FunkyBot
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
It is known to infect victims with the following range of malware families for the Android OS: FakeCop, FakeSpy, MoqHao and FunkyBot.
Techniques & procedures
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Last year, FortiGuard Labs identified a malware campaign targeting Japanese users. The campaign impersonated a logistics company and deployed an Android malware called FakeSpy.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
KeepAliceMain This Class is used as persistence mechanism by the malware... This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
KeepAliceMain This Class is used as persistence mechanism by the malware... This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The code of the packer in the sample we analysed was obfuscated.
As in their previous campaigns, this payload consists of a packer and a payload.
The different values of the configuration variable ‘ type’ correspond to different decryption routines... 2/3 : variations of XOR based decryption with the value `0x51` (81).
the code accesses the folder /data/data/<appname>/app_csn0/ and creates a folder ‘ .unzip’ in it. Note that the name of the folder contains a dot as the first character, making it invisible to a normal ls command.
The payload is started by calling the method `runCode` class `com.wfk.injectplugin.EntryPoint` through Java reflection.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
After the connection to the server is started, the malware proceeds to collect and send the following information about the device: IMEI IMSI Phone number List of contacts
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
Finally, the resulting string is decrypted using DES and a key is generated using the value `d2a57dc1d883fd21fb9951699df71cc7` as its seed
This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.
this malware uses social media to obtain its C2: it downloads the webpage of a photo-less Instagram account. It then extracts the biography field of this account and decodes it using Base64.
It then extracts the biography field of this account and decodes it using Base64.
The server address is not hardcoded in the `classes.dex` file, but it is retrieved during execution.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
After the connection to the server is started, the malware proceeds to collect and send the following information about the device: IMEI IMSI Phone number List of contacts
Observables
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.