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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
HLOADER’s is a self-signed binary written in Swift; it’s main purpose is to create persistence on the system through execution flow hijacking of the widely used chat application Discord.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Mach-O persistence component that replaces the Discord executable, restores the legitimate binary at launch, and re-executes both Discord and SUGARLOADER to maintain repeated execution without relying on standard background login items.
A Swift-based persistence loader that replaces the legitimate Discord binary, temporarily renames files, launches both the real Discord app and SUGARLOADER, and then restores filenames. It is used to hijack Discord execution flow for persistence on macOS.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.