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Malware2 associated actors

Antino

Tracked since Aug 13, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this week#86of 30,237 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days20 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs191Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePersistenceExfiltrationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLureFake updateWatering hole
Platforms
Windows

Antino is a Rust-based Windows backdoor used in cyberespionage against government, diplomatic, defense, law-enforcement, academic, policy-research, and civil-society organizations across Asia and the Middle East. It supports both 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. Antino has been deployed by the China-nexus activity cluster UAT-11587 and associated with Jewelbug operations; these activity designations are not established as interchangeable.

Antino supports host reconnaissance, process and directory enumeration, shell and PowerShell command execution, execution of operator-supplied programs, bidirectional file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading, and persistence through a user-level Registry Run key. It abuses the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework to execute PowerShell through legitimate Windows components. Its command-and-control communications use Microsoft Graph to interact with Microsoft 365 services. Observed implementations exchange commands through Outlook and use OneDrive for heartbeats and file transfers; other analyzed samples also receive commands through OneDrive. These cloud-service communications help conceal malicious activity within legitimate enterprise traffic.

Delivery mechanisms include tailored spear-phishing with geopolitical and institutional lures, malicious HTA or WSF stagers, and multistage JScript and .NET downloader chains. Deployment has included DLL sideloading through a legitimate Microsoft-signed executable. Antino is also distributed through fake Adobe and Flash installers. In Falcon/XG-Web operations, injected scripts on compromised government web applications selectively displayed fake Flash update prompts to deliver Antino. It is a separate native Windows implant, not a browser module of that framework.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Jewelbug

“Antino is Jewelbug's Windows backdoor. It was distributed through malicious HTML Application (HTA) downloaders whose file names referenced current geopolitical events, and through executables disguised as Adobe Flash and Adobe installers.”

via symantec blogsed-cms.broadcom.com
UAT-11587

UAT-11587 has deployed a previously undocumented Rust-compiled Windows backdoor known as Antino. The malware provides capabilities including host reconnaissance, command and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode execution, and persistence.

via ncert phncert.gov.ph
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

“The attack chain begins with spear-phishing and decoy documents, using Cloudflare infrastructure for delivery, tracking, and payload staging.”

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence4

"a web hosting provider was compromised to inject JavaScript code into a common webmail installation used by multiple ministries associated with a Middle Eastern government. The watering hole campaign spanned 15 government webmail tenants" | "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection and serve a next-stage payload"

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

The researchers explained that the threat actor obtained write access to the webmail installation used by multiple government ministries and agencies after compromising a shared web-hosting platform operated by the state telecommunications provider and national services agency.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

“The attack chain begins with spear-phishing and decoy documents, using Cloudflare infrastructure for delivery, tracking, and payload staging.”

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence6

“osc-cdn[.]com Spear-phishing sender domain” and multiple Cloudflare Pages URLs deliver themed HTA and WSF lures, including “Institutional_Disciplinary_Action_Report_May_2026.hta” and “Tehran_Bilateral_Summit_Proceedings_May2026.wsf.”

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

“Antino,” a Rust-based Windows backdoor capable of reconnaissance, command execution, file transfer, shellcode loading, and persistence.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Exécution shell (cmd, powershell) via Windows Scripted Diagnostics (sdiagnhost.exe)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

Exécution shell (cmd, powershell) via Windows Scripted Diagnostics (sdiagnhost.exe)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

HTA-hosted Microsoft JScript retrieved encrypted resources, decrypted them using RC4, and executed the decrypted JScript orchestrator in memory.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The actor used unsafe BinaryFormatter deserialization and .NET gadget chains, including System.Windows.Forms.AxHost+State and ActivitySurrogateSelector, to load TestAssembly.dll in memory.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

The phishing link led to download of an HTA file that was executed by mshta.exe.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It also sideloaded the “PDF Viewer” extension into the victim's browser profile, dropped the native-messaging helper, and wrote the registry value that enabled it: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts\com.microsoft.runedge

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistance via clé HKCU Run

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Persistance via clé HKCU Run

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

“Encrypted JScript orchestrator,” “Encrypted BinaryFormatter resource,” and “PE section .cfg Obfuscated JSON configuration section.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

“flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe Fake installer carrying standalone Antino” and “Standalone Antino fake-installer delivery.”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

slc.dll = backdoor Antino [...] flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Antino abuses the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework: sdiageng.dll initializes the PCW package and sdiagnhost.exe executes the attacker-controlled result.ps1 script.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence3

“mshta.exe Legitimate Windows component abused to execute HTA stages.”

