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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Flowerbed

Tracked since Jul 23, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs51Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
Cloud

Flowerbed is a Python-based, Docker-deployed server-side collection framework used by the Russian state-sponsored espionage actor LAUNDRY BEAR, also tracked as Void Blizzard, CL-STA-1114, and TA488. It supports post-compromise data collection and receipt of exfiltrated information in operations targeting Zimbra Collaboration Suite users, particularly in campaigns exploiting CVE-2025-66376. Flowerbed functions as attacker-controlled receiving infrastructure rather than an endpoint payload, and is designed to ingest, log, and temporarily store stolen victim data delivered over both DNS and HTTPS.

The framework includes multiple coordinated components: Catcher, which acts as the primary HTTP and DNS collection service; Nginx, which fronts the infrastructure as an HTTPS reverse proxy; Certbot, which automates TLS certificate provisioning; and Gardener, which performs health-check and service-monitoring functions. Reported operations used Flowerbed to receive compressed mailbox data, account information, Global Address List contents, credentials, two-factor recovery material, and application passcodes stolen by the related Ulej exploitation capability.

Flowerbed has been associated with cyber-espionage activity against organizations in government, defense, education, energy, law enforcement, media, non-governmental, and technology sectors, with a focus on covert email intelligence collection. In the documented Zimbra campaign, exfiltration to Flowerbed occurred immediately after exploitation and used covert dual channels: smaller data elements were encoded for DNS-based transfer, while larger archives and structured data were uploaded over HTTPS. The infrastructure was operated on attacker-controlled virtual private servers and rotated regularly to reduce exposure and complicate tracking.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-66376via socradar blogExploited in the wildStored XSS in Zimbra Collaboration Classic UI via CSS @importCVE-2025-66376 is a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Classic UI of Zimbra Collaboration Suite, creating a path to mailbox theft and abuse of the user’s authenticated webmail session. The flaw was exploited as a zero-day before Zimbra released fixes in November 2025.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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LAUNDRY BEAR

Flowerbed est le framework de collecte côté serveur, un projet Python conteneurisé via Docker comprenant : Catcher : serveur DNS/HTTP recevant les données exfiltrées ; Certbot : génération automatique de certificats Let’s Encrypt ; Nginx : reverse proxy HTTPS ; Gardener : health check du service Catcher.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

6 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

T1583 — Acquire Infrastructure (Resource Development)

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence3

LAUNDRY BEAR utilise des VPS provisionnés via des identités fictives

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

Using a custom-developed capability [T1587.001] named “Улей” or “Ulej” (Russian for beehive), LAUNDRY BEAR successfully targeted and exfiltrated sensitive user information.

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

T1588.002 — Obtain Capabilities: Tool (Resource Development)

T1588.007Artificial IntelligenceEvidence2

The simplistic Flowerbed codebase has indications that artificial intelligence (AI) played a role in its development ... [T1588.007].

T1608Stage CapabilitiesEvidence3

T1608 — Stage Capabilities (Resource Development)

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

CVE-2025-66376 does not provide direct server compromise – its impact is authenticated-session abuse leading to mailbox theft, credential exposure, and account persistence.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

the phishing bears abused the security hole in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite by sending malware-laden HTML email messages to target Western organizations

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

CVE-2025-66376 does not provide direct server compromise – its impact is authenticated-session abuse leading to mailbox theft, credential exposure, and account persistence.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

CVE-2025-66376 does not provide direct server compromise – its impact is authenticated-session abuse leading to mailbox theft, credential exposure, and account persistence.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

CVE-2025-66376 does not provide direct server compromise – its impact is authenticated-session abuse leading to mailbox theft, credential exposure, and account persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The attack doesn’t require any user interaction other than viewing the malicious email, and once that happens, the attackers get to work exfiltrating a ton of data. This includes the victims’ last 90 days of email communications, email addresses and passwords, the organizations’ email directories such as global address lists, two-factor authentication tokens, and newly created application passcodes.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Evidence details the creation of application passcodes, including passcodes named ZimbraWeb . If an attacker obtains credentials, active session material, application passcodes, or 2FA recovery codes, applying the software patch alone may not remove access that was already established.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The observed campaign reportedly targeted recent email, address-book information, account and mailbox metadata, 2FA recovery material, and application passcode functions.

T1074.002Remote Data StagingEvidence3

Flowerbed est le framework de collecte côté serveur

T1114Email CollectionEvidence4

T1114 — Email Collection (Collection)

T1114.002Remote Email CollectionEvidence1

T1114.002 — Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (Collection)

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

This includes the victims’ last 90 days of email communications, email addresses and passwords, the organizations’ email directories such as global address lists

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

T1560 — Archive Collected Data (Collection)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Smaller data is encoded and transmitted in DNS A-record queries, while larger payloads, including mailbox data, are uploaded over HTTPS as compressed archives to the attacker-controlled servers.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

For smaller data items, the malware encodes information in Base32 and triggers DNS lookups through specially crafted image URLs.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The group... swaps out its infrastructure every 7 to 60 days, which makes long-term tracking harder.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

once that happens, the attackers get to work exfiltrating a ton of data

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence6

L’exfiltration utilise deux canaux : DNS ... et HTTPS

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence3

HTTPS (JSON et octet-stream)

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence3

DNS (Base32, RFC 1035 compliant)

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

Stolen data lands on a backend the advisory calls Flowerbed, a set of Docker containers running on rented cloud servers. One container, “Catcher,” acts as both a DNS and HTTP server to receive the stolen data.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

51 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching51Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.