TONResolver
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
- Delivery
- PhishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
TONResolver is a JavaScript-based remote access trojan targeting Windows systems and executed through the legitimate Node.js runtime. Identified in phishing activity in late May 2026, it has been deployed against hospitality organizations, particularly Japanese accommodation businesses affiliated with Booking.com. Campaigns impersonate guest complaints, review requests, reservation inquiries, and legal threats. Both bulk messages and conversational phishing direct recipients to ZIP archives containing malicious Windows shortcuts disguised as photographs. Executing a shortcut launches PowerShell scripts that deploy the malware and obtain Node.js when required.
TONResolver uses The Open Network (TON) blockchain as a command-and-control dead drop resolver. It queries a public TON API to invoke a smart contract's get_domain method and retrieve the current command-and-control domain. Operators can update the contract to redirect existing infections without redistributing the malware. The implant communicates with the resolved server over WebSocket, using ECDH over secp256k1, HKDF-SHA256, and AES-256-CBC to protect communications. It transmits host-profiling information, including the username, hostname, operating system, processor count, memory information, and MAC address, maintains a 20-second keepalive cycle, and reconnects after network interruptions.
The malware employs custom virtual-machine-based obfuscation to hinder static analysis and establishes persistence through a per-user Windows Run entry. It provides a foothold for attacker commands and additional payload deployment. Follow-on activity has included a separate executable attempting credential theft through access to Chrome and Edge user data and interaction with the Windows security subsystem. This activity does not establish credential theft as an intrinsic TONResolver function. No named threat actor has been conclusively attributed to the campaigns.
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Attackers are targeting employees of Booking.com partner companies in Japan, using phishing emails that impersonate guest complaints and review requests to trick hotel staff into executing malicious files.
the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.
In this attack, a zip file was downloaded by accessing a hyperlink to a suspicious web site, and the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
The script then executes Invoke-WebRequest against the reconstructed domain, saves the retrieved PS1 file under "%TEMP%", and executes it with PowerShell.
The PowerShell command embedded in the LNK file handles two large integers... reconstructing the destination domain. The script then executes Invoke-WebRequest against the reconstructed domain, saves the retrieved PS1 file under "%TEMP%", and executes it with PowerShell.
The JavaScript file executed with arguments by node.exe (detection name: TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A) was identified as malware functioning as a remote access trojan (RAT).
The infection begins when a user downloads a zip file via a hyperlink in the email and executes a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo (PNG) file contained within the archive.
Within the ZIP file lied a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file that led to the installation of TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Checking and setting Run key persistence (HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)
Inside is a shortcut file (.LNK) disguised as a photo, and clicking it triggers a PowerShell command
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Checking and setting Run key persistence (HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)
Inside is a shortcut file (.LNK) disguised as a photo, and clicking it triggers a PowerShell command
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
This RAT malware employs VM-based obfuscation, making it impossible to reveal details through pure static analysis alone.
the infection began when the user clicked a shortcut link file (LNK) disguised as a photo file within the zip archive.
Starting from the node.exe process loaded with TONResolver, an executable was deployed... and further execution was found to have attempted credential theft.
the attacker packaged the malware as a Node.js application and applied virtual machine-based obfuscation, a method that wraps the code inside a protected execution environment, preventing security researchers from easily inspecting its logic through static analysis alone.
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
The deployed executable was observed performing operations on the following folders and involving the “C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe” process.
further execution was found to have attempted credential theft... These folders contain browser-stored password SQLite DBs, Cookie DBs, History, autofill, bookmark information, and other data
These folders contain browser-stored password SQLite DBs, Cookie DBs, History, autofill, bookmark information, and other data, raising suspicion of exfiltration by the attacker.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The endpoint information transmission in type:4 was confirmed to contain the following information... the endpoint's username, hostname
Transmission of endpoint information... includes the endpoint's username, hostname, as well as OS, CPU core count, memory information, and MAC address hardware information.
The deployed executable was observed performing operations on the following folders... C:\Users\<UserName>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\ ... Microsoft\Edge\User Data\
the attacker packaged the malware as a Node.js application and applied virtual machine-based obfuscation, a method that wraps the code inside a protected execution environment, preventing security researchers from easily inspecting its logic through static analysis alone.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Attackers in both campaigns use similar social engineering tactics... and ultimately deliver malware through zip archives containing Windows shortcut files disguised as images.
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
Connection to C&C domain via WebSocket communication... Keepalive every 20 seconds... Command reception from C&C server
Connection to C&C domain via WebSocket communication
dead drop resolver (DDR) is any mechanism where malware fetches its command and control (C2) address at runtime from a third-party, cyberattacker-controlled location instead of hardcoding it. | The loader posts JSON-RPC to the same high-reputation crypto SaaS hosts that wallets and decentralized applications use (Infura, Cloudflare, Binance, publicnode), so host-only network signatures drown in false positives.
The use of a blockchain to resolve C2 infrastructure, also known as blockchain-based dead drop resolving, is a novel technique to create more persistent ways of providing updated C2s to infected hosts.
If Node.exe does not exist, “node-v24.13.0-win-x64.zip” is retrieved from the official Node.js website... The Base64 string... is decrypted... to generate the JavaScript payload.
The JavaScript file executed with arguments by node.exe... was identified as malware functioning as a remote access trojan (RAT).
The ABI-decoded response holds the C2 pointer. Operators pick the encoding: a plain UTF-8 URL, Base64, Base64 plus XOR, gzip plus Base64, or a bash one-liner.
All traffic is encrypted using WebSocket with ECDH key exchange and AES-256-CBC, making packet-level inspection largely ineffective against this threat.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Keepalive every 20 seconds
Observables
144 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.