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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

PipeSnoop

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ShroudedSnooper

PipeSnoop can accept arbitrary shellcode from an Inter-Process Communication (IPC) pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
Scarred Manticore

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Storm-0861

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“allowing threat actors to remotely execute commands on infected devices” and HTTPSnoop can “execute decoded shellcode on the infected internet facing endpoint(s).”

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

“PipeSnoop… can accept arbitrary shellcode from an Inter-Process Communication (IPC) pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint. It reads and writes to and from a Windows IPC pipe.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

“The two new malware HTTPSnoop and PipeSnoop can masquerade as legitimate security software components, such as eXtended Detection and Response (XDR) agents.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.