/. The module is then loaded into the kernel using the insmod command.

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence1

By leveraging XDG Autostart, attackers can configure malicious applications to run automatically whenever users log into their desktop environment.

T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryEvidence1

Attackers can hijack system binaries by replacing or backdooring them with malicious counterparts, or manipulate $PATH to prioritize a malicious binary.

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

The patch introduces a hardcoded backdoor password. Any user who enters the password "_PASSWORD_" will bypass normal password verification and be authenticated successfully. | By providing the path to a backdoor script on the host system, we can ensure that our backdoor is executed on every successful SSH authentication. | Attackers can introduce custom modules or modify existing configurations to manipulate authentication flows, capture credentials, grant unauthorized access, or execute malicious code.

Privilege Escalation

20 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

Dynamic MOTD scripts stored in /etc/update-motd.d/ execute shell commands every time a user logs in. | SysV init scripts in /etc/init.d/ are executed with root privileges and can be enabled through update-rc.d to run at boot.

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

The rc.local script contains commands executed at the end of system boot; systemd-rc-local-generator enables it when /etc/rc.local exists and is executable.

T1037.005Startup ItemsEvidence1

The following analytic detects potential persistence using a systemd generator on Linux, which involves creating a malicious script or binary that is typically executed during the system's boot process.

T1053.002AtEvidence1

At is a utility for scheduling one-time tasks to run at a specified time in the future on Linux systems.

T1053.003CronEvidence2

Attackers can exploit [cron] jobs to run scripts or binaries that establish reverse connections or add reverse shell commands.

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

A timer unit specifies the schedule and is associated with a corresponding service unit that performs the task.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

Persistence can be established through the creation or modification of user accounts.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence2

By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

Attackers who can insert overly permissive rules [can] gain unauthorized privileges... an overly permissive policy always returns polkit.Result.YES, which means that any action that requires Polkit’s authentication will be allowed by anyone. | Attackers can replace or add .service files ... to hijack legitimate communication or inject malicious code.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

This unit file would attempt to establish a reverse shell connection every time the system boots, running with root privileges.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence3

Git hooks are scripts that Git executes before or after specific events such as commits, merges, and pushes; they are stored in .git/hooks/. | An attacker can set the pager to a command that executes arbitrary code by modifying the core.pager configuration. | When a rule matches, it can trigger a wide range of actions, including executing arbitrary commands or scripts.

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

Attackers [can] establish persistence on a system by injecting backdoors into these scripts.

T1546.016Installer PackagesEvidence2

By hijacking the package manager's execution flow, attackers can insert malicious code that executes during routine package management tasks, such as package installation or updates.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Adversaries abuse XDG autostart entries to achieve persistence on Linux desktop environments — any .desktop file placed in these directories is automatically executed when a user logs into a graphical session.

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

To achieve persistence across reboots, a configuration file named panix.conf is created in both /etc/modules-load.d/ and /usr/lib/modules-load.d/. The module is then loaded into the kernel using the insmod command.

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence1

By leveraging XDG Autostart, attackers can configure malicious applications to run automatically whenever users log into their desktop environment.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Attackers can abuse process capabilities to maintain persistence by setting specific capabilities on binaries or scripts, allowing a route back to root access.

T1548.001Setuid and SetgidEvidence1

After setting SUID permissions to the binary, it can be executed in a manner that will allow the user to keep the root privileges.

T1548.003Sudo and Sudo CachingEvidence1

A threat actor with root access can deliberately modify [sudoers] files to ensure they maintain elevated access.

T1611Escape to HostEvidence1

The escape.sh script ... uses nsenter to attach to the host's namespaces via the init process, effectively breaking container isolation.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Adversaries may replace these utilities with backdoored versions to hide malicious activity, harvest credentials, or maintain persistence while appearing to use legitimate system tools.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

Attackers can exploit GRUB’s flexibility and early execution in the boot process to establish persistence. By modifying GRUB configuration files, they can inject malicious parameters or scripts that execute with root privileges before the operating system fully initializes. | Modifying its contents—such as adding malicious scripts or altering initialization logic—enables execution of malicious code before the system fully initializes.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

D-Bus abuse aligns closely with T1543: Create or Modify System Process, as well as T1574: Hijack Execution Flow for cases where .service files are modified.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Dynamic Linker Hijacking occurs when an attacker manipulates the linking process to redirect execution flow. This can involve altering the library search order through LD_PRELOAD, modifying configuration files like /etc/ld.so.conf, or tampering with cached library mappings in /etc/ld.so.cache.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

The patch introduces a hardcoded backdoor password. Any user who enters the password "_PASSWORD_" will bypass normal password verification and be authenticated successfully. | By providing the path to a backdoor script on the host system, we can ensure that our backdoor is executed on every successful SSH authentication. | Attackers can introduce custom modules or modify existing configurations to manipulate authentication flows, capture credentials, grant unauthorized access, or execute malicious code.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

The patch introduces a hardcoded backdoor password. Any user who enters the password "_PASSWORD_" will bypass normal password verification and be authenticated successfully. | By providing the path to a backdoor script on the host system, we can ensure that our backdoor is executed on every successful SSH authentication. | Attackers can introduce custom modules or modify existing configurations to manipulate authentication flows, capture credentials, grant unauthorized access, or execute malicious code.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

PANIX creates a simple reverse shell ... Upon authentication, we can see the execution of the backdoor by the SSHD parent process, starting the reverse shell chain.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping31Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.