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Malware

CryptoBandits

Tracked since Jun 18, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs4Tracked

CryptoBandits is a Windows-based cryptocurrency clipper and stealer malware family, tracked by Microsoft as Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits.A, that has been active since at least February 2026. It spreads via malicious Windows shortcut (.LNK) files on USB/removable drives. The worm component hides legitimate documents such as DOC, XLSX, and PDF files, replaces them with look-alike malicious shortcuts using the same names and icons, and propagates to newly connected removable media. It establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and has been reported to add Microsoft Defender exclusions for staging folders and related binaries.

Its primary theft behavior is clipboard hijacking: it monitors the clipboard roughly every 500 milliseconds for cryptocurrency wallet addresses, 12- or 24-word BIP39 seed phrases, Ethereum private keys, and Bitcoin WIF keys. When wallet addresses are copied, it replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses, including for Bitcoin legacy, P2SH, Bech32, Taproot, Tron, and Monero formats. It also captures screenshots, commonly five over a ten-second interval, for exfiltration.

CryptoBandits uses Windows Script Host components such as wscript.exe and cscript.exe, along with PowerShell, cmd.exe, ActiveX/WScript logic, curl, and a bundled portable Tor client renamed ugate.exe. It routes command-and-control traffic through a local SOCKS5 proxy on 127.0.0.1:9050 and communicates with Tor hidden-service (.onion) infrastructure, including use of /route.php for check-ins and command retrieval, /recvf.php for file uploads, and /stub.php for payload downloads. The malware includes backdoor functionality via an EVAL command that enables arbitrary code execution by downloading JavaScript into a local file named cfile and executing it, effectively making it a lightweight backdoor in addition to a crypto-stealer.

The malware uses layered obfuscation, including a Python-based installer obfuscated with PyArmor and packaged with PyInstaller, plus obfuscated JavaScript payloads stored under C:\Users\Public\Documents. It performs a simple anti-analysis check by detecting Task Manager and exiting if taskmgr.exe is running. Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Defender for Endpoint detect related activity under names including Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits.A, Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits.B, Trojan:JS/CryptoBandits.A, and Trojan:JS/CryptoBandits.B. Reported indicators include SHA-256 hashes 7630debd35cac6b7d58c4427695579b3e3a8b1cc462f523234cd6c698882a68c and a7abf1d9d6686af1cefcd60b17a312e7eb8cfe267def1ec34aeab6128c811630, and .onion C2 domains such as cgky6bn6ux5wvlybtmm3z255igt52ljml2ngnc5qp3cnw5jlglamisad.onion and gfoqsewps57xcyxoedle2gd53o6jne6y5nq5eh25muksqwzutzq7b3ad.onion.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence4

The malware spreads through malicious Windows shortcut (.LNK) files on USB drives... The worm copies itself to any new USB drive connected to an infected machine.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then drops its main files ... and finally sets up automatic background tasks to keep running and infect any new USB drives plugged into the computer.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

An EVAL command from the server runs new code hidden in a local file named cfile, granting attackers permanent remote control.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

Malicious .LNK files execute hidden commands through wscript.exe and cscript.exe (Windows Script Host) to install the malware without user awareness.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

Specifically, the malware downloads JavaScript content into a file named 'cfile' and executes it on the infected machine.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The infection starts via USB flash drives containing malicious shortcut (.lnk) files. Clicking the shortcut launches a hidden worm instead of a document.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then drops its main files ... and finally sets up automatic background tasks to keep running and infect any new USB drives plugged into the computer.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

злоумышленники размещают вредоносный файл LNK... Найденные файлы скрываются, а вместо них создаются одноименные ярлыки. Для пользователя все выглядит привычно: он дважды кликает по «документу», но после этого запускает вредонос.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then drops its main files ... and finally sets up automatic background tasks to keep running and infect any new USB drives plugged into the computer.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

