Antino
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissancePersistenceExfiltrationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLureFake updateWatering hole
- Platforms
- Windows
Antino is a Rust-based Windows backdoor used in cyberespionage against government, diplomatic, defense, law-enforcement, academic, policy-research, and civil-society organizations across Asia and the Middle East. It supports both 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. Antino has been deployed by the China-nexus activity cluster UAT-11587 and associated with Jewelbug operations; these activity designations are not established as interchangeable.
Antino supports host reconnaissance, process and directory enumeration, shell and PowerShell command execution, execution of operator-supplied programs, bidirectional file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading, and persistence through a user-level Registry Run key. It abuses the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework to execute PowerShell through legitimate Windows components. Its command-and-control communications use Microsoft Graph to interact with Microsoft 365 services. Observed implementations exchange commands through Outlook and use OneDrive for heartbeats and file transfers; other analyzed samples also receive commands through OneDrive. These cloud-service communications help conceal malicious activity within legitimate enterprise traffic.
Delivery mechanisms include tailored spear-phishing with geopolitical and institutional lures, malicious HTA or WSF stagers, and multistage JScript and .NET downloader chains. Deployment has included DLL sideloading through a legitimate Microsoft-signed executable. Antino is also distributed through fake Adobe and Flash installers. In Falcon/XG-Web operations, injected scripts on compromised government web applications selectively displayed fake Flash update prompts to deliver Antino. It is a separate native Windows implant, not a browser module of that framework.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“Antino is Jewelbug's Windows backdoor. It was distributed through malicious HTML Application (HTA) downloaders whose file names referenced current geopolitical events, and through executables disguised as Adobe Flash and Adobe installers.”
UAT-11587 has deployed a previously undocumented Rust-compiled Windows backdoor known as Antino. The malware provides capabilities including host reconnaissance, command and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode execution, and persistence.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
“The attack chain begins with spear-phishing and decoy documents, using Cloudflare infrastructure for delivery, tracking, and payload staging.”
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
"a web hosting provider was compromised to inject JavaScript code into a common webmail installation used by multiple ministries associated with a Middle Eastern government. The watering hole campaign spanned 15 government webmail tenants" | "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection and serve a next-stage payload"
The researchers explained that the threat actor obtained write access to the webmail installation used by multiple government ministries and agencies after compromising a shared web-hosting platform operated by the state telecommunications provider and national services agency.
“The attack chain begins with spear-phishing and decoy documents, using Cloudflare infrastructure for delivery, tracking, and payload staging.”
“osc-cdn[.]com Spear-phishing sender domain” and multiple Cloudflare Pages URLs deliver themed HTA and WSF lures, including “Institutional_Disciplinary_Action_Report_May_2026.hta” and “Tehran_Bilateral_Summit_Proceedings_May2026.wsf.”
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
“Antino,” a Rust-based Windows backdoor capable of reconnaissance, command execution, file transfer, shellcode loading, and persistence.
Exécution shell (cmd, powershell) via Windows Scripted Diagnostics (sdiagnhost.exe)
Exécution shell (cmd, powershell) via Windows Scripted Diagnostics (sdiagnhost.exe)
HTA-hosted Microsoft JScript retrieved encrypted resources, decrypted them using RC4, and executed the decrypted JScript orchestrator in memory.
The actor used unsafe BinaryFormatter deserialization and .NET gadget chains, including System.Windows.Forms.AxHost+State and ActivitySurrogateSelector, to load TestAssembly.dll in memory.
The phishing link led to download of an HTA file that was executed by mshta.exe.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
It also sideloaded the “PDF Viewer” extension into the victim's browser profile, dropped the native-messaging helper, and wrote the registry value that enabled it: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts\com.microsoft.runedge
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Persistance via clé HKCU Run
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Persistance via clé HKCU Run
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
“Encrypted JScript orchestrator,” “Encrypted BinaryFormatter resource,” and “PE section .cfg Obfuscated JSON configuration section.”
“flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe Fake installer carrying standalone Antino” and “Standalone Antino fake-installer delivery.”
slc.dll = backdoor Antino [...] flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Antino abuses the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework: sdiageng.dll initializes the PCW package and sdiagnhost.exe executes the attacker-controlled result.ps1 script.
“mshta.exe Legitimate Windows component abused to execute HTA stages.”
When use_sleep_mask is enabled, Antino hooks Sleep, encrypts the tracked payload memory during sleep, then decrypts and restores execution after a vectored exception handler handles the access violation.
Chaîne de désérialisation .NET BinaryFormatter (gadget ActivitySurrogateSelector + AxHost+State) pour charger TestAssembly.dll en mémoire
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
It also sideloaded the “PDF Viewer” extension into the victim's browser profile, dropped the native-messaging helper, and wrote the registry value that enabled it: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Google\Chrome\NativeMessagingHosts\com.microsoft.runedge
GatherOsState.exe (binaire Microsoft ADK signé)
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
"The extension grants the ability to... harvest credentials by hooking login forms, cookies..." and "the malicious code activating on the login page and every mailbox view to exfiltrate cookies over a WebSocket connection"
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The system_info command collects host and process context.
Reconnaissance système (system_info)
Filesystem operations are handled through the list_files command.
When use_sleep_mask is enabled, Antino hooks Sleep, encrypts the tracked payload memory during sleep, then decrypts and restores execution after a vectored exception handler handles the access violation.
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
"Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control channel..."
“graph.microsoft.com Legitimate Microsoft Graph endpoint abused for C2” and the use of CloudFront, Cloudflare Pages, and Cloudflare R2 URLs for staged payload delivery.
C2 exclusivement via Microsoft Graph API (Outlook pour les commandes, OneDrive pour heartbeat et fichiers)
“graph.microsoft.com Legitimate Microsoft Graph endpoint abused for C2” and Cloud paths including “/antino/heartbeats/{id}.json,” “/antino_downloads/{file},” and “/antino_uploads/{file}.”
Le canal C2 utilise des dead drops : commandes reçues via emails Outlook [...] heartbeats JSON uploadés sur OneDrive
Antino communicates exclusively through Microsoft 365, using Microsoft Graph to interact with Outlook and OneDrive as dead-drop C2 channels.
TestAssembly.dll (.NET downloader) télécharge le bundle DLL sideloading et le document leurre
The script collected cookies and identified users through government email addresses. It then displayed a fake update prompt only to selected Windows users in targeted domains.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
Transfert de fichiers (upload_file, download_file) [...] C2 exclusivement via Microsoft Graph API
OneDrive pour heartbeat et fichiers
Observables
191 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
36 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.