PipeSnoop
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
PipeSnoop can accept arbitrary shellcode from an Inter-Process Communication (IPC) pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint.
ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.
ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.
Techniques & procedures
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
“allowing threat actors to remotely execute commands on infected devices” and HTTPSnoop can “execute decoded shellcode on the infected internet facing endpoint(s).”
“PipeSnoop… can accept arbitrary shellcode from an Inter-Process Communication (IPC) pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint. It reads and writes to and from a Windows IPC pipe.”
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
“The two new malware HTTPSnoop and PipeSnoop can masquerade as legitimate security software components, such as eXtended Detection and Response (XDR) agents.”
Observables
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.