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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

SOMNIRECORD

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

SOMNIRECORD is a C++ Windows backdoor associated with the REF2924 intrusion set, a state-sponsored, espionage-motivated cluster assessed as China-nexus. It uses DNS as its command-and-control transport, retrieving queued commands from DNS TXT records and returning hex-encoded command output through DNS queries, allowing its traffic to blend with DNS and potentially bypass egress filtering and network monitoring controls. SOMNIRECORD generates a per-instance identifier, supports host discovery and running-process enumeration, executes programs already present on the compromised host, and permits operators to adjust its beacon interval. It can also write a hard-coded ASPX web shell to an operator-selected location. Its implementation has been assessed as adapted from logic resembling the open-source DNS-Persist project. SOMNIRECORD has been observed alongside SIESTAGRAPH, NAPLISTENER, and DOORME in REF2924 operations affecting government environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF2924

This environment has already seen the emergence of the REF2924 intrusion set (SIESTAGRAPH, NAPLISTENER, SOMNIRECORD, and DOORME).

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“ECM” allows the malware to execute any software already present on the system, such as cmd.exe.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

“WS” is used to deploy an ASPX-based webshell to a specified path. The ASPX is hardcoded into the malware itself.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

“PSL” is used to list all processes currently running on the infected machine by executing the system command “tasklist”.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

“SYS” is used to retrieve information about the infected machine... collects information about the computer name, the number of processors, OEM ID, and processor type.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.004DNSEvidence1

SOMNIRECORD communicates with command and control (C2) while masquerading as DNS... The backdoor retrieves each command individually by sending a DNS query for a TXT record.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

SOMNIRECORD... encod[es] the output of executed commands as hex values... [and] performs a DNS query to the subdomain, allowing the encoded command output to be transmitted to the C2 server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware then performs a DNS query to the subdomain, allowing the encoded command output to be transmitted to the C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.