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Mallory
Malware7 associated actors

SManager

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors7Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs29Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistenceReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

SManager is a Windows malware loader that communicates with command-and-control servers, profiles compromised hosts, and downloads and executes additional Portable Executable payloads. Its DLL-based components receive server commands and collect computer and host names, network addressing information, operating-system version, language, username, default browser, and administrative-privilege status. SSL variants use Microsoft's Security Support Provider Interface for authentication and encrypted communications; TCP variants operate without that SSPI-based protection. Observed components have a limited command set centered on host profiling and payload loading rather than a full remote-access toolset.

Setup components unpack an embedded DLL, modify its configuration, and select execution behavior according to available privileges. With administrator privileges, they install and launch the payload as a Windows service, providing persistence. Without administrator privileges, they execute the DLL through the Windows DLL execution utility. SManager shares configuration structures, exported-function conventions, and implementation characteristics with Tmanger, Albaniiutas, and PhantomNet.

SManager has been observed in attacks against Vietnamese organizations and in Earth Kurma operations, where a KRNRAT user-mode backdoor retrieves it as a subsequent payload. Earth Kurma targets government and government-related telecommunications organizations in Southeast Asia.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Earth Kurma

The final payload from the C&C server would be the so-called SManager.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
TA428

今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。Smanager_ssl.dllは実行されると、C&Cサーバーとコネクションを確立します。その際、Microsoft Security Service Provider Interfaceを利用して、認証や通信の暗号化を行っています。C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
Tropic Trooper

今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。Smanager_ssl.dllは実行されると、C&Cサーバーとコネクションを確立します。その際、Microsoft Security Service Provider Interfaceを利用して、認証や通信の暗号化を行っています。C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
ta413

今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。Smanager_ssl.dllは実行されると、C&Cサーバーとコネクションを確立します。その際、Microsoft Security Service Provider Interfaceを利用して、認証や通信の暗号化を行っています。C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
FunnyDream

今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。Smanager_ssl.dllは実行されると、C&Cサーバーとコネクションを確立します。その際、Microsoft Security Service Provider Interfaceを利用して、認証や通信の暗号化を行っています。C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
Roaming Tiger

今回は私達がTmangerの亜種であると考えているSmanagerについて紹介します。Smanager_ssl.dllは実行されると、C&Cサーバーとコネクションを確立します。その際、Microsoft Security Service Provider Interfaceを利用して、認証や通信の暗号化を行っています。C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

In December 2020, Ignacio Sanmillan and Matthieu Faou released an excellent report on a Vietnamese supply-chain attack that used PhantomNet ( aka SManager) malware.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

Attackers modified the installer of the GCA01 software that is hosted on ca.gov.vn and added a backdoor to the MSI installer.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

C&Cサーバーとのコネクション確立後、C&Cサーバーから受信したデータに応じてコマンドを実行します。

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The victim needs to manually execute the trojanized installer.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

ServiceMain takes a service name as an argument and attempts to register a service control handler with a specific HandlerProc function meant to check and set the status of that service. With a valid service status handle, Mail-O detaches the calling process from its console, changes the service status values to reflect its current running state, and calls the Entery function.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

管理者権限で実行されている場合は HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost などを書き込み、DLLをサービスとして登録し、ServiceMainを実行します。

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The researchers noted that the malware’s persistence was established via a scheduled task that called the malicious DLL’s export, ‘Entery’.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

管理者権限で実行されている場合は HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost などを書き込み、DLLをサービスとして登録し、ServiceMainを実行します。

Stealth

1 technique
T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

管理者権限で実行されていない場合、WinExecでrundll32.exeを実行し、 DLLのExport関数である Enteryから実行します。

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

感染端末の情報を収集するコマンドでは、下記の情報を収集していることが判明しています。 コンピューター名 ホスト名 IPアドレス OSバージョン 言語情報 ユーザー名 デフォルトブラウザ 管理者権限の有無

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

実装されているコマンドとしては、感染端末の情報をC&Cサーバーに送信するコマンドや実行形式のファイルをダウンロードして実行するコマンドを確認しています。

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors7Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.