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Malware5 associated actors

CornFlake

Tracked since Jul 31, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionPost exploitation
Delivery
ClickfixFake updateLanding page
Platforms
Windows

CornFlake is a Windows remote access trojan written in Go that provides persistent remote control, surveillance, credential theft, and data collection. It is a principal implant in the CaptiveCrunch cyberespionage campaign, which Microsoft attributes to Storm-2945, an assessed operational sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard, also known as APT29. The campaign targets corporate travelers using hotel, conference-center, and other shared captive-portal networks across multiple countries.

CornFlake is delivered through fake browser or operating-system updates and ClickFix prompts presented after attackers manipulate DNS and HTTP traffic on compromised captive-portal infrastructure. These lures require victims to download or execute malicious code rather than silently infecting endpoints. During installation, CornFlake displays a false progress window resembling an update, security scan, or maintenance utility. It establishes persistence through Windows services, registry startup entries, and scheduled tasks, with a watchdog routine that restores removed persistence mechanisms. Observed samples also inject into a suspended process.

Its capabilities include remote command-shell execution, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, microphone and webcam surveillance, USB-device monitoring, system reconnaissance, and file exfiltration. It steals browser passwords and cookies and Microsoft 365 session tokens, enabling compromise beyond the infected endpoint. It accesses browser profile data and Microsoft Teams cache data. Command-and-control communications use encryption based on ECDH P-256 key exchange, and runtime reconfiguration allows operators to change infrastructure and targeting without redeploying the implant. A local HTTP API allows companion tooling, including the ChocoShell PowerShell infostealer, to reuse its command-and-control channel. Operators manage CornFlake implants and collected data through the FruitStone web-based control panel.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

The backdoor file copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%32.exe, writes an HKCU Run value, instantiates a Schedule.Service COM object as a second persistence path, injects into a suspended process, and reads Edge, Chrome and Firefox profile data along with the Microsoft Teams cache.

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
Storm-2945

The backdoor file copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%32.exe, writes an HKCU Run value, instantiates a Schedule.Service COM object as a second persistence path, injects into a suspended process, and reads Edge, Chrome and Firefox profile data along with the Microsoft Teams cache.

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
GTG-20006

The backdoor file copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%32.exe, writes an HKCU Run value, instantiates a Schedule.Service COM object as a second persistence path, injects into a suspended process, and reads Edge, Chrome and Firefox profile data along with the Microsoft Teams cache.

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
SVR

One of the malware strains it delivers is CornFlake. Described as "a full-featured Windows RAT" written in Go, CornFlake is the SVR's go-to persistent implant in these hospitality network attacks.

via register securitytheregister.com
Nobellium

One of the malware strains it delivers is CornFlake. Described as "a full-featured Windows RAT" written in Go, CornFlake is the SVR's go-to persistent implant in these hospitality network attacks.

via register securitytheregister.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

T1091 — Replication Through Removable Media (Lateral Movement)

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence6

The campaign abuses captive portal networks at hotels, conference centers, and similar venues to redirect victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Using this technique, they were able to redirect users to fraudulent Microsoft 365 login pages, phishing portals containing device codes, or fake software update screens when connecting to hotel Wi-Fi. | Microsoft observed the scheme expanding to include Microsoft Entra device code phishing, in which the victims are tricked into completing a legitimate Microsoft authentication process that unknowingly allows the attackers' session to be authorized instead of their own.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

CornFlake implements persistence through service registration, Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and a watchdog routine.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

Schedule.Service COM object instantiated.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

It carries keylogging, screenshots, microphone and webcam surveillance, browser credential theft and a remote shell

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer. ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

These include: ... Remote shell

T1204User ExecutionEvidence15

Victims are instructed to paste and run commands, in some cases with instructions for Android APK installation. Executing the ClickFix instructions downloads and runs CornFlake and/or ChocoShell.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

Ils utilisent des pièges d'ingénierie sociale de type ClickFix, incitant l'utilisateur à exécuter de fausses mises à jour système ou réseau.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

CornFlake implements persistence through service registration, Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and a watchdog routine.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

Schedule.Service COM object instantiated.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence10

CornFlake implements persistence through service registration, Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and a watchdog routine.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

On initial execution, CornFlake operates in dropper mode: it displays a convincing fake progress window designed to occupy the victim’s attention while the binary copies itself to %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe and establishes persistence

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

The backdoor file copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%32.exe, writes an HKCU Run value.

T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

CornFlake implements persistence through service registration, Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and a watchdog routine.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

Schedule.Service COM object instantiated.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Suspended process creation plus foreign memory and thread-context writes (assessed).

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence10

CornFlake implements persistence through service registration, Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and a watchdog routine.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

On initial execution, CornFlake operates in dropper mode: it displays a convincing fake progress window designed to occupy the victim’s attention while the binary copies itself to %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe and establishes persistence

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

The backdoor file copies itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%32.exe, writes an HKCU Run value.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence11

In dropper mode, CornFlake displays a fake progress window while copying itself to %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

svchost32.exe mimics svchost.exe.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Suspended process creation plus foreign memory and thread-context writes (assessed).

