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Malware2 associated actors

SHEETCORD

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs30Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

SHEETCORD is a Go-based backdoor associated with the Pakistan-linked espionage actor Transparent Tribe, also tracked as APT36. It appears to be an evolution of PATCHCORD and incorporates related functionality seen across the actor’s newer implant set. The malware has been used in campaigns targeting telecom, government, defense, energy, and other critical infrastructure organizations in South Asia, with especially notable targeting of Afghan telecom entities and Indian government-related organizations.

SHEETCORD uses Google Sheets as a covert command-and-control channel, allowing operators to blend malicious traffic with legitimate cloud-service activity. It supports remote command execution and gathers basic host information from compromised systems. Reported variants execute commands through PowerShell and create per-victim spreadsheet tabs for bidirectional tasking and response handling.

On Windows systems, SHEETCORD establishes persistence through startup-based mechanisms, including Windows startup registration and use of a Visual Basic Script placed for execution at user logon. It also reimplements browser shortcut hijacking techniques previously associated with PATCHCORD, extending this behavior beyond Chrome, Edge, and Firefox to additional Chromium-based browsers such as Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi. This approach allows the malware to launch before the legitimate browser while still opening the expected application to reduce user suspicion.

Observed delivery has involved impersonation infrastructure and themed installer lures, including domains masquerading as Indian government resources. The malware is part of a broader espionage toolchain that includes PATCHCORD, SHEETCREEP, and HACKERAI C2 Agent, reflecting Transparent Tribe’s shift toward Go-based implants and abuse of trusted cloud platforms for command-and-control. Its operational role is consistent with long-term access, covert tasking, and post-compromise control in targeted intrusions.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT36

In cases where it perhaps can't get away with cheap tactics like browser shortcut hijacking, Transparent Tribe can use Sheetcord, a Go-based evolution of Patchcord; and a remote access Trojan (RAT) called "Sheetcreep."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
APT-36

In cases where it perhaps can't get away with cheap tactics like browser shortcut hijacking, Transparent Tribe can use Sheetcord, a Go-based evolution of Patchcord; and a remote access Trojan (RAT) called "Sheetcreep."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

SHEETCORD, a Go-based implant... abusing Google Sheets for C2 communication... HACKERAI C2 Agent... replaces PATCHCORD's custom HTTP server and SHEETCORD's Google Sheets with GitHub Gists, using dedicated upload and download functions for both tasking and data exfiltration.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence4

Its phishing lures have impersonated network and logistics tools used by a large Afghani telecommunications company, a fuel-conservation tool for India's energy sector, an Indian government employee benefits resource, and so on.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The investigation began with the discovery of a suspicious ZIP archive, Telecom_TMS, on VirusTotal in June 2026. The archive contained a malicious Inno Setup installer, TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe, which delivered the PATCHCORD implant.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Its phishing lures have impersonated network and logistics tools used by a large Afghani telecommunications company, a fuel-conservation tool for India's energy sector, an Indian government employee benefits resource, and so on.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

PATCHCORD... support[s] five core capabilities... running arbitrary commands through a hidden shell... SHEETCORD... executes commands through powershell -Command with script block wrapping.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The backdoor implements a remote command execution capability through PowerShell instead of "cmd.exe"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

SHEETCORD also introduces an additional persistence mechanism... drops a VBScript file named SystemHelper.vbs into the Windows Startup folder... The implant generates a temporary VBScript (temp_update.vbs) that rewrites each shortcut... The script is then executed via wscript

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Sheetcord uses the more conventional persistence tactic of registering itself as a Windows startup process

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence3

sets up persistence by hijacking browser shortcuts associated with Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox... packs in PATCHCORD's browser shortcut hijacking mechanism to also target Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Sheetcord uses the more conventional persistence tactic of registering itself as a Windows startup process

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence3

sets up persistence by hijacking browser shortcuts associated with Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox... packs in PATCHCORD's browser shortcut hijacking mechanism to also target Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

including fake VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom (AFTEL) and telecom management tools... The malware has been found to be delivered via a domain impersonating India's National Informatics Center (NIC).

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

fingerprints the host... The backdoor implements a remote command execution capability through PowerShell instead of "cmd.exe," gathers basic host information

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The threat actor has been stealing data from his desktop and looking into his WhatsApp and private data

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Sheetcord uses the more conventional persistence tactic of registering itself as a Windows startup process, and tries to conceal its C2 traffic by sending it through Google Sheets.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

uses Google Sheets for command-and-control (C2) communications... uses the Google Sheets API for C2... uses GitHub Gists for C2

T1102Web ServiceEvidence5

Sheetcord uses the more conventional persistence tactic of registering itself as a Windows startup process, and tries to conceal its C2 traffic by sending it through Google Sheets.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actor has been stealing data from his desktop and looking into his WhatsApp and private data. They're trying to use that data to [design] decoy Excel files, or something like it, to phish some more employees.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The earliest activity traces back to December 2025 with appstoore[.]duckdns[.]org, a dynamic DNS domain, followed by the registration of appstoore[.]solutions in late January 2026.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching30Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.