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Mallory
Malware

BTR_CLI

Tracked since Aug 6, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

Abuse ( BTR_CLI ): Directly interacts with the Registry to create the service keys ( HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\{Random} ) and calls the undocumented NtLoadDriver syscall.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

Weaponization: Can be used to establish persistence (Run keys, Services) or disable security controls (Tamper Protection, EDR configs).

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

Драјверот може да: брише registry keys и registry values; запишува нови registry values од кој било тип.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence7

Драјверот се инсталира како сервис преку директно запишување во HKLM регистарот , со користење на: Type=1 Start=1 Group="Boot Bus Extender" Овој метод целосно го заобиколува Service Control Manager и не создава запис Windows Event ID 7045 (Service Installed) .

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence4

Вториот режим на активирање ги закажува овие операции за следното рестартирање . Драјверот потоа се извршува во она што Vinopal го нарекува „golden window“

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

Boot Execution (trigger boot): Configures the service with Start=1 (System) and Group Boot Bus Extender to execute during the early boot phase, bypassing active EDR/AV protections.

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

Once loaded, BTR.sys executes operations from Ring 0, allowing it to delete or move files, and modify registry entries.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence7

Драјверот се инсталира како сервис преку директно запишување во HKLM регистарот , со користење на: Type=1 Start=1 Group="Boot Bus Extender" Овој метод целосно го заобиколува Service Control Manager и не создава запис Windows Event ID 7045 (Service Installed) .

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence4

Вториот режим на активирање ги закажува овие операции за следното рестартирање . Драјверот потоа се извршува во она што Vinopal го нарекува „golden window“

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

Boot Execution (trigger boot): Configures the service with Start=1 (System) and Group Boot Bus Extender to execute during the early boot phase, bypassing active EDR/AV protections.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

За експлоатацијата е потребна administrator сметка со SeLoadDriverPrivilege , а BTR_CLI автоматски ја активира оваа привилегија за сметки кои веќе ја поседуваат.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

WDAC / Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist cannot block BTR.sys , because it is a required Windows component, not a third-party or vulnerable driver.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

TTP # T1014 — Rootkit (Defense Evasion)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

It is dropped to disk (with a randomized filename matching [a-z]{8}.sys , e.g., mzqnjtaq.sys ) only when a remediation action requires a reboot... accompanied by the following registry entries... At first glance, several characteristics resembled attacker tradecraft: A randomly named driver dropped shortly before reboot Creation of a transient service entry for loading it

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence6

Anti-forensics : BTR_CLI injecte automatiquement une Action 1 ciblant \SystemRoot\Temp\BootClean.log pour supprimer le log du driver avant déchargement

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

it exposes how a trusted, Microsoft-signed remediation component can become a Living-off-the-Land driver when its undocumented transaction protocol is reproduced.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

In effect, a valid transaction can direct a signed Microsoft driver to perform privileged operations from Ring 0.

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence3

use an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named :changelist for its encrypted configuration

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

Weaponization: Can be used to establish persistence (Run keys, Services) or disable security controls (Tamper Protection, EDR configs).

Defense Impairment

5 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

Драјверот може да: брише registry keys и registry values; запишува нови registry values од кој било тип.

T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence3

Драјверот може да: брише заклучени датотеки и директориуми; преместува датотеки на произволни патеки, вклучувајќи ја и System32\drivers ; ...

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Technique de bypass EDR/AV sans BYOVD : utilise un driver Microsoft signé légitime

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence5

Ова му овозможува на BTR.sys физички да ги отстрани безбедносните бинарни датотеки, како WdFilter.sys и MsMpEng.exe , пред тие да можат да се заштитат од бришење. Во демонстрација во живо ... истражувачите покажале како BTR_CLI го брише целиот Defender stack ... иако била активна Tamper Protection .

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

Service creation & triggering - direct HKLM registry writes ... bypass the SCM, so no Event ID 7045 is generated.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Action 3: Move / Quarantine Structure: [Flags] [Source Path] [Dest Path] Effect: Moves a file. Weaponization: If Dest Path is empty, this acts as a Delete operation. If Dest Path is valid, this allows Arbitrary File Write/Move (e.g., dropping a malicious DLL into System32).

Command and Control

1 technique
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Payload construction - builds the transaction structure ... per-region ~CRC32 checksums, RC4-encrypts the whole blob with the verified key.

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.