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Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

JADEPUFFER

Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
CVEs2Associated
Malware2Families
ATT&CK73Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Origin
🇳🇱 Netherlands
Motivation
Financial
Ransomware tactics
Encryption
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftReconnaissanceScanningLateral movementPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationExtortion
Also known asJADEPUFFER

JADEPUFFER, also tracked by Microsoft as Storm-3168, is a financially motivated ransomware and extortion actor targeting cloud environments and artificial intelligence and machine-learning infrastructure. Its operations include exploitation of exposed applications, credential harvesting and reuse, lateral movement, persistence, database encryption, and destructive cloud-resource deletion. The actor uses highly automated execution and adaptive payloads to progress rapidly from access to impact. JADEPUFFER has exploited CVE-2025-3248, an unauthenticated remote-code-execution vulnerability in Langflow, to compromise internet-facing AI workflow infrastructure. It searches compromised environments for provider API keys, cloud credentials, and database secrets, then reuses credentials against internal services. In one intrusion, it encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration records in a production database, deleted the original configuration and history tables, and left a ransom demand. The captured encryption code neither retained nor transmitted its randomly generated key, making recovery through payment impossible. Subsequent activity deployed ENCFORGE, a Go-based ransomware family targeting approximately 180 file extensions associated with model weights, vector indexes, training datasets, and other AI development assets. The actor also developed scripts to cross a container boundary and execute ransomware on the host. Separate extortion activity involved planting ransom notes in exposed, unauthenticated Chroma databases used for retrieval-augmented generation. In an Azure intrusion in June 2026, JADEPUFFER used two compromised service principals to enumerate resources, collect storage-account access keys, and perform destructive operations. It attempted more than 100 storage-account deletions in approximately seven minutes, most successfully, and deleted a Key Vault, a Function App, and an App Service plan. Parallel SQL database deletion attempts failed because of an unsupported API version, while resource locks and deletion protections blocked some other destructive actions. The actor also targeted backup and recovery protections. No ransom note or successful data exfiltration was confirmed in that Azure intrusion.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Utilities

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Netherlands
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

73 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

14 of 15 tactics92 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1592Gather Victim Host Information
T1595×3Active Scanning
T1595.002Vulnerability Scanning
TA0001Initial Access3 techniques
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.001×5Default Accounts
T1078.004×6Cloud Accounts
T1133×3External Remote Services
T1190×40Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002Execution5 techniques
T1053×4Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×12Cron
T1059×3Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.006×22Python
T1203×10Exploitation for Client Execution
T1609Container Administration Command
T1610Deploy Container
TA0003Persistence6 techniques
T1053×4Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×12Cron
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.001×5Default Accounts
T1078.004×6Cloud Accounts
T1098Account Manipulation
T1133×3External Remote Services
T1136×13Create Account
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.005×2Container Service
TA0004Privilege Escalation6 techniques
T1053×4Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×12Cron
T1068×9Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.001×5Default Accounts
T1078.004×6Cloud Accounts
T1098Account Manipulation
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.005×2Container Service
T1611×16Escape to Host
TA0005Stealth6 techniques
T1027×3Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002Software Packing
T1036×2Masquerading
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×8File Deletion
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.001×5Default Accounts
T1078.004×6Cloud Accounts
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218×3System Binary Proxy Execution
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify Tools
TA0006Credential Access7 techniques
T1003×2OS Credential Dumping
T1110×3Brute Force
T1528×2Steal Application Access Token
T1552×11Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001×7Credentials In Files
T1552.004Private Keys
T1552.005×2Cloud Instance Metadata API
T1555×15Credentials from Password Stores
T1606Forge Web Credentials
T1606.001×3Web Cookies
T1606.002SAML Tokens
T1649×2Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007Discovery11 techniques
T1016×4System Network Configuration Discovery
T1033×2System Owner/User Discovery
T1046×16Network Service Discovery
T1057×2Process Discovery
T1082×12System Information Discovery
T1083×10File and Directory Discovery
T1087×3Account Discovery
T1526×8Cloud Service Discovery
T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
T1613×9Container and Resource Discovery
T1619×4Cloud Storage Object Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement3 techniques
T1021×4Remote Services
T1210×4Exploitation of Remote Services
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009Collection5 techniques
T1005×4Data from Local System
T1074×3Data Staged
T1213×6Data from Information Repositories
T1213.002Sharepoint
T1530Data from Cloud Storage
T1602Data from Configuration Repository
T1602.002Network Device Configuration Dump
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1071×4Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2Web Protocols
T1090Proxy
T1105×9Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1041×4Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
TA0040Impact6 techniques
T1485×27Data Destruction
T1486×49Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489×6Service Stop
T1490×10Inhibit System Recovery
T1491×2Defacement
T1491.001×4Internal Defacement
T1657Financial Theft
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 2 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2025-324827 evidence · Oct 9, 2026Exploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow Code ValidationThe operation began by exploiting an internet-facing Langflow instance through CVE-2025-3248, a missing-authentication vulnerability in a code-validation endpoint that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary Python on the host.View vulnerability →
CVE-2021-294417 evidence · Jul 7, 2026Exploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Alibaba Nacos AuthFilterExploitation de CVE-2021-29441 (bypass auth Nacos) et forge de JWT via la clé de signature par défaut de Nacos.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does JADEPUFFER target?
JADEPUFFER targets Software & Services and Utilities.
What malware does JADEPUFFER use?
JADEPUFFER is associated with ENCFORGE and JADEPUFFER.
Where is JADEPUFFER from?
Mallory's sources associate JADEPUFFER with Netherlands.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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reliaquest com threat huntingNews · Nov 9, 2026Accommodation and Food Services Sees Attacks Rise 32%. Here’s Where Intrusions Start.Linked to destructive cloud activity using compromised Azure service principals. Attackers deleted storage accounts, a Key Vault, and application resources and attempted SQL database deletion within hours. Hospitality impacts are discussed as potential consequences, not as confirmed victim attribution.Read more ↗reliaquest com threat huntingNews · Nov 9, 2026For Utilities, One Stolen Identity Can Trigger an Outage. Here’s How to Defend Against It.Conducted destructive cloud activity using exposed service principal credentials, deleting resources and weakening recovery capabilities within minutes. The utilities-sector report highlights this activity as an example of the operational risk posed by compromised cloud identities.Read more ↗sysdig blogNews · Nov 5, 2026Refreshing the 555 Benchmark for Cloud Detection and Response in the AI era | SysdigDescribed as an autonomous, agent-driven threat actor targeting AI and machine-learning infrastructure with purpose-built ransomware. Mentioned as a background example supporting the article's argument for faster cloud detection and response.Read more ↗trellix otherNews · Nov 4, 2026The CyberThreat Report: November 2026 | TrellixNamed operation reported by Sysdig in which an LLM-based agent executed the attack chain before deploying ransomware designed to destroy AI models and training data.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping73MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware2Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs2CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables11Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.