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

When use_sleep_mask is enabled, Antino hooks Sleep, encrypts the tracked payload memory during sleep, then decrypts and restores execution after a vectored exception handler handles the access violation.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Chaîne de désérialisation .NET BinaryFormatter (gadget ActivitySurrogateSelector + AxHost+State) pour charger TestAssembly.dll en mémoire

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It also sideloaded the “PDF Viewer” extension into the victim's browser profile, dropped the native-messaging helper, and wrote the registry value that enabled it: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts\com.microsoft.runedge

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

GatherOsState.exe (binaire Microsoft ADK signé)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

"The extension grants the ability to... harvest credentials by hooking login forms, cookies..." and "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection"

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The system_info command collects host and process context.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Reconnaissance système (system_info)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Filesystem operations are handled through the list_files command.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

When use_sleep_mask is enabled, Antino hooks Sleep, encrypts the tracked payload memory during sleep, then decrypts and restores execution after a vectored exception handler handles the access violation.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

"Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control channel..."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

“graph.microsoft.com Legitimate Microsoft Graph endpoint abused for C2” and the use of CloudFront, Cloudflare Pages, and Cloudflare R2 URLs for staged payload delivery.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

C2 exclusivement via Microsoft Graph API (Outlook pour les commandes, OneDrive pour heartbeat et fichiers)

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

“graph.microsoft.com Legitimate Microsoft Graph endpoint abused for C2” and Cloud paths including “/antino/heartbeats/{id}.json,” “/antino_downloads/{file},” and “/antino_uploads/{file}.”

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

Le canal C2 utilise des dead drops : commandes reçues via emails Outlook [...] heartbeats JSON uploadés sur OneDrive

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

Antino communicates exclusively through Microsoft 365, using Microsoft Graph to interact with Outlook and OneDrive as dead-drop C2 channels.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

TestAssembly.dll (.NET downloader) télécharge le bundle DLL sideloading et le document leurre

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Transfert de fichiers (upload_file, download_file) [...] C2 exclusivement via Microsoft Graph API

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

OneDrive pour heartbeat et fichiers

Indicators of compromise

Observables

191 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

36 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Nov 17, 2026Hackers Abuse Microsoft SharePoint and Ably to Hide GraphDoor Backdoor Attacks on Government NetworksRust backdoor that uses Outlook and OneDrive for command and control. Mentioned as a comparison illustrating abuse of trusted Microsoft services, not as a component of the GraphDoor activity.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 17, 2026Hackers Abuse Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub to Hide GraphDoor Backdoor Attacks on Government Networks | Cryptika CybersecurityRust backdoor that uses Outlook and OneDrive for command and control. Mentioned as a comparison illustrating the abuse of trusted Microsoft services, not as part of the GraphDoor operation.Read more ↗cysecurity newsNews · Nov 16, 2026Falcon C2 Malware Turns Web Browsers Into Espionage Tools - CySecurity News - Latest Information Security and Hacking IncidentsRust-based Windows implant associated with the Falcon framework, also called Antin in the text. It uses Microsoft OneDrive and JSON files for command exchange and system-information uploads. Capabilities include shell and PowerShell execution, file transfers, program execution, system reconnaissance, and persistence through a Windows Registry Run key. The article describes delivery to selected users through a fake Adobe Flash Player update prompt during a campaign targeting a police entity.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 16, 2026Hackers Use Falcon C2 to Hijack Government Browsers and Steal Passwords, Emails, and Session Cookies | Cryptika CybersecurityRust-based Windows backdoor delivered through a fake Adobe Flash Player update lure to selected users at a Southeast Asian police entity after attackers harvested usernames from an internal application. The analyzed sample uses Microsoft OneDrive for commands, status updates, and file transfers. It is a separate endpoint implant rather than a Falcon browser module.Read more ↗
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IOC matching191Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.