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Malware5 associated actors

Lorem Ipsum

Tracked since Jun 16, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs130Tracked
Also known asLorem Ipsum BackdoorLorem Ipsum Loader
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Vice Society

The investigation followed a September incident in which attackers used ClickFix to deploy Lorem Ipsum Loader and a Python tunnel client.

via itsecurityguruitsecurityguru.org
Rapid Brigantine

In late September, we investigated an incident where threat actors leveraged ClickFix to deploy the Lorem Ipsum Loader malware and load a Python tunnel client into victims.

via forescoutforescout.com
Gold Victor

Sophos analysts identified the deployment of Lorem Ipsum Loader, a shellcode-based loader first observed by BlueVoyant in February 2026.

via sophos blogsophos.com
Fox Tempest

The Click Fix technique has also been observed in an active campaign that uses at least five compromised WordPress sites as a starting point to deliver a nascent loader, and backdoor codenamed Lorem Ipsum Loader.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Forging Marauder

The Click Fix technique has also been observed in an active campaign that uses at least five compromised WordPress sites as a starting point to deliver a nascent loader, and backdoor codenamed Lorem Ipsum Loader.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

11 techniques
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

Campaign infrastructure is consistently registered through NameCheap with Withheld-for-Privacy domain privacy service out of Iceland and weaponized within hours to days of registration

T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

In October 2025, MSTIC publicly attributed and disrupted a Rapid Brigantine campaign distributing fake MSTeamsSetup.exe files hosted on Teams-themed malicious domains ... driven by SEO poisoning and malvertising.

T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

For the new ClickFix delivery model, Lorem Ipsum's operator is currently using at least five legitimate but compromised WordPress websites to host its ClickFix lures.

T1584.006Web ServicesEvidence2

The pivot to ClickFix lures hosted on compromised WordPress (WP) sites significantly broadens the potential victim pool.

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1588.001 (Obtain Capabilities: Malware)

T1588.005ExploitsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1588.005 (Obtain Capabilities: Exploits)

T1608Stage CapabilitiesEvidence1

In the March 2026 iteration of the campaign, the operators relied on plainraw[.]com ... to serve gzip-compressed, hex-encoded PowerShell payloads under disposable /raw/<hex> URL paths embedded in the trojanized MSI installers.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1608.001 (Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware)

T1608.002Upload ToolEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1608.002 (Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool)

T1608.004Drive-by TargetEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1608.004 (Drive-by Target)

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence3

The first phase, observed in March and April, relied on SEO-poisoned websites distributing trojanized Microsoft Teams MSI installers.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques T1102.001 (Dead Drop Resolver) T1189 (Drive-by Compromise) T1204.004 (Malicious Copy and Paste)

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

An injected iframe on the website displays a fake browser update notification about the user's browser being out of date.

Execution

10 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

"The scheduled task uses /sc minute /mo 60 and runs immediately."

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

“[ClickFix] substitut[es] the legitimacy of a validly signed installer with... a user voluntarily executing the malicious command in their own terminal.”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

A trojanized Teams installer "contains an intermediate PowerShell file" that decodes a GZIP-compressed final stage.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The detection table identifies "powershell.exe → cmd.exe /c" execution of "1.bat" with a signed executable argument.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

...downloads a ZIP file and an outdated version of Node.js released in 2017 (version 7.10.1) to execute JavaScript-based payloads present within the archive...

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The MSI file contains a custom action that executes the PowerShell loader component silently by incorporating the -WindowStyle Hidden flag

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

TerminalFix lures direct users to open a Windows Terminal window, where victims execute a PowerShell command.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

the pop-op instructs the user to paste a provided PowerShell command, disguised as a Microsoft Edge security intelligence update, into their Windows Terminal.

T1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteEvidence1

The website displays an iframe, presenting the user with a fake pop up indicating that their browser is out of date. The iframe includes instructions on how to remediate, simply by opening up windows terminal ( wt.exe ) and pasting a command into the terminal.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Each ZIP contains "a clean signed Microsoft executable, a trojanized DLL that the executable loads, and a .bat file."

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

"The scheduled task uses /sc minute /mo 60 and runs immediately."

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

...including a batch script that sets up persistence by launching a DLL side-loading chain to execute a malicious DLL...

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

"Script 1.bat writes an HKCU Run registry value and creates a scheduled task for persistence."

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

"The scheduled task uses /sc minute /mo 60 and runs immediately."

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader "relaunches a second copy of the sideload executable and injects itself into it, after which the original process exits."

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

...including a batch script that sets up persistence by launching a DLL side-loading chain to execute a malicious DLL...

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

"Script 1.bat writes an HKCU Run registry value and creates a scheduled task for persistence."

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Lorem Ipsum uses "word-based shellcode encoding," while Axolotl's decrypted shellcode uses "a distinct stack-junk obfuscator."

