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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

FunkyBot

Tracked since Jun 25, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Roaming Mantis

It is known to infect victims with the following range of malware families for the Android OS: FakeCop, FakeSpy, MoqHao and FunkyBot.

via medium csis techblogmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Last year, FortiGuard Labs identified a malware campaign targeting Japanese users. The campaign impersonated a logistics company and deployed an Android malware called FakeSpy.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

KeepAliceMain This Class is used as persistence mechanism by the malware... This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

KeepAliceMain This Class is used as persistence mechanism by the malware... This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The code of the packer in the sample we analysed was obfuscated.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

As in their previous campaigns, this payload consists of a packer and a payload.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The different values of the configuration variable ‘ type’ correspond to different decryption routines... 2/3 : variations of XOR based decryption with the value `0x51` (81).

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

the code accesses the folder /data/data/<appname>/app_csn0/ and creates a folder ‘ .unzip’ in it. Note that the name of the folder contains a dot as the first character, making it invisible to a normal ls command.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The payload is started by calling the method `runCode` class `com.wfk.injectplugin.EntryPoint` through Java reflection.

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

After the connection to the server is started, the malware proceeds to collect and send the following information about the device: IMEI IMSI Phone number List of contacts

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Finally, the resulting string is decrypted using DES and a key is generated using the value `d2a57dc1d883fd21fb9951699df71cc7` as its seed

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This class periodically re-launches the main service used by the malware to create a gRPC connection to a remote server.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

this malware uses social media to obtain its C2: it downloads the webpage of a photo-less Instagram account. It then extracts the biography field of this account and decodes it using Base64.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

It then extracts the biography field of this account and decodes it using Base64.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The server address is not hardcoded in the `classes.dex` file, but it is retrieved during execution.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

After the connection to the server is started, the malware proceeds to collect and send the following information about the device: IMEI IMSI Phone number List of contacts

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.