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Malware1 associated actor

XcLoader

Tracked since Aug 6, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs22Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Larva-26005

“{random}.bat”은 XcLoader와 Xctdoor를 다운로드하며

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

또 다른 사례에서는 외부에 노출되어 있던 그룹웨어 시스템의 업로드 페이지를 통해 초기 침투를 시도한 것으로 추정된다. 취약한 파일 업로드 페이지를 이용해 공격자는 웹셸을 업로드했으며 그룹웨어 시스템에 대한 초기 제어권을 확보하였다.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

CRAT was first identified in 2020 and was used in various attack cases targeting South Korean users, including spear phishing attacks... The first detected instance of CRAT was distributed via a spear phishing attack using a Hangul document with the file name “Coronavirus Response Emergency Inquiry.Hwp” that exploited the CVE-2017-8291 vulnerability.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

자사 ASD 로그에서 확인되는 공격들은 대부분 스피어 피싱으로 추정된다. 최초 침투 과정에서 LNK가 사용되는데 LNK 악성코드는 드로퍼로서 위의 보안 프로그램 위장 사례처럼 미끼 문서 파일을 보여주고 동시에 3개의 스크립트 파일을 생성하고 실행한다.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“{Random}.Bat” performs its downloader function while simultaneously registering the VBS downloader malware “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.Vbs,” located in the same Path, in the Task Scheduler.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“{random}.bat”은 다운로더 기능을 수행함과 동시에 동일 경로에 위치한 VBS 다운로더 악성코드 “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.vbs”를 작업 스케줄러에 등록한다.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

“p{random}.vbs”는 파워쉘 스크립트 “%PUBLIC%\videos\2.ps1″를 다운로드한다.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

“s{random}.vbs”는 동일 경로에 위치한 BAT 다운로더 악성코드 “%PUBLIC%\videos\{random}.bat”를 실행한다.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

먼저 VBS 런처 악성코드인 “%PUBLIC%\videos\s{random}.vbs”가 실행된다.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

As the malware is currently being distributed via LNK files... LNK files are used during the Initial Intrusion phase. The LNK malware acts as a dropper; similar to the security program disguise case described above, it displays a decoy document file while simultaneously creating and executing three script files.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“{Random}.Bat” performs its downloader function while simultaneously registering the VBS downloader malware “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.Vbs,” located in the same Path, in the Task Scheduler.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“{random}.bat”은 다운로더 기능을 수행함과 동시에 동일 경로에 위치한 VBS 다운로더 악성코드 “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.vbs”를 작업 스케줄러에 등록한다.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence2

관리되지 않은 윈도우 IIS 웹 서버를 공격해 웹쉘을 설치한 후 XcLoader와 Xctdoor를 설치한 사례가 있었다.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Once this process is complete, the following command uses RegSvr32 to run XcLoader, which creates and executes a shortcut on the startup path to maintain persistence... Upon execution, it injects itself into a legitimate process and creates a LNK file... and registers an LNK file that executes it via RegSvr32 in the Run key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

여기까지의 과정이 끝나면 지속성 유지를 위해 시작 프로그램 경로에 바로가기를 생성하고 실행하는 데 XcLoader를 RegSvr32를 통해 실행시키는 명령이다.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“{Random}.Bat” performs its downloader function while simultaneously registering the VBS downloader malware “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.Vbs,” located in the same Path, in the Task Scheduler.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“{random}.bat”은 다운로더 기능을 수행함과 동시에 동일 경로에 위치한 VBS 다운로더 악성코드 “%PUBLIC%\videos\p{random}.vbs”를 작업 스케줄러에 등록한다.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

해당 프로세스에 앞서 디코딩한 roaming.dat PE 파일을 인젝션한다.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Once this process is complete, the following command uses RegSvr32 to run XcLoader, which creates and executes a shortcut on the startup path to maintain persistence... Upon execution, it injects itself into a legitimate process and creates a LNK file... and registers an LNK file that executes it via RegSvr32 in the Run key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

여기까지의 과정이 끝나면 지속성 유지를 위해 시작 프로그램 경로에 바로가기를 생성하고 실행하는 데 XcLoader를 RegSvr32를 통해 실행시키는 명령이다.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

DLL Side-Loading 방식으로 동작하는 드로퍼부터 XcLoader 그리고 Xctdoor는 모두 코드 영역이 난독화되어 있으며 실행 도중에 코드 영역을 복호화하여 실행한다.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

최초 유포 사례는 알 수 없지만 보안 프로그램 Veraport와 SoftCamp를 위장한 드로퍼로 설치되었다.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

해당 프로세스에 앞서 디코딩한 roaming.dat PE 파일을 인젝션한다.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence2

실행 명령 : C:\WINDOWS\system32\regsvr32.exe /s %LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftOffice365Hub_8wekyb3d8bbwe\Settings\settings.lock

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

“{random}.bat”은 XcLoader와 Xctdoor를 다운로드하며 “p{random}.vbs”는 파워쉘 스크립트 “%PUBLIC%\videos\2.ps1”를 다운로드한다.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching22Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.