злоумышленники размещают вредоносный файл LNK... Найденные файлы скрываются, а вместо них создаются одноименные ярлыки. Для пользователя все выглядит привычно: он дважды кликает по «документу», но после этого запускает вредонос.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The malware employs multiple layers of evasion: PyArmor obfuscation... Dual-layer JavaScript obfuscation... All malware components are encrypted and only decrypted at runtime.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Перед запуском он проверяет список активных процессов и завершает работу, если обнаруживает диспетчер задач.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Task Manager detection: The malware checks whether Task Manager is running and exits if it detects the process, frustrating casual investigation.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

This worm hides the original files on the USB drive and creates matching malicious shortcuts to trick more users.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Legitimate documents on infected USB drives are hidden using Windows file attribute manipulation and replaced with malicious .LNK shortcuts bearing identical names and icons.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

To evade detection, it configures Windows Defender exclusions to bypass scanning on its setup folders.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Перед запуском он проверяет список активных процессов и завершает работу, если обнаруживает диспетчер задач.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Task Manager detection: The malware checks whether Task Manager is running and exits if it detects the process, frustrating casual investigation.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence4

The malware spreads through malicious Windows shortcut (.LNK) files on USB drives... The worm copies itself to any new USB drive connected to an infected machine.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Malware extracts BIP39 seed phrases, Ethereum private keys, Bitcoin WIF keys, and captures five screenshots over ten seconds for exfiltration to the C2 server.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

The malware includes a surveillance module that captures five screenshots over a ten-second interval, packaging them for upload to the C2 server.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence4

Once running, it monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses, seed phrases, and private keys, replacing copied addresses with attacker-controlled ones.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The central component of the threat is the bundled Tor client, which routes communication over localhost:9050 and resolves destination domains to reduce DNS visibility and hide its C&C location.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

регистрирует жертву на управляющем сервере и начинает постоянный обмен командами через локальный SOCKS5-прокси.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Dubbed CryptoBandits, the malware has been used in attacks since February 2026, deploying a portable Tor client on the infected systems and routing traffic through a local SOCKS5 proxy.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence3

The malware bundles a portable Tor client (ugate.exe) and routes all traffic through a SOCKS5 proxy on localhost:9050 to a hidden .onion service.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

A command called EVAL allows the C2 operators to push and execute arbitrary code on infected machines... the malware downloads JavaScript content into a file named 'cfile' and executes it.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

обычный криптостилер фактически превращается в легковесный бэкдор с возможностью удаленного выполнения кода.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

A tool called curl is used to send data to a .onion website. ... /recvf.php to upload screenshots

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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hackreadNews · Jun 23, 2026New CryptoBandits Malware Uses USB Drives and Tor to Steal CryptoWindows-based cryptocurrency clipper active since February 2026 that spreads via malicious USB .lnk shortcuts, hides files, sets Windows Defender exclusions, monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses, private keys, and seed phrases, swaps copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, captures screenshots, communicates over a bundled Tor client, and can execute server-supplied code for persistent remote control.Read more ↗security weekNews · Jun 22, 2026North Korean Hackers Blamed for Mastra NPM Supply Chain Attack - SecurityWeekReferenced only by title as malware that doubles as a backdoor and abuses Tor.Read more ↗xakepNews · Jun 22, 2026USB-червь распространяет малварь для кражи криптовалюты - ХакерWindows malware active since at least February 2026 that spreads via USB drives using malicious LNK files. It steals cryptocurrency-related data by monitoring the clipboard, harvesting BIP39 seed phrases and private keys, replacing wallet addresses, taking screenshots, and communicating with operators over Tor hidden services. It also behaves like a worm by copying itself to new USB devices and supports remote code execution via attacker-supplied JavaScript.Read more ↗threataft blogNews · Jun 22, 2026USB Worm CryptoBandits Steals Cryptocurrency via Windows Shortcut Files | ThreatAftA USB-propagating Windows worm that spreads via malicious .LNK shortcut files, hides legitimate documents, replaces them with look-alike shortcuts, hijacks cryptocurrency clipboard data, steals seed phrases and private keys, captures screenshots, and communicates with C2 over a bundled Tor client. It also supports arbitrary code execution via EVAL, functioning as a lightweight backdoor.Read more ↗
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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.