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Malware5 associated actors

ChocoShell

Tracked since Jul 31, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK48Techniques
IOCs43Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPrivilege escalationDefense evasion
Delivery
ClickfixFake updateLanding page
Platforms
Windows

ChocoShell is an in-memory PowerShell information stealer targeting Windows systems. It harvests browser session cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 single sign-on tokens, Azure Active Directory access and refresh tokens, and stored Wi-Fi credentials. Its collection of authentication tokens and cookies enables session hijacking and access to cloud services without requiring the victim’s password. It bypasses Chrome App-Bound Encryption protections to obtain browser secrets and uses browser debugging features to extract readable cookies.

ChocoShell conceals its PowerShell window, changes execution policy, executes Base64-encoded code, and runs background jobs. Defense-evasion measures include disabling the Antimalware Scan Interface through .NET reflection and checking for sandbox and virtual-machine environments. It implements multiple UAC bypass techniques and uses SYSTEM token impersonation when accessing protected browser encryption material. It also collects browser history, communicates through HTTPS requests resembling tracking traffic, and exfiltrates stolen information through HTTPS POST requests.

ChocoShell is deployed in the CaptiveCrunch espionage campaign, which Microsoft attributes to Storm-2945, an assessed operational sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard, also known as APT29. The campaign manipulates traffic on compromised hotel, conference, and other guest-network captive portals to redirect travelers to malicious landing pages. Fake browser or operating-system updates and ClickFix prompts induce victims to execute malware. ChocoShell operates alongside the CornFlake remote-access trojan and can be delivered as an additional in-memory payload through CornFlake’s modular platform. The operation targets corporate travelers across multiple sectors, using stolen credentials and session material to extend endpoint compromise into enterprise cloud accounts.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

Microsoft names CornFlake (the Go backdoor) and ChocoShell (the PowerShell stealer).

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
Storm-2945

Microsoft names CornFlake (the Go backdoor) and ChocoShell (the PowerShell stealer).

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
GTG-20006

Microsoft names CornFlake (the Go backdoor) and ChocoShell (the PowerShell stealer).

via reversing labs blogreversinglabs.com
SVR

CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer. ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory.

via register securitytheregister.com
Nobellium

CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer. ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory.

via register securitytheregister.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

48 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Entering the attacker-supplied code on Microsoft's legitimate sign-in page can grant the attacker-controlled session multi-factor authentication (MFA)-satisfied access.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence5

The campaign abuses captive portal networks at hotels, conference centers, and similar venues to redirect victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Using this technique, they were able to redirect users to fraudulent Microsoft 365 login pages, phishing portals containing device codes, or fake software update screens when connecting to hotel Wi-Fi. | Microsoft observed the scheme expanding to include Microsoft Entra device code phishing, in which the victims are tricked into completing a legitimate Microsoft authentication process that unknowingly allows the attackers' session to be authorized instead of their own.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence16

The stager file hides its window and changes the PowerShell execution policy.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence12

Victims are instructed to paste and run commands, in some cases with instructions for Android APK installation. Executing the ClickFix instructions downloads and runs CornFlake and/or ChocoShell.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Internet Shortcut files that open the stager URL (assessed).

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Entering the attacker-supplied code on Microsoft's legitimate sign-in page can grant the attacker-controlled session multi-factor authentication (MFA)-satisfied access.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

SilentCleanup task hijack: Writes a malicious command to HKCU\Environment\windir , then triggers the built-in SilentCleanup scheduled task

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

wsreset.exe COM hijack: Creates a COM handler key in HKCU\Software\Classes and launches the auto-elevating Windows Store reset tool.

T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

Privilege Escalation

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It establishes redundant persistence mechanisms: Windows service registrations, Registry Run keys, named scheduled tasks

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Entering the attacker-supplied code on Microsoft's legitimate sign-in page can grant the attacker-controlled session multi-factor authentication (MFA)-satisfied access.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence2

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

SilentCleanup task hijack: Writes a malicious command to HKCU\Environment\windir , then triggers the built-in SilentCleanup scheduled task

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

wsreset.exe COM hijack: Creates a COM handler key in HKCU\Software\Classes and launches the auto-elevating Windows Store reset tool.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence4

ChocoShell ... escalates privileges using silent User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques (such as SilentCleanup task hijack, wsreset.exe COM hijack, and sdclt.exe folder hijack)

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence3

ChocoShell ... escalates privileges using silent User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques (such as SilentCleanup task hijack, wsreset.exe COM hijack, and sdclt.exe folder hijack), falling back to a visible UAC prompt when necessary.

Stealth

13 techniques
T1006Direct Volume AccessEvidence1

Locked browser SQLite databases are accessed through three strategies: shared file access, Volume Shadow Service snapshots

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information (Defense Evasion)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Stager served under a fake JavaScript bundle name next to a polyfill library.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include ... Volume Shadow Copy Service abuse

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Entering the attacker-supplied code on Microsoft's legitimate sign-in page can grant the attacker-controlled session multi-factor authentication (MFA)-satisfied access.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence2

Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

It decodes and runs Base64-encoded code.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

ChocoShell ... escalates privileges using silent User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques (such as SilentCleanup task hijack, wsreset.exe COM hijack, and sdclt.exe folder hijack)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

It disables Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via .NET reflection, performs sandbox and VM detection

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

PowerShell runs hidden and non-interactive.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Captive portals on hotel and conference Wi-Fi networks have been hijacked to route guests through attacker infrastructure, serving fake browser and operating system updates that install Russian espionage malware.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory, Microsoft said.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence7

It disables Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via .NET reflection

Credential Access

11 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

ChocoShell runs entirely in memory, disabling the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) before harvesting browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 single sign-on tokens and Wi-Fi credentials.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

CornFlake ou des voleurs de données comme ChocoShell, capables de capturer les frappes au clavier...

