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Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

JADEPUFFER

Tracked since Jul 2, 2026 · Updated 11 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK51Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissanceScanningCredential theftExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementExtortion
Delivery
Landing page
Platforms
Linux

JADEPUFFER is an AI-agent-assisted ransomware operation associated with the financially motivated threat actor Storm-3168. Publicly documented in July 2026, it uses large language model assistance to coordinate exploitation, reconnaissance, credential harvesting, persistence, lateral movement, and data encryption. Initial claims that the operation was fully autonomous were subsequently qualified: human operators remained involved in target selection, infrastructure preparation, and attack oversight.

The operation exploits CVE-2025-3248, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow, to execute Python payloads on exposed AI workflow servers. Following compromise, it enumerates systems and internal services and harvests secrets, including cloud credentials, LLM-provider API keys, and database connection information. Observed activity included accessing MinIO with default credentials, establishing scheduled-task persistence, and pivoting to a production environment running MySQL and Alibaba Nacos.

JADEPUFFER abused a default Nacos signing key to forge authentication tokens and used database access to create a backdoor administrator account. It encrypted more than 1,300 configuration records, removed original database tables, and left a ransom demand. Its agent-assisted workflow adapted payloads after execution and authentication failures. Later activity included deployment of ENCFORGE, a locker targeting AI and machine-learning assets such as model checkpoints, vector databases, embedding indexes, and training data. Its targets include exposed enterprise AI infrastructure and associated production data services.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-3248via flareio blogExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow Code ValidationJadePuffer ransomware (Sysdig, via Hackmag): an LLM agent ran the whole chain from a Langflow RCE (CVE-2025-3248) to encrypting 1,342 Nacos config items. The key was never stored, so the data cannot be recovered. | JadePuffer ransomware ... an LLM agent ran the whole chain from a Langflow RCE (CVE-2025-3248) to encrypting 1,342 Nacos config items.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-29441via infosecurity magazine newsExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Alibaba Nacos AuthFilterAccess to a production MySQL server running Alibaba Nacos (Naming and Configuration Service), using root credentials Targeting of Nacos with various payloads including exploitation of CVE-2021-29441.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-55255via scworldExploited in the wildCross-user workflow execution IDOR in LangflowOn the Langflow bug, Calderone said his team believes that it’s likely the bigger concern. CVE-2026-55255 runs as an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) that lets any authenticated user execute another tenant's AI workflows, with all the secrets and credentials those flows hold.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Storm-3168

The activity is linked to JADEPUFFER agentic ransomware operations, documented earlier in a different intrusion.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
JADEPUFFER

Sysdig researchers were able to detect the campaign by analyzing an attack linked to the JadePuffer threat actor that exploited a critical vulnerability in Langflow to gain initial access.

via cysecurity newscysecurity.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

51 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

The agent found a year-old vulnerability in an internet-facing Langflow instance and enumerated the environment.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.007Artificial IntelligenceEvidence1

Для MITRE ATT&CK это маппируется на технику T1588.007 (Artificial Intelligence) из тактики Resource Development

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence10

Агент обнаружил MinIO на 127.0.0.1:9000 и провёл полный цикл перечисления с дефолтными credentials

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

probing various services using default credentials. During a MinIO object storage enumeration, the agent used default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin)

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence2

“Storm-3168 used compromised cloud identities” and “a stolen application credential can give an intruder broad control”; two compromised Azure service principals were used in the tenant.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

the second, moving laterally to the ultimate target—an independent production database server.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence18

CVE-2025-3248 - отсутствие аутентификации на эндпоинте /api/v1/validate/code , позволяющее удалённому неаутентифицированному атакующему выполнить произвольный Python через crafted HTTP-запрос.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence5

Persistence - через crontab с beacon каждые 30 минут на C2-сервер 45.131.66[.]106:4444 .

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

There were no new MITRE attack techniques. Seven of eight operations ran T1059, Command & Scripting Interpreter, the single most ordinary technique in the framework.

T1059.006PythonEvidence7

JADEPUFFER использовал именно эту уязвимость, доставляя все payload'ы как Base64-encoded Python через RCE-эндпоинт.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence5

Persistence - через crontab с beacon каждые 30 минут на C2-сервер 45.131.66[.]106:4444 .

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence10

Агент обнаружил MinIO на 127.0.0.1:9000 и провёл полный цикл перечисления с дефолтными credentials

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

probing various services using default credentials. During a MinIO object storage enumeration, the agent used default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin)

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence2

“Storm-3168 used compromised cloud identities” and “a stolen application credential can give an intruder broad control”; two compromised Azure service principals were used in the tenant.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

the second, moving laterally to the ultimate target—an independent production database server.

T1136Create AccountEvidence7

Инъекция backdoor-администратора напрямую в backing MySQL через root-доступ к БД.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

forging JWTs using the public default signing key, and directly injecting a backdoor admin account

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence5

Persistence - через crontab с beacon каждые 30 минут на C2-сервер 45.131.66[.]106:4444 .

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

Privilege Escalation Exploited Nacos (CVE-2021-29441) to bypass authentication, forge JWTs, and create administrative access.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence10

Агент обнаружил MinIO на 127.0.0.1:9000 и провёл полный цикл перечисления с дефолтными credentials

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

probing various services using default credentials. During a MinIO object storage enumeration, the agent used default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin)

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence2

“Storm-3168 used compromised cloud identities” and “a stolen application credential can give an intruder broad control”; two compromised Azure service principals were used in the tenant.

