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Malware2 associated actors

Smoke

Tracked since Jun 15, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs10Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Process injectionDefense evasionPersistence
Delivery
Cracked software
Platforms
Windows

Smoke Loader is a modular Windows malware family first identified in 2011. It primarily downloads and executes additional malware and also supports information theft. It is used in multi-stage criminal infection chains to deploy secondary payloads.

Observed behavior includes injecting malicious code into Windows Explorer, communicating with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, and executing PowerShell commands to add Microsoft Defender exclusions. Smoke Loader has also configured scheduled tasks to launch a cryptocurrency-mining payload at system startup with elevated privileges. These behaviors provide stealthy execution, weaken endpoint protection, and maintain execution of secondary malware.

Smoke Loader has appeared in infection chains originating from fake cracked-software downloads, including a campaign in which PrivateLoader launched it alongside multiple information stealers and other malware. The financially motivated Silence group has also manually modified and used Smoke as part of its toolkit for attacks against financial institutions. Its use by different criminal operators is not limited to a single threat actor or industry.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Silence

When needed, the group would also manually modify malware developed by other crooks, such as the Kikothac backdoor, the Smoke downloader, or the Undernet DDoS bot.

via zdnet zero dayzdnet.com
FAKESECURITY

When the malicious code is executed, the file downloads the payload from http://google-document[.]co.za/doc/loader.exe. Signature analysis showed that the downloaded file is a Smoke loader sample.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Process 4192 runs a command that will start a scheduled task called “GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC” using schtasks... (T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

Stealth

1 technique
T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

The purpose is to evade analysis environments with time-based methods, and the Windows Task Scheduler can be abused... (T1497.003 – Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion, and T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Process 4192 runs a command that uses PowerShell to tell the Windows Defender to ignore the current user’s profile folder... and the Program Files folder... (T1562.001 – Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools).

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

The purpose is to evade analysis environments with time-based methods, and the Windows Task Scheduler can be abused... (T1497.003 – Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion, and T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task).

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Process 4440 is also seen communicating with its C2 server, 185[.]216.70.235 and 195.20.16[.]45 via port 80 (T1071 – Application Layer Protocol).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.