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CcProtect.sys is a legitimate Windows kernel driver distributed with the Chinese CnCrypt disk-encryption product. It has been catalogued as a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver-style abuse candidate because publicly available proof-of-concept code demonstrates its ability to terminate processes from kernel mode. Threat actors have deployed renamed copies of the driver in Windows malware operations to disable antivirus and endpoint detection and response products, thereby supporting SYSTEM-level post-compromise activity and defense evasion. In one observed campaign, a renamed copy was installed as a service and used to repeatedly terminate security processes. The driver’s process-termination capability was abused directly rather than through a demonstrated memory-corruption exploit.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A signed Chinese disk-encryption/host-defense kernel driver whose process-termination functionality was abused by the campaign. Installed under the Alinubx.sys filename, it operated at kernel level to disable 145 antivirus and EDR products, enabling Rapuncel credential theft.
Pilote noyau dont Alinubx.sys est décrit comme une version renommée. Il est matériellement lié à la capacité BYOVD de désactivation des défenses de la campagne.
An abusable signed driver from the CnCrypt disk-encryption product. The Alinubx.sys payload is described as a renamed copy sharing its product name, version, and submitter; it is capable of terminating security processes and is used as the lineage for the malicious driver.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.