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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

Settra

Tracked since Aug 11, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this week#91of 30,236 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days21 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionExfiltrationDefense evasionPersistenceByovd
Platforms
Windows

Settra is a Windows ransomware family and associated data-extortion operation first observed in June 2026. It encrypts victim files and creates ransom notes, combining encryption with threats to disclose stolen corporate information. Observed victims include retail, consumer-services, and manufacturing organizations.

Settra intrusions have involved deployment of the legitimate MeshAgent remote-management tool for persistent access and command execution. The ransomware and its operators impede investigation and restoration by clearing Windows Event Logs, disabling the Windows Recovery Environment, and attempting to remove recovery partitions. One investigated intrusion also used a native Windows utility to overwrite free disk space, hindering recovery of deleted material. A manufacturing intrusion exhibited bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver activity involving a vulnerable Gigabyte driver, although successful impairment of security products was not established.

Settra operators have been linked to exploitation of GlobalProtect authentication-bypass vulnerability CVE-2026-0257 for unauthorized VPN access. Initial access was not established in two separately investigated Windows incidents. Activity tracked as TAG-218 overlaps with Settra operations and has involved GhostFrame, a distinct VMware ESXi post-exploitation framework that provides persistent hypervisor access, virtual-machine control, network pivoting, and credential harvesting. This association does not establish that the Settra encryptor itself runs on ESXi.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-0257via loginsoft researchExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in PAN-OS GlobalProtect Portal and GatewaySpikey Scorpius and Tarnished Scorpius exploited the GlobalProtect authentication bypass, while additional reporting linked exploitation to Settra ransomware. Attackers bypassed MFA, established VPN sessions and staged ransomware deployment. | “public reporting attributed further exploitation to actors using Settra ransomware.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TAG-218

Researchers at Recorded Future’s Insikt Group found the framework while tracking a group named TAG-218, whose activity overlaps with Settra ransomware.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Settra

Multiple groups, including the Qilin and Settra ransomware operations, are actively targeting CVE-2026-0257 to establish unauthorized VPN sessions and gain initial access to internal networks.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ou des identifiants compromis pour l’accès initial »

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ... pour l’accès initial »

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Threat actors used the command cmd.exe /c cipher /w:D:\ >nul 2>&1 to launch the native Windows cipher utility to overwrite free space on multiple file volumes.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ou des identifiants compromis pour l’accès initial »

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ... pour l’accès initial »

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

« L’un des deux incidents présente des indicateurs de technique BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver). »

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ou des identifiants compromis pour l’accès initial »

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

In the July incident, MeshAgent was renamed to mvtcs.exe. In both cases, the ransomware executable was named after the victim's own domain, with '_win64.exe' appended.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The native Windows cipher utility [was used] to overwrite free space on multiple file volumes. This was done to make it more difficult to recover deleted data.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

« les attaquants exploitent des VPN ou des identifiants compromis pour l’accès initial »

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

Le contenu identifie T1562.001 parmi les TTPs observées et décrit la désactivation des options de récupération Windows ainsi qu’une tentative d’effacement du journal Windows Defender.

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence3

« Effacement des journaux d’événements Windows » ; une faute de frappe a empêché l’effacement du journal Windows Defender dans un incident.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

« Déploiement d’outils RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) pour la persistance »

Impact

3 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

They also used the native Windows cipher utility to overwrite free disk space, making file recovery significantly harder.

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3

« Chiffrement des fichiers des victimes »

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

« Désactivation des options de récupération Windows »

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.