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include ... Volume Shadow Copy Service abuse

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation, Volume Shadow Copy Service abuse

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

These include: ... Security posture sweep ...

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation, Volume Shadow Copy Service abuse, and a Defender signature lock.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence17

Keylogger YARA hit, DirectInput and raw input device creation.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence7

ChocoShell is an in-memory PowerShell credential stealer targeting browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 and Azure AD tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence7

It carries keylogging, screenshots, microphone and webcam surveillance, browser credential theft and a remote shell... ChocoShell runs entirely in memory... harvesting browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 single sign-on tokens and Wi-Fi credentials.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

Browser credential theft that includes a Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass.

T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence8

After compromising captive portal equipment or shared infrastructure, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic on the network. When a victim connects to Wi-Fi and encounters the captive portal login prompt, traffic is redirected through an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) position to attacker-controlled infrastructure

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan with a broad capability set... file exfiltration, USB monitoring, and system reconnaissance.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

scan removable media

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence3

Researchers describe CornFlake as a Windows RAT written in Go with a wide range of capabilities that include: USB drive monitoring

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Empire-style browser history retrieval; profile enumeration.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

These include: ... Security posture sweep ...

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Collects 18 categories of host intelligence including ... Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) history

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

T1091 — Replication Through Removable Media (Lateral Movement)

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

Microsoft also discovered an unprotected web-based management panel, FruitStone, which the threat actor used to manage infected systems, browse victim files, execute PowerShell commands, and capture screenshots and keystrokes.

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence2

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) that offers the following capabilities: ... USB monitoring

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence17

Keylogger YARA hit, DirectInput and raw input device creation.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence14

It establishes an encrypted C2 channel via ECDH P-256 key exchange and provides RAT capabilities including keylogging, screenshot capture

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence9

CornFlake is a Go-based remote access trojan with a broad capability set: remote shell access, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capturing, microphone and webcam surveillance...

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence16

...capables de capturer les frappes au clavier, d'écouter les micros...

T1125Video CaptureEvidence15

provides RAT capabilities including keylogging, screenshot capture, microphone and webcam surveillance

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence8

After compromising captive portal equipment or shared infrastructure, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic on the network. When a victim connects to Wi-Fi and encounters the captive portal login prompt, traffic is redirected through an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) position to attacker-controlled infrastructure

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Collected data is compressed, encoded, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Collected data is compressed, encoded, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Microsoft also found ClickFix pages configured to push an APK file, suggesting the threat actor might be targeting Android devices too.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

CornFlake is a Go-based Windows RAT that serves as the cornerstone of Storm-2945’s persistent access strategy.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence3

C2 chiffré via ECDH P-256 avec clé éphémère par session

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

Collected data is compressed, encoded, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.

Impact

1 technique
T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence3

The activity was previously disclosed in a report from cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, which detailed how the attacker changed DNS settings on Wi-Fi devices to steal Microsoft 365 accounts.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Oct 16, 2026Midnight Blizzard-Linked Hackers Use Claude AI to Rebuild Malware and Evade DetectionGo-written Windows backdoor associated with Microsoft’s CaptiveCrunch reporting. It persists through registry startup and task-scheduling mechanisms, injects into a suspended process, and reads browser profiles and Microsoft Teams cache data. Sandbox findings also indicated possible keylogging. ReversingLabs observed an installation path under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\svchost32\svchost32.exe but did not establish its delivery mechanism or a direct delivery relationship with ChocoShell.Read more ↗reversing labs blogNews · Oct 15, 2026How RL mapped a Midnight Blizzard-linked campaign from two hashes | RL BlogGo-based Windows backdoor that installs as svchost32.exe, establishes persistence, injects into a suspended process, and accesses browser profiles and the Microsoft Teams cache. Sandbox findings indicate keylogging-related functionality. Microsoft additionally describes persistence through a Windows service displayed as Cloud Sync Service. RL assesses with moderate confidence that it is the campaign's collection component and that 192[.]142[.]52[.]31 is associated infrastructure. Its delivery mechanism and a direct connection from ChocoShell were not observed by RL; their campaign association rests on the two vendors' reporting.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 6, 2026Midnight Blizzard Abuses Hotel Wi-Fi Captive Portals to Deliver Malware and Steal Credentials | Cryptika CybersecurityA remote-access implant deployed in the CaptiveCrunch campaign through manipulated captive portals and deceptive update or ClickFix prompts. It displays a fake progress window, copies itself into an application-data directory, establishes persistence, and masquerades as a Windows service named Cloud Sync Service. The report also describes a Rust variant observed during renewed campaign activity beginning September 29, 2026.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 6, 2026Midnight Blizzard Abuses Hotel Wi-Fi Captive Portals to Deliver Malware and Steal CredentialsWindows remote-access implant deployed in the CaptiveCrunch campaign through manipulated captive portals and deceptive update or ClickFix prompts. It displays fake installation progress, persists across reboots, and masquerades as a Windows service named Cloud Sync Service. Its executable is placed at %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe. An October 5, 2026 update reported a Rust variant in renewed activity beginning September 29.Read more ↗
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IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.