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Malware

TONResolver

Tracked since Jun 29, 2026 · Updated 14 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs144Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

TONResolver is a JavaScript-based remote access trojan targeting Windows systems and executed through the legitimate Node.js runtime. Identified in phishing activity in late May 2026, it has been deployed against hospitality organizations, particularly Japanese accommodation businesses affiliated with Booking.com. Campaigns impersonate guest complaints, review requests, reservation inquiries, and legal threats. Both bulk messages and conversational phishing direct recipients to ZIP archives containing malicious Windows shortcuts disguised as photographs. Executing a shortcut launches PowerShell scripts that deploy the malware and obtain Node.js when required.

TONResolver uses The Open Network (TON) blockchain as a command-and-control dead drop resolver. It queries a public TON API to invoke a smart contract's get_domain method and retrieve the current command-and-control domain. Operators can update the contract to redirect existing infections without redistributing the malware. The implant communicates with the resolved server over WebSocket, using ECDH over secp256k1, HKDF-SHA256, and AES-256-CBC to protect communications. It transmits host-profiling information, including the username, hostname, operating system, processor count, memory information, and MAC address, maintains a 20-second keepalive cycle, and reconnects after network interruptions.

The malware employs custom virtual-machine-based obfuscation to hinder static analysis and establishes persistence through a per-user Windows Run entry. It provides a foothold for attacker commands and additional payload deployment. Follow-on activity has included a separate executable attempting credential theft through access to Chrome and Edge user data and interaction with the Windows security subsystem. This activity does not establish credential theft as an intrinsic TONResolver function. No named threat actor has been conclusively attributed to the campaigns.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence6

Attackers are targeting employees of Booking.com partner companies in Japan, using phishing emails that impersonate guest complaints and review requests to trick hotel staff into executing malicious files.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence6

In this attack, a zip file was downloaded by accessing a hyperlink to a suspicious web site, and the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The script then executes Invoke-WebRequest against the reconstructed domain, saves the retrieved PS1 file under "%TEMP%", and executes it with PowerShell.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

The PowerShell command embedded in the LNK file handles two large integers... reconstructing the destination domain. The script then executes Invoke-WebRequest against the reconstructed domain, saves the retrieved PS1 file under "%TEMP%", and executes it with PowerShell.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence5

The JavaScript file executed with arguments by node.exe (detection name: TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A) was identified as malware functioning as a remote access trojan (RAT).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

The infection begins when a user downloads a zip file via a hyperlink in the email and executes a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo (PNG) file contained within the archive.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

Within the ZIP file lied a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file that led to the installation of TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Checking and setting Run key persistence (HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Inside is a shortcut file (.LNK) disguised as a photo, and clicking it triggers a PowerShell command

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Checking and setting Run key persistence (HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Inside is a shortcut file (.LNK) disguised as a photo, and clicking it triggers a PowerShell command

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

This RAT malware employs VM-based obfuscation, making it impossible to reveal details through pure static analysis alone.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Starting from the node.exe process loaded with TONResolver, an executable was deployed... and further execution was found to have attempted credential theft.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the attacker packaged the malware as a Node.js application and applied virtual machine-based obfuscation, a method that wraps the code inside a protected execution environment, preventing security researchers from easily inspecting its logic through static analysis alone.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The deployed executable was observed performing operations on the following folders and involving the “C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe” process.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

further execution was found to have attempted credential theft... These folders contain browser-stored password SQLite DBs, Cookie DBs, History, autofill, bookmark information, and other data

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

These folders contain browser-stored password SQLite DBs, Cookie DBs, History, autofill, bookmark information, and other data, raising suspicion of exfiltration by the attacker.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The endpoint information transmission in type:4 was confirmed to contain the following information... the endpoint's username, hostname

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Transmission of endpoint information... includes the endpoint's username, hostname, as well as OS, CPU core count, memory information, and MAC address hardware information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The deployed executable was observed performing operations on the following folders... C:\Users\<UserName>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\ ... Microsoft\Edge\User Data\

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the attacker packaged the malware as a Node.js application and applied virtual machine-based obfuscation, a method that wraps the code inside a protected execution environment, preventing security researchers from easily inspecting its logic through static analysis alone.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Attackers in both campaigns use similar social engineering tactics... and ultimately deliver malware through zip archives containing Windows shortcut files disguised as images.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Connection to C&C domain via WebSocket communication... Keepalive every 20 seconds... Command reception from C&C server

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Connection to C&C domain via WebSocket communication

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

dead drop resolver (DDR) is any mechanism where malware fetches its command and control (C2) address at runtime from a third-party, cyberattacker-controlled location instead of hardcoding it. | The loader posts JSON-RPC to the same high-reputation crypto SaaS hosts that wallets and decentralized applications use (Infura, Cloudflare, Binance, publicnode), so host-only network signatures drown in false positives.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence6

The use of a blockchain to resolve C2 infrastructure, also known as blockchain-based dead drop resolving, is a novel technique to create more persistent ways of providing updated C2s to infected hosts.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

If Node.exe does not exist, “node-v24.13.0-win-x64.zip” is retrieved from the official Node.js website... The Base64 string... is decrypted... to generate the JavaScript payload.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

The JavaScript file executed with arguments by node.exe... was identified as malware functioning as a remote access trojan (RAT).

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The ABI-decoded response holds the C2 pointer. Operators pick the encoding: a plain UTF-8 URL, Base64, Base64 plus XOR, gzip plus Base64, or a bash one-liner.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

All traffic is encrypted using WebSocket with ECDH key exchange and AES-256-CBC, making packet-level inspection largely ineffective against this threat.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence1

Keepalive every 20 seconds

Indicators of compromise

Observables

144 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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rhisacNews · Oct 9, 2026RH-ISAC | Hackers Utilize Negative Hotel Reviews to Spread AI-Variant Malware; Hiding C2 on Blockchain - RH-ISACNodeJS-based malware delivered through malicious LNK shortcuts in archives linked from fabricated guest complaints and related hospitality lures. It obtains its current command-and-control address from the TON blockchain, enabling infrastructure rotation without updating deployed malware and complicating conventional domain and IP takedowns.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 8, 2026Hackers Use Negative Hotel Reviews to Spread Malware That Hides C2 on BlockchainDelivered through hotel complaint-themed phishing emails and malicious Windows shortcuts disguised as images. It runs using Node.js and retrieves its external C2 address through a public TON blockchain API using wallet or smart-contract data. The blockchain supplies directions to the command server rather than issuing commands itself. Operators can update these directions to help infections survive C2 infrastructure takedowns.Read more ↗cofense blogNews · Oct 7, 2026From Guest Complaints to Malware: Blockchain Abuse Targets HotelsDelivered through malicious LNK shortcuts in archives linked from fabricated guest complaints, reviews, or inquiries. Runs through NodeJS and queries a public TON API to retrieve an encoded C2 address stored in wallet or smart-contract data. Blockchain transactions allow operators to rotate C2 infrastructure while infected hosts continue consulting the same on-chain address. Similarities to EtherRAT suggest possible shared loader infrastructure, but the report does not establish common operators.Read more ↗netskope blogNews · Aug 18, 2026Blockchain Dead Drop Resolvers Explained - NetskopeMalware/tooling that uses TON blockchain DNS smart-contract get_domain calls as a dead drop resolver to obtain a C2 domain, with operators able to rotate the value over time.Read more ↗
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IOC matching144Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.