Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

NAPLISTENER

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

NAPLISTENER is a C# HTTP-listener backdoor associated with the REF2924 espionage intrusion set. It is deployed as a Windows service under a name intended to resemble a legitimate Microsoft service component. The implant receives specially formatted inbound HTTP requests, Base64-decodes an attacker-supplied .NET assembly, and loads and executes the assembly directly in memory. It operates separately from IIS and handles matching requests through Windows HTTP request redirection, reducing visibility in IIS web-server logs and hindering detection based on web logs or network inspection. Its HTTP response behavior and server-like headers are intended to blend with expected web traffic. NAPLISTENER requires endpoint SSL and application-registration configuration to operate. REF2924 activity involving NAPLISTENER has been concentrated in southern and southeastern Asia and is associated with persistent access operations against government environments.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
REF2924

NAPLISTENER is an HTTP listener written in C#... creates an HTTP request listener that can process incoming requests from the internet, reads any data that was submitted, decodes it from Base64 format, and executes it in memory.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Wmdtc.exe was created and installed as a Windows Service using a naming convention similar to the legitimate binary used by the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service (Msdtc.exe).”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Wmdtc.exe was created and installed as a Windows Service using a naming convention similar to the legitimate binary used by the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service (Msdtc.exe).”

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“When a request comes in, it reads any data that was submitted (stored in a Form field), decodes it from Base64 format, and creates a new HttpRequest object with the decoded data.”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

“Wmdtc.exe was created and installed as a Windows Service using a naming convention similar to the legitimate binary used by the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service (Msdtc.exe).”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

“Any web request to /ews/MsExgHealthCheckd/ that contains a base64-encoded .NET assembly in the sdafwe3rwe23 parameter will be loaded and executed in memory.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“NAPLISTENER creates an HTTP request listener that can process incoming requests from the Internet, and respond accordingly by filtering malware commands and transparently passing along legitimate web traffic.”

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.