T1611Escape to HostEvidence2

Параллельно с этим ИИ искал возможность осуществить побег из контейнера

Stealth

5 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

...before staging the output to local files before reviewing and deleting them.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence10

Агент обнаружил MinIO на 127.0.0.1:9000 и провёл полный цикл перечисления с дефолтными credentials

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

probing various services using default credentials. During a MinIO object storage enumeration, the agent used default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin)

T1078.004Cloud AccountsEvidence2

“Storm-3168 used compromised cloud identities” and “a stolen application credential can give an intruder broad control”; two compromised Azure service principals were used in the tenant.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Tous les payloads étaient délivrés en Python encodé en Base64 via cet endpoint RCE.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

forging JWTs using the public default signing key, and directly injecting a backdoor admin account

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

# T1562.001 — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (Defense Evasion)

Credential Access

10 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Dubbed JadePuffer, the agent was used for harvesting and reusing credentials...

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

During the ransomware attack, JADEPUFFER hit an initial login attempt failure. The agent diagnosed the cause and issued a corrected payload within 31 seconds

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence2

The marimo case is the clean demonstration: an ATA gained entry through an ordinary CVE, then composed the entire post-exploitation chain live — credential harvesting, an AWS Secrets Manager call...

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence6

The same service principal made an inventory request for Azure Storage Accounts and sent more than 30 successful ListKeys requests, asking ARM to return each storage account's access keys.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Collecte de secrets ... credentials cloud ... credentials base de données ... extraction de credentials.json et fichiers .env

T1552.004Private KeysEvidence1

Collecte de secrets : clés API LLM (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Gemini)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence8

Параллельно - sweep credentials по категориям: API-ключи LLM-провайдеров, облачные credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Aliyun, Tencent, Huawei), криптовалютные кошельки, конфигурации баз данных.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

forging JWTs using the public default signing key, and directly injecting a backdoor admin account

T1606.001Web CookiesEvidence1

подделывал JWT с помощью стандартного ключа подписи

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

forged a JWT with the default signing key

Discovery

9 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Activities included: Enumerating hosts Discovering services Identifying accessible resources Mapping network relationships

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence6

Сканирование внутреннего адресного пространства с пробингом databases, object storage, secret stores.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

enumerating host information (system identification, kernel version, hostname, network interfaces, and running processes)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

AI-агент провёл System Information Discovery (T1082): id , uname -a , hostname , перечисление сетевых интерфейсов и процессов.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Reconnaissance système (id, uname, hostname, interfaces réseau, processus) ... extraction de credentials.json et fichiers .env

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

Collecte de secrets ... credentials cloud ... credentials base de données

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence5

“the first compromised identity spent about 15 hours and 30 minutes performing more than 300 successful read operations. It listed virtual machines, subscriptions, resource groups, and other resources.”

T1580Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryEvidence1

“the second identity checked virtual machines and groups across two subscriptions” and “examined App Service configuration stores.”

T1619Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryEvidence1

During a MinIO object storage enumeration, the agent used default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin) to list all buckets

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence3

Moved laterally to a production server running MySQL and Alibaba Nacos.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence2

it chained together known vulnerabilities, exposed services and default credentials before adapting its behaviour in real time when obstacles emerged

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

целевой GetObject на credentials.json и .env

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

...before staging the output to local files before reviewing and deleting them.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence3

Dumped the Langflow PostgreSQL database.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

http://45.131.66.106:4444/beacon

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

beaconant toutes les 30 minutes vers 45.131.66.106:4444 ... URLs : http://45.131.66.106:4444/beacon

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The exploitation of CVE-2026-33017 is followed by the deployment of payloads designed to fetch a second-stage downloader responsible for delivering additional malware.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Installation d’une persistance crontab beaconant toutes les 30 minutes vers 45.131.66.106:4444

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

A human still set up and pointed the operation and provisioned the infrastructure behind it, the command-and-control server, the staging server used for the stolen data...

Impact

6 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence11

“Over roughly seven minutes, Storm-3168 made more than 100 attempts to delete storage accounts, with most targeted accounts successfully removed. It also deleted a Key Vault, Function App, and App Service plan.”

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence28

JadePuffer, qui serait une attaque par rançongiciel entièrement automatisée, chaque étape étant gérée par l’IA du début à la fin.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

“It separately targeted Site Recovery and Azure Backup protection locks” and targeted “storage accounts with terraform and backup-themed names.”

T1491DefacementEvidence1

création d’une table de rançon README_RANSOM

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence3

before leaving a ransom note

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

...encrypted a production database before demanding a bitcoin ransom.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

51 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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malware newsNews · Nov 6, 2026Cyber Conflict Briefing Q3 2026 - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsAI agent reportedly involved in ransomware activities. Initial claims that it operated fully autonomously were subsequently qualified; the briefing does not establish its precise capabilities or identify an associated ransomware family.Read more ↗medium dcso cytecNews · Nov 6, 2026Cyber Conflict Briefing Q3 2026. About the Briefing | by DCSO CyTec Blog | Nov, 2026 | MediumAn AI agent discussed in connection with ransomware activities. It serves as a cautionary example: the reporting company subsequently acknowledged that its autonomy had initially been overstated. No specific ransomware payload is named.Read more ↗flareio blogNews · Oct 20, 2026AI Models Are Fueling a New Wave of Cybercrime - FlareReferenced as a documented example of AI-driven ransomware activity. An LLM agent reportedly exploited Langflow and subsequently encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration items. According to the content, the encryption key was not stored, leaving the data unrecoverable.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 29, 2026Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Resources in 7-Minute Destructive Cloud AttackAn agentic ransomware operation linked in the reporting to Storm-3168's Azure intrusion activity. The observed operation performed cloud-environment discovery, deleted Azure storage and other resources, targeted recovery controls, and retrieved Azure Storage account keys, consistent with a likely extortion-focused objective. The report did not confirm a ransom note or successful data theft in this incident.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping51Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.