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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
These campaigns utilized “fileless” loading of a relatively new malware called August through the use of Word macros and PowerShell. August contains stealing functionality targeting credentials and sensitive documents from the infected computer.
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
These campaigns utilized “fileless” loading of a relatively new malware called August through the use of Word macros and PowerShell... the emails used references to issues with supposed purchases on the company’s website... the attached document contained detailed information about the issue. However, the documents contained macros that could download and install August Stealer.
These campaigns utilized “fileless” loading of a relatively new malware called August through the use of Word macros and PowerShell.
August is written in .NET, with samples obfuscated with Confuser... there are few lines of code that deobfuscate the array through an XOR operation... Use simple encryption of network data via base64 encoding, character replacement, adding a random key... and reversing the strings.
Collect cookies and passwords from Firefox, Chrome, Thunderbird, and Outlook
Communicate the hardware ID, OS name, and victim's username to the C&C server.
It filters out security researchers and sandboxes using checks including Maxmind, task counts, task names, and recent file counts.
Use simple encryption of network data via base64 encoding, character replacement, adding a random key (passed to server encoded in the User-Agent field), and reversing the strings.
20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.