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Malware1 associated actor

Prince Ransomware

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SecDbg

Proofpoint researchers identified a campaign impersonating the British postal carrier Royal Mail delivering Prince ransomware. Prince is a ransomware variant freely available on GitHub with a “disclaimer” that it is only designed for educational purposes.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Proofpoint researchers identified a campaign impersonating the British postal carrier Royal Mail delivering Prince ransomware... Messages contained a unique PDF attachment that also impersonated Royal Mail.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Messages contained a unique PDF attachment that also impersonated Royal Mail. The PDF included a link that led to the download of a ZIP file hosted on Dropbox.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Used PowerShell to create a Scheduled Task that ran every 20 minutes, but only if the computer was connected to power and had been idle for 15 minutes

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

It used PowerShell to run PS1.ps1 and PS2.ps1... JS2.js again ran the PS1.ps1 AMSI Bypass, and then ran PS3.ps1... The Scheduled Task ran an encoded PowerShell command

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

It used the “findstr” command to find the JavaScript code embedded in the shortcut, wrote it to a file... in %temp%, and executed it using WScript.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The second ZIP file contained a shortcut (LNK) file which, if executed, extracted and ran JavaScript... The JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated, performed the following actions...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The second ZIP file contained a shortcut (LNK) file which, if executed, extracted and ran JavaScript extracted from the shortcut itself.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Used PowerShell to create a Scheduled Task that ran every 20 minutes, but only if the computer was connected to power and had been idle for 15 minutes

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Deleted all previously dropped files Wrote three Base64 strings to the registry (keys varied between the scripts)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The second ZIP file contained a shortcut (LNK) file which, if executed, extracted and ran JavaScript extracted from the shortcut itself... It used the “findstr” command to find the JavaScript code embedded in the shortcut, wrote it to a file... and executed it using WScript.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Used PowerShell to create a Scheduled Task that ran every 20 minutes, but only if the computer was connected to power and had been idle for 15 minutes

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The second ZIP file contained a shortcut (LNK) file which, if executed, extracted and ran JavaScript extracted from the shortcut itself... It used the “findstr” command to find the JavaScript code embedded in the shortcut, wrote it to a file... and executed it using WScript.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

PS2.ps1 was a highly obfuscated version of a well-documented Windows Connection Manager UAC bypass. This essentially wrote an INF file and opened it with Windows Connection Manager (CMSTP) to invoke WScript to run the previously created JS2.js.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated... PS1.ps1 was a highly obfuscated version of a well-known AMSI Bypass... PS2.ps1 was a highly obfuscated version of a well-documented Windows Connection Manager UAC bypass... PS3.ps1, which was again heavily obfuscated... The loaded .NET assembly... was likely obfuscated with some form of the ConfuserEx obfuscator

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The emails all contained a sender or reply-to Proton Mail email address... Email lure impersonating Royal Mail... Messages contained a unique PDF attachment that also impersonated Royal Mail.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Created an AES decrypt function that used the AES key and Initialization Vector from the previously written registry keys... decrypted the third Base64 encoded registry key, decoded the resulting Base64, which was compressed with Gzip, and extracted that data to a new Base64 string. This final string was decoded to bytes and loaded as a .NET assembly.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

This final string was decoded to bytes and loaded as a .NET assembly.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Deleted all previously dropped files Wrote three Base64 strings to the registry (keys varied between the scripts)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

PS1.ps1 was a highly obfuscated version of a well-known AMSI Bypass... [Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Utils.Amsi').GetField('amsiInitFailed', 'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null, $true)

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The ZIP contained another password-protected ZIP file... and a text file... that contained the password needed to open the password-protected ZIP file.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The PDF included a link that led to the download of a ZIP file hosted on Dropbox... The only network activity was the download of the desktop background

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

Impact T1486 – Data Encrypted for Impact The ransomware encrypts file using ChaCha20 and ECIES cryptography which makes it difficult to recover the files

T1491DefacementEvidence1

While encrypting files, the ransomware displayed the Windows Update splash screen to the user... This connection was first identified due to the observed sample downloading the same PNG from Imgur, and setting the PNG as the background

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.