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

T1528 — Steal Application Access Token (Credential Access)

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence17

...et d'extraire les cookies de navigateur.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

It also harvests Microsoft 365 and Azure AD/WAM tokens from the Token Broker cache, as well as Wi-Fi credentials via netsh wlan .

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence10

ChocoShell, on the other hand, is a PowerShell-based infostealer that's used to steal ... saved passwords, Microsoft 365 Single Sign-On (SSO) tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials from compromised systems.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

Browser credential theft that includes a Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass.

T1556.009Conditional Access PoliciesEvidence1

After modifying DNS settings, the attacker can redirect victims to phishing pages that impersonate Microsoft 365 login portals, or to device code phishing pages that abuse Microsoft Entra ID authentication flows.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence9

A portion of this activity leverages doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft online services to conduct follow-on adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations that abuse the device code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID.

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence1

The activity involves obtaining administrative access to the Wi‑Fi gateways to modify devices' configurations and making use of DNS poisoning to reroute regular web traffic to dispatch connections for legitimate domains through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence9

It also harvests Microsoft 365 and Azure AD/WAM tokens from the Token Broker cache

Discovery

2 techniques
T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Empire-style browser history retrieval; profile enumeration.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence4

It disables Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via .NET reflection, performs sandbox and VM detection

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550.001Application Access TokenEvidence1

Overlaps techniques avec Storm-2372 (device code phishing, exfiltration via Microsoft Graph). ... T1550.001 — Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (Lateral Movement)

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

collect files and keystrokes

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

CornFlake ou des voleurs de données comme ChocoShell, capables de capturer les frappes au clavier...

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

...capables de capturer les frappes au clavier, d'écouter les micros...

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence9

A portion of this activity leverages doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft online services to conduct follow-on adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations that abuse the device code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID.

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence1

The activity involves obtaining administrative access to the Wi‑Fi gateways to modify devices' configurations and making use of DNS poisoning to reroute regular web traffic to dispatch connections for legitimate domains through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

T1560 — Archive Collected Data (Collection)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Collected data is compressed, encoded, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

HTTPS beacon to a raw IP with a tracking-pixel path.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Stager retrieved over HTTPS from the staging server.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence1

After gaining control of the network layer, Storm-2945 manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic to reroute users through attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (Exfiltration)

Impact

2 techniques
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

VSS shadow copies are deleted via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence2

The activity was previously disclosed in a report from cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, which detailed how the attacker changed DNS settings on Wi-Fi devices to steal Microsoft 365 accounts.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

43 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

23 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Oct 16, 2026Midnight Blizzard-Linked Hackers Use Claude AI to Rebuild Malware and Evade DetectionPowerShell stager associated with the reported espionage campaign against Ukrainian and European organizations. It incorporates PowerSploit and Empire code to collect browser history, checks shadow copies through WMI, runs background jobs and reports progress through HTTPS tracking-pixel endpoints. Microsoft also reported browser credential theft and data uploads. Investigators identified five additional builds with matching capability profiles despite changed hashes; only some had confirmed infrastructure links. The rebuild pattern is consistent with Anthropic’s account of AI-assisted malware updates, but ReversingLabs could not independently establish AI authorship or actor attribution.Read more ↗reversing labs blogNews · Oct 15, 2026How RL mapped a Midnight Blizzard-linked campaign from two hashes | RL BlogPowerShell stager and information stealer that hides its window, changes execution policy, executes Base64-encoded code, collects browser information using PowerSploit and Empire code, and enumerates shadow copies through WMI. Microsoft additionally reports browser credential theft, a Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass, and HTTPS POST exfiltration. It reports execution stages through a tracking-pixel endpoint. RL identified five additional builds sharing its capability profile, although several have only moderate-confidence operator attribution. Attribution to Midnight Blizzard comes from Microsoft and Anthropic, not independent confirmation by RL.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 6, 2026Midnight Blizzard Abuses Hotel Wi-Fi Captive Portals to Deliver Malware and Steal Credentials | Cryptika CybersecurityAn in-memory PowerShell information stealer used in the CaptiveCrunch campaign. It steals browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 single sign-on tokens, and stored Wi-Fi credentials. It retrieves browser encryption keys and uses browser debugging features to obtain readable cookies, enabling authenticated-session theft. The report describes anti-malware scanning interference, analysis-environment checks, privilege elevation, compressed data exfiltration to command-and-control infrastructure, and removal of temporary traces.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 6, 2026Midnight Blizzard Abuses Hotel Wi-Fi Captive Portals to Deliver Malware and Steal CredentialsIn-memory PowerShell infostealer used in the CaptiveCrunch campaign to steal credentials and authenticated session data. It retrieves browser encryption keys and uses browser debugging features to obtain readable cookies. The content describes anti-malware scanning evasion, analysis-environment checks, privilege elevation, compression and exfiltration of stolen data, and removal of temporary traces. Listed infrastructure includes dedicated command-and-control, secondary-module retrieval, and data-exfiltration endpoints.Read more ↗
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IOC matching43Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping48Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.