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

The image files contain encoded data that the malware extracts and decodes to facilitate C2 communications.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

the Lorem Ipsum loader begins by resolving various Windows libraries using the API LoadLibraryA ... then resolves specific corresponding APIs using GetProcAddress

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Axolotl's ciphertext "is appended after the PNG IEND chunk inside a named PNG resource." Lorem Ipsum carries malicious content in an added ".cpoc section."

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Auto-run entries masquerad[e] as legitimate Microsoft or software-update components.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The loader "relaunches a second copy of the sideload executable and injects itself into it, after which the original process exits."

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The MSI file contains a custom action that executes the PowerShell loader component silently by incorporating the -WindowStyle Hidden flag

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Lorem Ipsum's decoded blob "jumps over an embedded decoy JPEG and XORs the remaining content in 8-byte units."

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

Following API resolution, the shellcode creates a mutex via CreateMutexA to prevent concurrent execution.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The MSI file contains a custom action that executes the PowerShell loader component silently by incorporating the -WindowStyle Hidden flag, concealing it from the end user

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Each ZIP contains "a clean signed Microsoft executable, a trojanized DLL that the executable loads, and a .bat file."

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The second PowerShell code is responsible for decoding another Base64-encoded payload embedded within itself, decompress it using gzip, and reflectively loads it directly into memory for execution, ensuring it is never written to disk.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Next, the backdoor gathers information about the impacted host, storing the information in JSON.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The loader sends "a POST request to /api/init/ with Content-Type: image/jpeg and an embedded decoy JPEG as the body" and then polls every five seconds.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

Lorem Ipsum Loader issues an HTTP request to an attacker-controlled profile hosted on the legitimate Letsdiskuss platform... to retrieve the current set of C2 servers.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence5

A public forum profile's about field "carries a C2 list framed by -=( and )=- and encoded using a dictionary."

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

Each infection beacons to three redundant Cloudflare-fronted C2 domains using the same per-victim UUID, complicating takedown and rendering IP-based blocking ineffective.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The hunting table identifies "powershell.exe creating libgcc_s_seh-1.dll and libwinpthread-1.dll beside an unsigned DLL" under a public user directory.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

the loader attempts to establish communication by transmitting its embedded JFIF image to the C2 server using a Content-Type: image/jpeg header rather than a conventional HTTPS request.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

130 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
itsecurityguruNews · Oct 16, 2026Forescout ClickFix - IT Security GuruLoader deployed through ClickFix in an incident contained before any ransomware deployment. Researchers suspected ransomware delivery was the intended goal and noted that the tradecraft had previously been attributed to Vice Society. Analysis of five samples identified another delivery method using MSI installers and multi-stage PowerShell. Infrastructure overlaps and command-and-control similarities suggest it may be a later iteration of Axolotl, but that relationship is unconfirmed.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 15, 2026Hackers Use ClickFix and Python Tunnels to Prepare Systems for Ransomware AttacksWindows loader delivered through DLL sideloading or a modified Teams MSI and PowerShell chain. It conceals its payload using word-based encoding and XOR, executes code in memory, interferes with endpoint monitoring, and injects code into another process. Registry startup entries and hourly scheduled tasks provide persistence. It retrieves encoded command-server information from public forum profiles and polls for tasks every five seconds. The observed chain downloaded a Python client providing bidirectional TCP tunneling over TLS-protected WebSockets. Containment prevented the suspected ransomware stage; neither ransomware deployment nor attribution to Vice Society was confirmed.Read more ↗forescoutNews · Oct 14, 2026From ClickFix to C2: Comparative Analysis of Two Malware Loaders - ForescoutLoader delivered through ClickFix or TerminalFix lures, trojanized installers, DLL sideloading, Node.js droppers, and PowerShell scripts. It conceals shellcode through word-dictionary encoding, compression, and XOR decoding; some DLL samples contain an added .cpoc section. It supports registry and scheduled-task persistence, process injection, and ntdll unhooking for defense evasion. Public-forum dead-drop profiles supply C2 addresses, and WinHTTP communications use JPEG registration bodies and a Firefox-like user agent. The investigated incident delivered a Python reverse-tunnel implant and was contained before the suspected ransomware deployment. Its relationship to Axolotl is supported by behavioral and infrastructure similarities, but a direct evolutionary relationship remains unproven.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Oct 6, 2026TerminalFix and Lorem Ipsum Loader enable covert tunneling | Community Portal | GuruculA malware loader identified in intrusions investigated in August 2026 involving TerminalFix social-engineering lures and deployment of a Python-based tunneling implant. The intrusions involved command-and-control infrastructure, persistence, and DLL sideloading and were linked to the STAC4924 campaign. The content does not detail the loader's specific functionality.Read more ↗
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IOC matching130Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.