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ChocoShell is an in-memory PowerShell infostealer used by Storm-2945, an operational sub-cluster assessed to be associated with the Russia-linked Midnight Blizzard (APT29) espionage actor. It was deployed in the CaptiveCrunch campaign against corporate travelers using compromised hospitality and other captive-portal Wi-Fi environments. ChocoShell is delivered through ClickFix-style fake browser or operating-system update lures and executes entirely in memory. It disables AMSI, performs sandbox or virtual-machine checks, and uses UAC-bypass techniques to facilitate collection. The stealer harvests browser cookies and saved passwords, including Chrome data protected by App-Bound Encryption, Microsoft 365, Azure AD, and Web Account Manager authentication tokens, and stored Wi-Fi credentials. Stolen tokens and cookies can enable replay or abuse of authenticated cloud and browser sessions. ChocoShell exfiltrates collected data over HTTPS and can be delivered as a companion payload by the CornFlake remote-access trojan.
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4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
« des voleurs de données comme ChocoShell, capables de capturer les frappes au clavier, d'écouter les micros et d'extraire les cookies de navigateur »
Microsoft also found evidence that the group used AI tools to assist operations, including the development of the CornFlake and ChocoShell malware.
CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer. ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory.
CornFlake exposes a localhost HTTP API server to transform the malware into a modular platform, delivering additional payloads such as ChocoShell, a PowerShell-based infostealer. ChocoShell is delivered and executed entirely in-memory.
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
ChocoShell, on the other hand, is a PowerShell-based infostealer that's used to steal browser session cookies...
Victims are instructed to paste and run commands, in some cases with instructions for Android APK installation. Executing the ClickFix instructions downloads and runs CornFlake and/or ChocoShell.
Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation
OAuth code phishing and doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft services support the same objective.
Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include ... Volume Shadow Copy Service abuse
Additional defense evasion and privilege abuse across the toolset include SYSTEM token impersonation
ChocoShell ... escalates privileges using silent User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques (such as SilentCleanup task hijack, wsreset.exe COM hijack, and sdclt.exe folder hijack)
ChocoShell runs entirely in memory, disabling the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) before harvesting browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 single sign-on tokens and Wi-Fi credentials.
CornFlake ou des voleurs de données comme ChocoShell, capables de capturer les frappes au clavier...
It also harvests Microsoft 365 and Azure AD/WAM tokens from the Token Broker cache, as well as Wi-Fi credentials via netsh wlan .
ChocoShell, on the other hand, is a PowerShell-based infostealer that's used to steal ... saved passwords, Microsoft 365 Single Sign-On (SSO) tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials from compromised systems.
A portion of this activity leverages doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft online services to conduct follow-on adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations that abuse the device code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID.
The activity involves obtaining administrative access to the Wi‑Fi gateways to modify devices' configurations and making use of DNS poisoning to reroute regular web traffic to dispatch connections for legitimate domains through attacker-controlled infrastructure.
CornFlake ou des voleurs de données comme ChocoShell, capables de capturer les frappes au clavier...
A portion of this activity leverages doppelganger domains mimicking Microsoft online services to conduct follow-on adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing operations that abuse the device code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID.
The activity involves obtaining administrative access to the Wi‑Fi gateways to modify devices' configurations and making use of DNS poisoning to reroute regular web traffic to dispatch connections for legitimate domains through attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Collected data is compressed, encoded, and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.
26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Information stealer deployed through ClickFix lures; it can capture keystrokes, listen through microphones, and extract browser cookies.
A PowerShell-based infostealer delivered via a ClickFix lure that steals browser session cookies, bypasses Chrome app-bound encryption protections, and harvests saved passwords, Microsoft 365 SSO tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials.
Malware developed and used in support of the CaptiveCrunch campaign; the content indicates it was part of operations involving credential theft and malicious APK delivery, but gives no further functionality details.
An in-memory PowerShell stealer that disables AMSI, performs sandbox/VM detection, uses UAC bypass techniques, steals browser cookies and passwords, harvests Microsoft 365 and Azure AD/WAM tokens from the Token Broker cache, collects Wi-Fi credentials, and exfiltrates data over HTTPS POST to C2 endpoints disguised as tracking pixels and JavaScript polyfill files.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.