MalwareRansomware

Avalon

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The observed intrusion began with a spoofed legal-document email that sent the victim to a password-protected archive hosted on Proton Drive.

Execution

4 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

It launched cmd.exe, searched the mounted image for Mimecast Secure File Logs\zfighv.tmp, copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When mounted, it showed a document-themed shortcut named Secure Document CA-283505.pdf.lnk... That shortcut did not simply open a PDF.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The loader then manually mapped the next PE into memory instead of writing and launching a normal executable.

Credential Access

4 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Harvesting credentials, cookies, history, and bookmarks from Chromium-based browsers and Firefox.

T1552.006Group Policy PreferencesEvidence1

Collecting data from cryptocurrency wallets, Windows Credential Manager, Discord, Slack, Teams, OpenVPN, WireGuard, saved RDP connections, SSH known hosts, Wi‑Fi profiles, and Group Policy Preferences cpassword artifacts.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Harvesting credentials, cookies, history, and bookmarks from Chromium-based browsers and Firefox.

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence1

Lateral Movement

3 techniques

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Collecting data from cryptocurrency wallets, Windows Credential Manager, Discord, Slack, Teams, OpenVPN, WireGuard, saved RDP connections...

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Collection

1 technique

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The observed intrusion began with a spoofed legal-document email that sent the victim to a password-protected archive hosted on Proton Drive.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

before retrieving a remote payload over HTTPS from helloxcherry[.]com

Impact

2 techniques

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

The ransomware function inside the framework was internally labeled CrownX. It used Windows cryptography APIs and AES-GCM-style handling to encrypt files

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Avalon contained logic to terminate the Volume Shadow Copy Service, delete shadow copies through COM, disable VSS through registry changes, remove VSS-related scheduled tasks, query Win32_ShadowCopy.ID, and target Windows Recovery Environment and System Restore paths

Other

1 technique

T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Its stages attempted to reduce telemetry by interfering with Event Tracing for Windows and AMSI-related inspection before retrieving a remote payload over HTTPS

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trojan killer newsNews

Jul 3, 2026

Avalon Malware Framework Leads to CrownX Ransomware

A previously unknown Windows post-exploitation malware framework delivered via phishing, password-protected archive, ISO, LNK, and MSBuild execution. It steals credentials and browser data, communicates with C2, loads payloads in memory, prepares lateral movement and remote execution, and sabotages recovery before deploying its ransomware component.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping19

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareRansomware

Avalon

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The observed intrusion began with a spoofed legal-document email that sent the victim to a password-protected archive hosted on Proton Drive.

Execution

4 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

It launched cmd.exe, searched the mounted image for Mimecast Secure File Logs\zfighv.tmp, copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When mounted, it showed a document-themed shortcut named Secure Document CA-283505.pdf.lnk... That shortcut did not simply open a PDF.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

copied the file to %TEMP%\ngen0cc9.dat, and executed it with the 64-bit .NET Framework build of MSBuild.exe.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The loader then manually mapped the next PE into memory instead of writing and launching a normal executable.

Credential Access

4 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Harvesting credentials, cookies, history, and bookmarks from Chromium-based browsers and Firefox.

T1552.006Group Policy PreferencesEvidence1

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Harvesting credentials, cookies, history, and bookmarks from Chromium-based browsers and Firefox.

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence1

Lateral Movement

3 techniques

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Collecting data from cryptocurrency wallets, Windows Credential Manager, Discord, Slack, Teams, OpenVPN, WireGuard, saved RDP connections...

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

Validating credentials and preparing remote execution through scheduled tasks, stolen-token execution, DCOM, and PsExec-style service creation.

Collection

1 technique

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The observed intrusion began with a spoofed legal-document email that sent the victim to a password-protected archive hosted on Proton Drive.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

before retrieving a remote payload over HTTPS from helloxcherry[.]com

Impact

2 techniques

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

The ransomware function inside the framework was internally labeled CrownX. It used Windows cryptography APIs and AES-GCM-style handling to encrypt files

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Other

1 technique

T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Its stages attempted to reduce telemetry by interfering with Event Tracing for Windows and AMSI-related inspection before retrieving a remote payload over HTTPS

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

trojan killer newsNews

Jul 3, 2026

Avalon Malware Framework Leads to CrownX Ransomware

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping19

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.