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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

FruitStone

Tracked since Jul 31, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

FruitStone is a web-based command-and-control management panel associated with the Storm-2945 intrusion set and the CaptiveCrunch campaign, which has been linked to the Russia-aligned Midnight Blizzard/APT29 ecosystem. It is branded as a fictitious enterprise cloud administration product, commonly presented as CloudSync Console, and serves as the centralized operator interface for managing compromised endpoints and campaign infrastructure.

The panel is used to administer infected systems, deploy and configure payloads, review collected data, and coordinate multi-stage operations. Reported operator functions include browsing victim files, executing PowerShell commands, capturing screenshots, collecting keystrokes, and managing implants such as CornFlake. FruitStone has also been described as supporting payload building and broader infrastructure administration for the campaign.

FruitStone is part of an espionage-oriented operation targeting travelers and organizations through compromised captive-portal and hospitality Wi-Fi ecosystems, with downstream targeting affecting sectors such as government, diplomacy, academia, defense, aerospace, nonprofits, and think tanks. Its role is not initial compromise itself, but centralized post-compromise control, tasking, and review of stolen information from infected Windows hosts. The panel has been described as exposed on the internet and, in some reporting, lacking effective authentication on administrative functions.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

Operators manage compromised systems, deploy payloads, and review stolen data through FruitStone, an unauthenticated web-based C2 panel branded as CloudSync Console.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com
Storm-2945

Operators manage compromised systems, deploy payloads, and review stolen data through FruitStone, an unauthenticated web-based C2 panel branded as CloudSync Console.

via zscaler threat labzzscaler.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

ChocoShell is an in-memory PowerShell credential stealer targeting browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 and Azure AD tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

it does all this while disguising itself. It claims to be a Windows service called Cloud Sync Service... Fruitstone claims to be something called Cloud Sync Console by a fictional company called Acuity Systems Inc.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan with a broad capability set: remote shell access, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capturing, microphone and webcam surveillance...

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

ChocoShell is a PowerShell credential stealer that targets cookie files... The malware has been identified as targeting access and refresh tokens for Microsoft 365 and Azure Active Directory, thereby allowing attackers to potentially hijack enterprise sessions without requiring users to enter their credentials again.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File system browser — Live directory traversal and arbitrary file download from compromised hosts

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Microsoft also discovered an unprotected web-based management panel, FruitStone, which the threat actor used to manage infected systems, browse victim files, execute PowerShell commands, and capture screenshots and keystrokes.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan with a broad capability set: remote shell access, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capturing, microphone and webcam surveillance...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan with a broad capability set: remote shell access, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capturing, microphone and webcam surveillance...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.