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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The threat actor names this component “upan”, which we observe in the malware’s PDB strings.
1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment
From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.